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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the linkages between water supply and economic inequalities within 
smallholder irrigation schemes, with particular focus on Tanzania, as a key example of a 
developing, agrarian economy in sub-Saharan Africa. In developing countries, income 
inequalities are critical for poverty reduction as they determine how economic growth is 
distributed and, thus, to which extent the poor benefit relative to everyone else. On a global 
scale, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, poverty is most prevalent in rural areas where 
agriculture is the main source of livelihoods. Irrigation development is recognised as a key 
strategy for rural poverty reduction, although a growing body of literature questions its 
implications for equity and social justice. While this topic is addressed from various perspectives 
in the literature, there is a gap among empirical studies. Specifically, the linkages between 
irrigation water supply and economic inequalities at small scales have received limited attention.  
To research this need, this thesis carries out quantitative, qualitative and policy investigations on 
two smallholder irrigation schemes in southern Tanzania. The data originates from structured 
household surveys, semi-structured interviews with key informants, direct infrastructure 
observations, maps of the irrigation schemes and documentary sources. The thesis is organised as 
follows: First, inequality analyses using the Gini coefficient and the Theil index are used to 
calculate the level and decomposition of income inequalities within six smallholder irrigation 
schemes in sub-Saharan Africa. Next, qualitative investigations uncover irrigators’ perspectives 
about the association between water supply and economic inequalities within the two Tanzanian 
schemes. Third, multiple regression analyses evaluate the relative impact of water supply and 
farm location (as well as other variables) on irrigated crop income and production within 
smallholder irrigation schemes. Finally, an investigation of Tanzania’s water and irrigation 
institutional framework highlights current policy shortfalls and possible strategies targeting 
greater equity of irrigation water supply.    
This thesis’ findings show that high levels of income inequality exist within agricultural 
communities in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique, and that such disparities are not properly 
considered by development polices based upon national statistics. In particular, within 
smallholder irrigation schemes, inequities in water supply affect economic inequalities in 
iv 
multiple ways, some of which – for example erosion of human capital and social stratification − 
are not adequately noted in previous literature. Household characteristics and farm location are 
also shown to be important for irrigated crop incomes and yields. While typically regarded as a 
good water management practice, the transfer of responsibilities to the local level is shown in 
this study to be problematic for traditional irrigators. Instead, in the pursuit of greater equity of 
water supply, participatory process should be considered based on six key equity aspects: 
quantity; reliability; obligations; benefits/externalities; decision-making; and land rights. 
Overall, this thesis contributes the international development and inequality literature by 
providing a deeper understanding of: a) the effect of irrigation water supply on economic 
inequalities; and b) which water policies might be changed to reduce water supply inequities 
within traditional irrigation systems. These findings are important to respond to rural poverty in 
Africa, as it is at the local scale that poverty, growth and inequality interventions can be most 
effective. Importantly, because a large part of the world’s rural population seeks pathways out of 
poverty, it is critical to ensure that income-enhancing strategies, such as irrigation, do not result 
in aggravated economic disparities and a barrier to sustainable human development.  
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Chapter 1 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Problem statement 
In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council formally 
recognised water to be a fundamental human right (UN 2010 p. 22). Yet, some 800 million 
people still remain without adequate access to safe drinking water and many more do not have 
access to irrigation water. Rather than physical water scarcity, Pérez-Foguet and Giné Garriga 
(2011) argue that the root of the water crisis is one of management, which needs to be addressed 
through a multi-disciplinary approach.  
Within the context of irrigation, two well-recognised goals are the efficient utilisation and 
equitable distribution of water resources. A frequent problem in open-channel systems, is the 
heterogeneity in water distribution, whereby irrigators located closer to the intake tend to 
withdraw disproportionately more water and more frequently than those located further 
downstream (Ostrom & Gardner 1993). Such imbalances are particularly acute within traditional, 
low-technology schemes - common in developing areas - where technical and governance 
limitations impede adequate control and monitoring of water deliveries. Such disparities in water 
access play a critical role in determining how the benefits of irrigation may be distributed 
amongst the members of a society – whether irrigation reinforces pre-existing inequalities or, 
conversely, it has a positive impact for the poor (Turner et al. 2004). Pointedly, it has been 
argued that ‘inequitable water distribution in large surface irrigation system is one of the major 
factors contributing to income inequality’ (Bhattarai et al. 2002 p. 19).  
Income inequality is a major obstacle hindering the potential for poverty reduction at global, 
regional and country scales. Despite decades of sustained growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
over half of the population still live in poverty amid some of the world’s highest levels of wealth 
and income inequality (Cogneau et al. 2007). While the drivers of economic inequality are 
numerous and complex, access to natural resources plays a crucial role in rural areas, where 
agriculture is typically the main source of livelihoods (Sampath 1988). Irrigation is recognised as 
an effective strategy for rural welfare and development, yet a growing body of literature raises 
fundamental questions regarding its implication for equity and social justice (Giordano & de 
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Fraiture 2014; Gorantiwar & Smout 2005; Van Den Berg & Ruben 2006). As noted by Lipton et 
al. (2003 p. 414), ‘the poor are not an homogenous group’ and thus, irrigation may have a 
different impacts among them. Kanbur (2005 p. 229) points out that, while common analyses 
focus on the rich-poor gap, poverty reduction polices can ‘pit some poor against other poor’ as a 
result of aggravated disparities among them.  
Most studies on irrigation water supply and economic inequalities are at a large scale (e.g. 
regions or countries), and there is a gap in empirical work at the local (micro) scales, partially 
driven by shortfalls in the data (Ravallion 2001). This PhD research was linked to a broader 
research project addressing agricultural productivity and livelihood strategies within six 
smallholder irrigation schemes in SSA (see Section 2.2 for details). The broad questions asked in 
this PhD research are: 
− How large are economic inequalities amongst smallholder irrigators? What drives 
such disparities? And how do they compare to national statistics?   
− Are economic inequalities within smallholder irrigation schemes aggravated by 
disparities in irrigation water distribution? If so, would better water management 
mitigate the economic gap?  
 Theoretical framework 
1.2.1 Poverty-growth-inequality triangle  
According to the latest comprehensive data on global poverty, 767 million people (11 percent of 
the global population) lived in extreme poverty1 in 2013, down from 1.85 billion (35 percent) in 
1990 (The World Bank 2017). Although poverty rates declined across all regions, the progress 
was uneven and mainly driven by East Asia − notably China and Indonesia − and South Asia− 
namely India. In SSA, poverty rates dropped from 56 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2012, but, 
because of high population growth, the number of extreme poor remained practically unchanged 
(UN 2013b). Examining within-country poverty and development, it becomes evident that rural 
                                                 
1 Extreme poverty is defined as average daily consumption of USD 1.90 (Purchasing Power Parity) or less and 
means living on the edge of subsistence (The World Bank 2015). 
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areas are, typically, the most disadvantaged (UN 2014a) and those living exclusively off 
agriculture tend to be the poorest among the rural populations (Senadza 2011).  
The association between poverty, growth and inequality (PGI) is a longstanding area of study in 
the economic literature, namely since the 1950s. In the aftermath of World War II, rebuilding the 
international economic systems and stability was a top priority. Thus, fuelling economic growth 
was a primary focus, both in developed and developing countries. At that time, inequality was 
largely seen as a secondary concern and efforts to reduce it were regarded as an obstacle for 
growth (Ravallion 2014). Kuznets (1955) theorised that economic growth and inequality follow 
an inverted-U shape relationship, whereby short-term inequality may rise with growth, but 
trickle-down effects will narrow the gap in the long-term. Initial evidence of rising inequalities in 
developing countries provided support for further theoretical argumentations (Ahluwalia et al. 
1979; Robinson 1976) reinforcing Kuznets’ hypothesis. Cross-country empirical analyses 
(Ahluwalia 1976; Srinivasan 1977) also seemed to verify the inverted U-shape growth-inequality 
pattern. Notwithstanding, such results were undermined by the short time-span of the data 
available (less than a decade). Hence, the observed associations were mainly driven by growth-
inequality differences between countries, rather than within-country changes overtime. Early 
observations of PGI associations (Adelman & Morris 1973) also raised concerns about the 
increase in relative and absolute poverty levels; the lack of evidence of trickle-down effects; and 
the importance of relationships among income-groups as a determinant of income distribution. 
Ram (1988) argued that the internationally-observed inverted-U relationship was due to 
structural differences between developed and developing countries and that such pattern was not 
replicated in sub-samples of developing countries only.  
As more data became available in the 1990s, further empirical studies emerged analysing the 
PGI nexus across countries and over time. Two important determinants of how much the poor 
benefited from economic development were: a) initial inequality levels; and b) changes in 
inequality during growth spells (Bourguignon 2004). 
Ravallion (1997) found that, at any positive rate of growth, the higher the initial inequality, the 
lower the rate at which income-poverty falls. Moreover, at very high inequality rates, it is 
possible for growth to result in rising poverty levels. This contrasts with the affirmation made by 
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Dollar and Kraay (2002) claiming that, on average, growth benefits the poor just as much as 
everyone else, particularly under polices favouring private property rights, macroeconomic 
stability and openness to trade. Aghion and Williamson (1998 p. 33) argue that macroeconomic 
volatility and taxation polices play critical roles in the poverty-growth-inequality relationship ant 
that ‘overall, inequality actually proves bad for growth in several circumstances’. Similarly, 
studies on land asset inequality (Deininger & Olinto 1999; Deininger & Squire 1998) found that 
initial inequality is negativity associated with long-term growth and that inequality reduces 
income growth for the poor − but not for the rich. Other mechanisms whereby inequality impacts 
poverty and growth are: access to credit and education; (un)employment; demand for consumer 
goods; socio-political instability; investment; and migration. (Alesina 1996). 
Using the same data from 60 countries as previously employed by Ahluwalia (1976), Anand and 
Kanbur (1993) found that the shape of growth-inequality relationship − flat, U or inverted U − 
very much depended on the statistical methods employed (e.g. logarithmic vs linear regression). 
Ravallion (2001) examined 117 time spells in developing countries and found that, during 
growth periods, inequality rises as often as it falls. While poverty is reduced in both cases, the 
decline rate is seven times greater when inequality diminishes. In an analysis of 130 countries 
over 25 years, Ferreira and Ravallion (2008) conclude that, globally, there is a clear negative 
association between levels of inequality and development. Furthermore, the study found no 
robust evidence that such inequality levels fall with economic growth. Simulation studies by 
Groll and Lambert (2013), found no evidence that income distribution changes could be 
inequality-increasing and pro-poor at the same time. The term pro-poor is given several 
definitions and measurements in the literature (Kakwani & Pernia 2000; Ravallion & Chen 2003; 
Son 2004), with a common understanding that pro-poor growth is such that it benefits the poor to 
a greater extent than the rest of the population. Using a dataset sampling 130 countries between 
1980 and 2010, Ravallion (2014) reveals that current inequality levels in the developing world 
are lower than 30 years ago − albeit a steady increase since 2005. The main driver behind such 
trend is the drop in between-country disparities, whilst within-country inequalities have been 
slowly rising. This study of new data also ratifies previous findings from the 1990s on the 
negative impact of inequality on growth and poverty elasticity. 
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In comparative analyses of PGI across developing regions, Fosu (2009, 2017) found that the 
responsiveness of poverty to changes in growth and inequality was much lower in SSA than in 
non-SSA areas (except for Latin America and the Caribbean). In addition to uncovering 
particularities at regional level, the studies highlight the need for policymakers to look beyond 
average and take into consideration country-specific drivers of PGI. In Tanzania, between 1983 
and 1991, major agricultural reforms brought higher producer prices and greater incomes for 
some farmers who, then, were able to escape poverty. However, less advanced farmers were left 
behind, resulting in a 40 percent increase in income inequality. According to Ferreira (1996), if 
income distribution had not changed during this period, with the same growth level, poverty 
reduction would have been much greater, i.e. equal to 39 percent, instead of the actual 14 
percent. More recently, a study analysing the 2000-2007 growth spell in Tanzania concluded that 
greater poverty reduction could have been achieved if the absolute increases in real income had 
been more evenly spread (Atkinson & Lugo 2010). Similarly, between 1995 and 2002 in 
Mozambique, income levels in rural areas experienced growth as a result of higher food prices. 
Consequentiality, 60 percent of rural households - who were net grain buyers - were affected by 
their declining purchasing power and eroded welfare levels (Boughton et al. 2006).  
While the literature on PGI is predominantly based at the macroeconomic level, there is a need to 
understand growth and distributional change at the micro scale (Ravallion 2001). Indeed, 
averages reflected in national accounts fail to capture heterogeneities across different populations 
groups – some if which may become worse off during growth spells, even if poverty falls on 
average.  At the micro level, the ability of poor people to benefit from a growing economy may 
be affected by a number factors, including physical and human capital, location, social exclusion 
and exposure to risk (Ibid.). In SSA in particular, barriers to participation in non-agricultural 
activities may limit income-earning opportunities for the poor (McCullough 2017). However, 
inequities within groups of agricultural and non-agricultural households tend to be largest driver 
of total inequality, rather than disparities between both groups (Cogneau et al. 2007). A recent 
study in Malawi (Takane & Gono 2017) found that off-farm incomes can be a driver of 
inequality among agricultural households, yet the level of impact and its direction (inequality 
increasing or reducing) vary considerable across locations and time. Hence, the authors conclude 
that context-specific interventions would be more appropriate, rather than policies following a 
nationwide perception.    
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The importance of inequality for growth and poverty reduction is formally recognised by the UN 
as part of its Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015). Within this framework, goal 10 aims to 
‘reduce inequality within and among countries’ through a set of specific targets. The first target 
is to achieve income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population at a higher rate than the 
national average. Pointedly, the third target is to ‘Ensure equal opportunity and reduce 
inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and 
promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard’. This is particularly relevant 
for the scope of this thesis because the key research questions revolve around the impact of water 
on inequality of irrigation outcomes, and the opportunities for reducing disparities through 
adequate water management policies.   
1.2.2 The importance of irrigation water for poverty, growth and inequality 
Linkages between poverty, growth and inequality, commonly observed at macroeconomic level, 
and also be found at regional and local levels (Jayne et al. 2003; Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2012). As 
noted by Calderón and Servén (2014), provision public infrastructure typically raises aggregate 
growth, but can also impact income distribution depending on how different members of the 
local communities gain access to such services.  
In rural areas, especially where people’s welfare and potential for growth depend on to their 
access to water, water management can be one key strategy for addressing multiple dimensions 
of poverty and pursuing inclusive growth (Peña 2011). Consequentially, the Tanzanian Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006) highlights the link between 
water access and inclusive growth by noting that inequitable water allocation and ill-defined 
water rights pose a major obstacle to poverty reduction. 
Typically, farmers relying on rainfed agriculture tend to be poorer than those able to irrigate, 
mainly due to high seasonal variability of yields and lower market prices of crops on rainfed 
farming systems (Hussain & Hanjra 2004). Given strong environmental impacts, such as floods 
and droughts, dryland farmers lacking weather-mitigating strategies, tend to suffer crop and 
incomes losses, thus potentially pushing them further down into poverty (Silva 2013). In a 
review of over 120 Asian and African irrigation schemes, Hussain and Hanjra (2003) find strong 
linkages between irrigation development, agricultural growth and poverty reduction. Arguably, 
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access to adequate irrigation water can alleviate poverty through five key dimensions: crop 
production, income/consumption, employment, vulnerability/food security, and other social and 
financial factors. These factors are aligned with the key capitals (natural, physical, human, 
cultural/social, economic/financial, political and/or built) that form the bases of several 
community development and resource management frameworks: Sustainable Livelihoods 
(Scoones 1998), Capitals and Capabilities (Bebbington 1999) and Community Capitals (Emery 
& Flora 2006; Gutierrez-Montes et al. 2009). 
Within the context of irrigation in poor, rural areas, a large body of literature (Hussain & Hanjra 
2003; Maskey et al. 1994; Ostrom & Gardner 1993; Senaratna Sellamuttu et al. 2014) identifies 
significant differences in water access between head and tail-ends within gravity-fed systems. 
Typically, farms located closer to the system’s intake are able to withdraw larger volumes of 
water with greater reliability compared to those further downstream, thus commonly resulting in 
underperformance of tail-enders. Disparities in water distribution within low-technology 
schemes are rooted in a series of complex factors at various levels of management, i.e. national, 
regional and local. Among others, these may include: ambiguity in the definition of roles and 
responsibilities of multiple water-governing institutions; limited ability (or willingness) of 
irrigators to conform to scheme norms (e.g. obeying water-sharing rules and doing maintenance); 
impeded infrastructure operability due to insufficient level of maintenance and repairs; and lack 
of objective data to plan and monitor water deliveries.  
Drawing from investigations in India and Pakistan, Bhattarai et al. (2002) theorise that 
inequitable water distribution in surface irrigation systems is one of the major factors 
contributing to income inequality. Based on observations in India and Mexico, Bardhan and 
Dayton-Johnson (2007) argue that location advantages and disadvantages between head and tail-
end of a canal system can impact long-run wealth disparities through capitalisation into different 
land values. Similarly, Williams and Carrico (2017) note that, in Sri Lanka, social inequalities 
are known to relate to locations along the canal, with more powerful farmers often occupying 
land closest to the water source. Furthermore, Conceição et al. (2016) consider that, in fast-
growing sub-Saharan Africa, equitable water distribution is critical to ensure that greater 
irrigation productivity translates into higher income and food security for the poor. Distribution 
of irrigation water is, in fact, at the root of social cohesion and stability within traditional 
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systems, as it is a major determinant of collective action (cooperation and conflict) among 
irrigators (Bardhan 2000; Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 2007; Dayton-Johnson 2000b; Makombe 
& Sampath 2003; Ostrom et al. 1999).  
1.2.3 Defining equity of water distribution 
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of equity and equality of water distribution, 
their measurement and definition remain ambiguous. After conducting an extensive review of the 
concept of water equity, Wegerich (2007 p. 1) argues that ‘what remains questionable is, what 
exactly is equity as regards water management and who defines this and how is it implemented 
in practice’. Similarly, Kolberg (2012) notes there is still no standard methodology to measure 
water-related inequality in irrigation water management. 
A common consideration in the context of resource allocation is the distinction between 
‘egalitarianism’ and ‘proportionality’ (Bournaris et al. 2014; Syme et al. 1999). Egalitarianism 
suggests that everyone should be treated alike and, therefore, resources ought to be distributed 
equally regardless of individual circumstances. Conversely, proportionality mirrors the concept 
of ‘equity’, whereby individuals’ needs and demands are taken into account and thus, resources 
are allocated in a ‘just’ or ‘fair’ manner. Typically, irrigation water-sharing rules are based on 
proportionality of water requirements; hence the use of water equity as the preferred term in the 
literature, as opposed to water equality. For consistency in this thesis, the term water equity is 
used when referring to water supply and distribution, unless otherwise specified. 
A number of approaches to measure heterogeneities in irrigation water have been proposed, 
mostly applying methods from wealth economics, e.g. Gini coefficient (Cullis & van Koppen 
2007); Theil Index (Anwar & Ul Haq 2013); Atkinson index (Kolberg 2012); coefficient of 
variation (Lal Kalu et al. 1995; Molden & Gates 1990); and interquartile ratio (Bird 1991; 
Steiner & Walter 1992). Several authors have attempted to review and synthesise the numerous 
measures of water equity and equality, with Gorantiwar and Smout (2005) providing one of the 
most compressive examinations of heterogeneity measurement in irrigation schemes .  
Common rules include irrigation time proportional to landholding size (Anwar & Ul Haq 2013) 
or equality of water depth (Bird 1991; Lal Kalu et al. 1995), which is equivalent to volume 
proportional to area. Despite aiming for social justice, proportionality can be an imperfect and 
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impractical way to allocate irrigation water resources. For example, water allocation on a time-
basis may result in uneven supply due to seepage losses along distributary canals, which reduces 
available flows at the tail-end (Sharma & Oad 1990). In large-scale, complex schemes, the 
fairness of water allocation may be difficult to assess because of ineffective communication 
between operators and many users (Bournaris et al. 2014). Furthermore, proportional distribution 
necessarily entails higher costs of record-keeping, monitoring and negotiation (Dayton-Johnson 
2000a). In a study of land and water rights in Nepal, van Etten et al. (2002) reason that water 
allocation proportional to land may actually be detrimental to the poor. Although poor 
households could theoretically sell their water rights, they tend to have small plots that provide 
only small water allocations. In turn, such small entitlements are too little to generate significant 
income when sold.    
Another common distinction in welfare systems is ‘vertical’ vs. ‘horizontal’ equity (Bournaris et 
al. 2014; Maskey et al. 1994; Wegerich 2007). Vertical equity refers to the distribution of 
resources amongst individuals with different needs (e.g. different water users or farm categories), 
whereas horizontal equity is a measure of treatment for those with equal needs (e.g. distribution 
among smallholder farms). 
In many developing countries, such as Tanzania, the most common form of irrigation is 
traditional, smallholder schemes, water supplies are very rarely quantified, given a widespread 
lack of adequate technical, financial and human resources (van Koppen et al. 2004). In absence 
of quantitative, objective data, previous studies have used a variety of proxy measures (see 
Section 4.2), including irrigators’ own perceptions (Starkloff 2001; Tisdell 2003). Building on 
evidence from rural Mozambique, Ducrot and Bourblanc (2017) note that water supply programs 
should take into consideration the varying perceptions of water equity among community 
members. Moreover, the authors propose that equity should be evaluated across three distinct 
dimensions: distributional equity (spatial coverage), procedural equity (participation) and 
contextual equity (structural and relational mechanisms). Similarly, Lipton et al. (2003) conclude 
that there are many complex factors impacting irrigation water distribution and thus, equity 
should be considered through the lenses of disparities in water quantities, timing, access to 
inputs, decision-making institutions and negative externalities.  
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 Research gaps 
When investigating the specific linkages between irrigation water supply and economic 
inequalities, the key points of originality of this thesis that contribute to filling existing literature 
gaps are: i) the local scale (smallholder communities) and area (sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania 
in particular); ii) the combination of the quantitative and qualitative methods in assessing 
(in)equity of water supply; and iii) the conceptualisation of a new analytical framework for the 
analysis of equity of irrigation water supply. 
Vertical water equity – among users of different kinds - has been the object of several previous 
studies at the scale of large geographical regions or river basis. For example, the Punjab area in 
India (Anwar & Ul Haq 2013); the Olifants River Water Management Area in South Africa 
(Cullis & van Koppen 2007); and the Rufiji River Basin in Tanzania and its Greater Ruaha sub-
catchment (Kadigi et al. 2005; Kashaigili et al. 2009; van Koppen et al. 2007). Conversely, 
horizontal water supply disparities within traditional, smallholder systems remain largely 
understudied (Saldias et al. 2013). Importantly, Dayton-Johnson (1999) note that resource 
inequality polices should focus on small-scale systems to maximise the positive impacts of 
public interventions on rural development. More broadly, Peña (2011) analyses equity from an 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 2 perspective, thus concluding that the causes, 
dynamics and consequences of water management and social equity should be addressed in the 
local context, as this is where possible solutions should be grounded. In fact, national or 
international, overarching institutions only have limited ability to enforce water equity at the 
local level, as only the systems’ insiders can determine whether a situation is equitable or not 
(Wegerich 2007). Most of the literature at local scales (smallholder schemes) originates from 
India, Pakistan and Nepal (Anwar & Ul Haq 2013; Bhattarai et al. 2002; Maskey et al. 1994; 
Mollinga 2003; Ostrom & Benjamin 1993; Sharma et al. 2008). Conversely, fewer studies 
investigate the impact of irrigation on economic inequality in SSA, for example, Kimmage 
(1991) in Niger, Makombe and Sampath (1998) in Zimbabwe and Van Den Berg and Ruben 
                                                 
2 IWRM is defined as a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems (Abdullaev et al. 2009) 
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(2006) in Ethiopia. Much of the focus in these studies is on the heterogeneities between dryland 
and irrigation farmers, but not disparities within irrigation schemes. This thesis focuses on 
disparities among irrigators in small-irrigation schemes. 
The water-economic inequality debate is strongly dominated by the effects of landholding 
(Bardhan 2000; Dayton-Johnson 2000b; van Etten et al. 2002) and crop yields (Maskey et al. 
1994; Ostrom 1993) on agricultural incomes. The common approach in these studies consists of 
first, quantifying disparities (water, yields land, income, etc.); and second, drawing quantitative 
associations among the various inequality measures. This method has two major limitations. 
First, it ignores the fact that in the vast majority of traditional irrigation schemes in developing 
areas, there is an absolute lack of quantitative measures of water deliveries and that, ‘for decades 
to come’ costly flow metering will remain largely absent (van Koppen et al. 2004 p. 13). 
Therefore, without the input of external expertise and technology, quantifying inequality based 
on traditional metrics (e.g. volumes and Gini coefficients) remains beyond the capabilities of 
smallholder irrigators and, thus, has a very narrow applicability at the grassroots levels across the 
developing world. This thesis addresses such a gap by questioning the water-economic inequality 
nexus employing a qualitative approach, directly derived from irrigators’ personal perspectives 
(see Chapter 4 for further literature review and research rationale). 
Equity (and equality) of irrigation water supply is a common theme in the agriculture and 
international development literature, but it lacks a consistent framework of analysis. While 
Common Pool Resources (CPRs) (Ostrom 1990) and the Water Poverty Index (WPI) (Sullivan 
2002) are well-recognised frameworks across the literature (see Chapter 6 for details), there is no 
such equivalent in terms of the equity of irrigation water supply. Thus, based on a thorough 
review of past studies and insights from the author’s own fieldwork, this PhD conceptualises a 
framework that allows for the analysis of six key factors in terms of the equity of irrigation water 
supply. In a practical application, this PhD evaluates Tanzania’s current water and irrigation 
polices to highlight shortfalls and then, based in the research finding, highlight possible policy 
options. 
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 Project background 
This thesis was affiliated to a larger research project entitled ‘Increasing irrigation water 
productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe through on-farm monitoring, adaptive 
management and agricultural innovation platforms’ (ACIAR 2013). The project encompasses a 
number of African and Australian research initiations, including the Australian National 
University (ANU) and the University of South Australia (UniSA). Hence, this thesis has been 
developed under the Memorandum of Understating between ANU and UniSA that allows for the 
delivery of joint PhD degrees in fields where both institutions have common strategic goals.  
The project was funded by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
(ACIAR) and focused on six smallholder irrigation schemes: Mkoba and Silalatshani in 
Zimbabwe; Kiwere and Magozi in Tanzania; and 25 de Setembro and Khanimambo in 
Mozambique (Figure 1-1).  
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Figure 1-1 Locations of the six irrigation schemes. 
 
Source: Mwamakamba et al. (2017) 
The broad aim of the ACIAR study was to investigate ways to increase agricultural water 
productivity and food security through the development of Agricultural Innovation Platforms 
(AIPs) – a communication system between multiple agricultural stakeholders. Through 
participatory processes across the six irrigation schemes, van Rooyen et al. (2017) identified 32 
major challenges. The most common topic was water, with 11 issues referring to water 
availability, reliability, governance, fees or supply infrastructure. Other key problems referred to 
farm inputs (9), human capacity (7) and markets (5). 
Out of the three countries, this PhD focuses on Tanzania for because of the interest of the 
country’s recent water policy reforms and the suitability of the two schemes (Kiwere and 
Magozi) for the specific purpose of researching water and economic disparities. Preliminary 
observations in the Tanzanian schemes (Mdemu & Mziray 2014) found remarkable socio-
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economic differences among the irrigation schemes (Figure 1-2). For example, focus groups 
discussion in Kiwere pointed out that only a few families (around five percent of the irrigation 
community) were perceived as being ‘rich’, as they owned brick houses, big farms, farming 
machinery and/or their own business. By contrast, it was understood that over half of the 
community members were ‘poor’, i.e. food insecure, landless, living in mud-built home and/or 
unable to send their children to school.  
Figure 1-2 High and low quality houses in Kiwere, Tanzania  
 
Source: Mdemu and Mziray (2014) 
During field observations and discussions with irrigators, inequities in water supply across the 
scheme were noted. Some irrigators in Magozi commented that uncertainty of supply made it 
very difficult for them to adequately plan their farming activities. Moreover, it was pointed out 
that, while some areas (typically head-end of the scheme) have better water provision (volumes 
and timing), all irrigators pay the same fees – proportional to irrigated area, but irrespective of 
adequacy of supply.  
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Figure 1-3 Rice fields in Magozi: flooded (left), adequately irrigated (centre) and water-
scarce (right)  
 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork in 2015 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide further information on the ACIAR project goals, the rationale for area 
selection, and the economic and agricultural situation in each country. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
provide detailed background information on water and irrigation in Tanzania. 
 Research objectives 
The main research objective of this thesis is to understand how inequities in irrigation water 
supply are associated with economic inequalities within smallholder irrigation schemes. To 
answer this broad question, the analysis is subdivided into four distinct parts, whose main 
objectives are to: 
1. Estimate the level of economic inequality within six SSA smallholder irrigation schemes 
and its decomposition by types of economic activity. 
2. Identify the key linkages perceived by smallholder irrigators between water supply and 
economic inequalities. 
3. Evaluate the relative impact of water supply (holding all other influences constant) on 
irrigated crop income and production within smallholder irrigation schemes. 
4. Understand the shortfalls of Tanzania’s water and irrigation polices in terms of equity of 
supply and propose policy options to be considered by local actors. 
Water supply and economic inequalities can be defined in multiple different ways (see Sections 
1.2.3 and 3.5). Chapter 3 focuses on household income inequality and its decomposition. In 
Chapter 4, the definition of economic inequalities from water remains purposely broad with the 
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aim to stimulate interviewees’ answers from their own personal and unrestricted viewpoint. In 
Chapter 4, the focus is on water supply inequality, while in Chapter 5, ‘adequacy of water 
supply’ is used as a proxy for actual water supply. Farm locations within the irrigation schemes 
are also used to investigate differences in water supply. In the absence of flow metering or other 
systematic records within the irrigation schemes, this thesis focuses strongly on irrigators’ 
perception as a way to evaluate water supply. Thus, a mixed-method approach – combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods – is used to better understand causes, consequences and 
possible changes related to equity of irrigation water supply. 
A primary assumption made in this thesis is that smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania, like 
in many other agricultural areas of the developing world, have a significant potential to improve 
the management of water resources, including reducing water supply inequities. Furthermore, the 
assumption made is that water distribution improvements may contribute to mitigating economic 
inequalities, given the recognised association between water access and welfare. The second key 
underlying assumption is that the connection between water and economic inequalities is 
complex and many possible linking mechanisms exist beyond the well-known studied impacts of 
farm incomes and yields. Third, it is assumed that, irrigators themselves play a critical role in 
defining, monitoring and enforcing equitable water supply at the local level, although adequate 
regional and national policies are may be important for successful governance of smallholder 
irrigation schemes. 
 Thesis structure: contents, key results and limitations 
This thesis examines the linkages between water supply and economic inequalities from different 
perspectives following the four key research objectives. The structure consists of four analytical 
chapters, as well as Introduction, Background and data, and Conclusions. Each analytical chapter 
is an independent essay, yet the questions of analysis and the results are articulated in a cohesive 
manner, thus contributing to the overarching goal of the thesis. A summary of the objectives and 
rationale for research of each chapter is presented in Table 1-1.
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Table 1-1 Thesis structure and theoretical framework for different chapters 
Chapter  Research questions Rationale for research 
1 What are the objectives of this thesis?  
2 What are the background and data used in this thesis?  
3 What are the levels of economic inequality within 
smallholder irrigation schemes and how do they compare to 
national averages? How do different economic activities 
contribute to total inequality?  
Using the PGI framework in developing countries (Fosu 2009); Fosu (2017), and building on 
the literature calling for i) micro-empirical work on PGI (Ravallion 2001) and ii) context-specific 
analysis of the drivers of income inequality (Takane & Gono 2017) , Chapter 2: 
 Estimates income inequality (Gini coefficient) within six smallholder irrigation schemes 
in SSA and compares it to national statistics; 
 Decomposes income inequality by economic activity sector (between/within group Theil 
index decomposition); and 
 Decomposes income inequality by source (Gini decomposition) and carries out marginal 
effects analysis. 
4 What are irrigators’ perceptions on water equity within their 
schemes? Is there a perceived linkage between water 
(in)equity and economic inequality?  
Departing from the framework for the analysis of irrigation water management in heterogeneous 
irrigation schemes (Giordano & de Fraiture 2014; Gorantiwar & Smout 2005; Van Den Berg & 
Ruben 2006), and responding to the need to consider irrigators’ perceptions on water equity (Tisdell 
2003), Chapter 3: 
 Explores possible linking mechanisms between water equity and economic inequalities 
within two smallholder irrigation schemes; and 
 Evaluates differences in various measures of crop production across population sub-
groups determined by their level of water supply satisfaction 
5 What is the effect of irrigation water on crop yields and 
irrigated crop incomes, while holding other variables 
constant?  
Using frameworks of community development and resource management (Bebbington 1999; 
Emery & Flora 2006; Gutierrez-Montes et al. 2009; Scoones 1998) and based on the hypothesis that 
heterogeneities in water supply between head and tail-enders cause of differences in crop 
production and irrigated crop income (Hussain 2005; Ostrom 1993), this chapter: 
 Evaluates the relative impact of human, social, financial, natural, physical, and farm 
management factors on irrigated crop incomes and yields. 
 Identifies those influences that are most susceptible to change and that could provide the 
greatest benefits for the community. 
 Tests the relative impact of farm location (and other water variables) on yields and 
incomes, whilst holding all other variables constant 
6 What are the multiple dimensions s of water equity within 
the specific context of irrigation? How do water and 
irrigation polices in Tanzania address the goal of water 
equity at the local level?  
Over the last decades, Tanzania – as many other SSA countries - has decentralised authority to 
manage water and irrigation, from the national to the regional and local levels (van Koppen et al. 
2004). Although Irrigators Organisations have the responsibility to ensure equity of irrigation water 
supply, this goal remains unfulfilled in Kiwere and Magozi, as two examples of Tanzanian 
smallholder schemes (Mwamakamba et al. 2017). The causes are complex and varied (technical, 
social, institutional, etc.) and thus, need to be better understood to be able to discuss relevant policy 
options.    
7 What are the key conclusions of this thesis?  
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Chapter 2 provides an explanation of the data used in this thesis, including a description of the 
information used, its sources and the collection methods. This thesis is linked to a larger research 
project entitled ‘Increasing irrigation water productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe through on-farm monitoring, adaptive management and agricultural innovation 
platforms’, funded through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
(ACIAR 2013). Through this overarching project, the first set of data were obtained, consisting 
of quantitative answers to a household survey conducted in 2014 across six smallholder 
irrigation schemes. The second source of data is the author’s fieldwork carried out in the Kiwere 
and Magozi schemes in Tanzania, between May and August 2015. The information collected by 
the author includes quantitative and qualitative data from the schemes, as well as policy 
documentation at the local and regional scales.  
Chapter 3 provides an insight into income inequalities at the level of smallholder irrigation 
schemes in SSA. The motivation for this research is that, although economic inequalities are 
understood to hinder the potential for poverty reduction, there is very little understating of 
inequalities at the small-scale, mainly due to lack of data. Thus, Chapter 3 first estimates the 
levels of income inequality (Gini coefficient) within six smallholder irrigation schemes and 
compares them to national statistics. Second, a statistical analysis and Theil Index decomposition 
evaluate the differences between and within household groups defined by economic activity 
(agricultural or diversified). Third, a Gini decomposition and marginal effect analysis by four 
income sources identify which are the sources that most contribute to total inequality and which 
have an equalising/unequalising effect. To summarise, Chapter 3 highlights the importance of 
understating income inequalities at small scales, which may actually exceed and be overlooked 
by aggregate national statistics. Furthermore, Chapter 3 argues that policies targeting economic 
inequalities within smallholder agricultural communities should not be generalised. Based on the 
six schemes of study, possible interventions could consider income diversification as well as 
increase of income from sources having an equalising effect, such as agriculture. 
Chapter 4 investigates the linkages between economic inequality and heterogeneities in irrigation 
water supply in the Tanzanian Kiwere and Magozi schemes. The contribution of this chapter lies 
in the use of qualitative methods, such as open-ended questions, to provide irrigators with the 
opportunity to freely express their opinions and perceptions. The results first identify the main 
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reasons that, according to interviewees, cause inequity of water supply within their schemes, i.e. 
water scarcity, weak governance and poor understanding of rules. Second, Chapter 4 unveils a 
number of complex mechanisms whereby irrigators believe a more equitable water supply could 
help mitigate economic inequalities. Interestingly, these qualitative investigations reveal new 
linkages, such as social stratification and erosion of human capital. Third, statistical analyses 
evaluate whether the linkages identified through subjective interpretations are, in fact, reflected 
in various quantitative measures of crop production. The results suggest that irrigators who are 
dissatisfied with their water supply underperform in several ways (yields, land failure and 
financial losses), yet the yield gap analysis tends to indicate that they hold the greatest growth 
potential if their water supply was improved. 
In Chapter 5, two multiple regression models (based on the Tanzanian schemes) are built to test 
the hypotheses that adequacy of water supply (and proximity to the system’s intake) are 
positively associated with irrigation incomes and crop yields. Drawing from the literature and 
fieldwork, a list of independent variables are included in the general (theoretical) models. 
Chapter 5 concludes by discussing if, and why, the hypotheses are confirmed by the models and 
what other key factors should be considered by water and irrigation management policies. While 
‘water satisfaction’ is shown to be statistically significant for only yields, physical location 
appears to be influential for yields and income.  
Chapter 6 analyses Tanzania’s water and irrigation institutional setting and its policies in matters 
of equity of water supply. Upon review of existing literature and findings from the fieldwork, a 
framework is provided to analyse the equity of irrigation water supply. This framework is used to 
highlight the current policy shortfalls in Tanzania and facilitate the discussion of possible options 
aimed at greater equity of irrigation water supply. Chapter 6 concludes that the overlap and 
ambiguity in the responsibilities among various national, regional and local institutions is one of 
the key areas that deserve further attention. A key finding is that, while Irrigators Organisations 
(IOs) are relatively young governance bodies, they hold a great potential to develop in ways that 
support more equitable water supply – a highly desirable goal by most irrigators.   
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Chapter 2 Data sources, descriptions and limitations  
 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data used in this thesis, provides details on the collection processes, 
the information obtained and also limitations. The two main sources of data are: 1) the 2014 
baseline survey carried out by local researchers in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique and 2) 
the 2015 fieldwork carried out by the author in Tanzania.  
 Research framework: ACIAR project 
This PhD thesis is affiliated to a larger research project entitled ‘Increasing irrigation water 
productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe through on-farm monitoring, adaptive 
management and agricultural innovation platforms’ (ACIAR 2013). The project was funded with 
AUD 3.3 million from the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) 
over four years, from June 2013 to June 2017. The author received very significant support from 
the ACIAR Africa project including finance, guidance, logistical assistance and access to data. A 
second stage of the project was approved in July 2017. 
The broad aim of the ACIAR Africa project was to investigate ways to increase agricultural 
water productivity and food security through the development of Agricultural Innovation 
Platforms (AIPs). The AIP is a relatively new participatory communication system between 
farmers and their multiple stakeholders along the agricultural value chain. The specific 
objectives of the ACIAR project were to: 
1. Develop, test and deploy innovative water and solute monitoring systems to stimulate 
farmer learning toward greater water productivity. 
2. Evaluate whether agricultural innovation platforms, based on existing community 
organisations can identify and overcome institutional and market barriers to greater water 
productivity. 
3. Identify and communicate economic and policy incentive mechanisms for greater water 
productivity. 
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Research carried out as part of the ACIAR Africa project research has led to the following 
publications: Bjornlund and Pittock (2017); Bjornlund et al. (2017a); de Sousa et al. (2017); 
Manero (2017); Mdemu et al. (2017); Moyo et al. (2017); Mwamakamba et al. (2017); Pittock et 
al. (2017); Stirzaker et al. (2017); van Rooyen et al. (2017); Wheeler et al. (2017). 
2.2.1 Selection of study areas  
The countries of study in the ACIAR project were selected following a scoping exercise across 
Southern and Eastern Africa. The review was conducted by the ANU and Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) based in Australia, together with a 
series African research and government organisations (Pittock et al. 2013). Initially, nine African 
nations were considered where Australia has longstanding engagements (Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The candidate 
countries were evaluated based on their existing ties with Australia, their potential to increase 
food production, favourable policies and institutions, stable governance structures and regional 
research networks (Rhodes et al. 2014). Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique were prioritised 
for the potential to tackle poverty and food insecurity through stronger growth in irrigated 
agricultural production.  
2.2.2 The six irrigation schemes 
Following the scoping exercise, two irrigation schemes were chosen in each of the three 
countries of study (Table 2-1). The scheme section was made by local research partner 
organisations based on their institutional capacity, ability to improve agricultural practices, 
accessibility and the interest of local agencies in collaboration. Further detail on the economic 
and agricultural characteristics of the irrigation schemes is provided in Chapter 3.  
Table 2-1 Characteristics of the irrigation schemes and surveys undertaken 
Country District and Area Irrigation scheme Main crops 
Zimbabwe 
Gweru Rural - Natural Region V Mkoba Maize, vegetables 
Insiza – Natural Region IV Silalatshani Maize, wheat, vegetables 
Tanzania 
Iringa - Southern Highlands Kiwere Vegetables, maize 
Iringa - Southern Highlands Magozi Rice 
Mozambique 
Boane – Maputo Province 25 de Setembro Vegetables 
Magude –Maputo Province Khanimambo Vegetables 
Source: Rhodes et al. (2014) 
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The Mkoba and Silalatshani schemes, in Zimbabwe, are located in a semi-arid region in the 
southern part of the country (Figure 2-1). Arid and semi-arid areas of Zimbabwe account for 80 
percent of the total area and are characterised by erratic rainfall. Within these areas, irrigation 
provides an important opportunity to increase agricultural production, compared to dryland 
(FAO 2016). Ninety percent of the area irrigated by settlers and smallholders is under surface 
irrigation, with water being drawn from rivers, storage reservoirs or deep boreholes (Coche 
1998). This is consistent with the Mkoba and Silalatshani schemes, which are fed from storage 
dams and irrigate using surface methods.   
Figure 2-1 Map of irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Moyo et al. (2017) 
The two Tanzanian schemes, Kiwere and Magozi, are located in the Southern Highlands area, 
within the Iringa region (Figure 2-2). Farming is the main economic activity in Iringa, employing 
almost 80 percent of its population and making it one of the five largest food-producing regions 
of the country (Swai 2005). The Kiwere and Magozi schemes are supplied from the Little Ruaha 
River. Water is then distributed through a network of open channels, some of which are concrete 
or stone lined. This type of schemes is very common in mainland Tanzania, where almost all 
irrigation water comes from surface sources and smallholder systems typically consist of lined 
and unlined gravity-fed canals (FAO 2016). 
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Figure 2-2 Map of irrigation schemes in Tanzania 
 
Source: Mdemu et al. (2017) 
The 25 de Setembro and Khanimambo schemes in Mozambique schemes are located within the 
Maputo province. The Southern region − which Maputo province belongs to − is one of the 
country’s most important agricultural areas and holds two-thirds of all the land equipped for 
irrigation (FAO 2016). This area has a semi-arid climate and receives most of its rainfall 
concentrated over hurricane and cyclone events during the wet season (McSweeney et al. 2010). 
Given the unreliability of rainfall for dryland farming, irrigation development through small, 
communal schemes is one the key strategies to increase agricultural productivity and food 
security (República de Moçambique 2010). A national survey on irrigated agriculture (Marques 
2006) identified that 62 percent of all irrigation schemes in Mozambique were under 50 ha. 
These small schemes are mostly operated by farmers individually or organised in an association 
(FAO 2016). As in the 25 de Setembro and Khanimambo schemes, in Mozambique’s traditional 
irrigation schemes, water is typically abstracted from surface sources by diesel pumps manged 
by the irrigators and distributed across the fields through gravity-fed methods. These differ from 
both the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian schemes as running the pumps imposes significant 
extraction costs on irrigators.  
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Figure 2-3 Map of irrigation schemes in Mozambique 
 
Source: República de Moçambique (2014) 
 Baseline survey 2014 
The baseline survey for the overall ACIAR study was conducted between May and July 2014 in 
each of the six irrigation schemes. The areas under irrigation were subdivided into plots, each of 
which is cultivated by one family, with some families cultivating more than one farm plot. Given 
the association between farm plot and household − not farm and individual − the data collection 
process was designed using households as the basic unit.  
The populations of study were defined according to the Irrigators’ Organisations (IOs) member 
registry. This means that irrigators who are not registered members of their respective IOs were 
excluded from the study. Studying the entire irrigation communities was not possible because 
there is no comprehensive list of all irrigators, thus impeding adequate probability sampling. 
Conversely, IOs keep up-to-date lists of all their members, which served as the basis of the 
sampling. Sampling methods varied depending on the size of the population of each irrigation 
scheme. In the three smallest schemes − Mkoba (Zimbabwe), 25 de Setembro and Khanimambo 
(Mozambique) − the aim was to interview the whole population, yet some irrigators asked to be 
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excused and others were absent. In the three largest schemes - Silalatshani (Zimbabwe), Kiwere 
and Magozi (Tanzania) - the population was sampled using a stratified approach. Households 
were categorised according to gender of the household head and wealth category (poor, medium 
and well-resourced) and then randomly sampled (Moyo et al. 2014). A summary of the 
population and samples is provided in Table 2-2. 
The 2014 survey consisted of 65 structured questions relative to the 12-month period prior to the 
interviews, regarding the family structure, farm characteristics, agricultural practices, revenues 
and expenses, among other topics. Most of the questions of the baseline survey followed a close-
ended format, including numerical values (e.g. age, incomes), multiple choice (e.g. crops grown, 
assets owned) and Likert scales (e.g. agreement with a certain statement). A copy of the baseline 
survey questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. Each participating household was identified 
with a unique respondent code that would be used to match its records to further information 
collected during subsequent surveys. 
The 2014 surveys were conducted by trained enumerators and the data recorded in paper-copies 
of the questionnaires. Upon completion of the surveys, each country team coded their data into a 
SPSS database. Subsequently, for this thesis, the country data was imported by the author from 
SPSS into Stata 13®, which was used to conduct the data review and clean-up process. Data 
from the six schemes was combined into one dataset, which facilitated cross-scheme and cross-
country analyses. Many observations were identified with unusual values regarding family 
characteristics, farm sizes, incomes and expenses, among other variables. These could potentially 
be due to errors during the data collection and/or coding processes. Hence, a list of observations 
was sent to be verified by the respective in-country teams. In most cases, the local researchers 
were able to correct erroneous entries (e.g. wrong decimal points, typos, blanks coded as zeros, 
etc.). In some other cases, the unusual values remained and were dealt with at later stages this 
thesis (see chapters 3 and 5).   
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Table 2-2 Population and sample characteristics of the six irrigation schemes from the 2014 
baseline survey 
 Zimbabwe Tanzania Mozambique 
 Mkoba Silalatshani Kiwere Magozi 25 de Setembro Khanimambo 
Total area (ha) 10 110 189 939 38 16 
Number of registered households 75 212 199 578 38 27 
Surveyed households in 2014 68 100 100 100 25 9 
Average household landholding (ha) 0.13 0.52 0.95 1.62 1.00 0.59 
 Tanzania fieldwork in 2015 
The author’s PhD fieldwork was carried out in Tanzania between May and August 2015. Due to 
funding and time constraints, investigations were limited to one of the three countries of the 
overarching project. After evaluating various options, Tanzania was selected because of ertain 
key advantages. First, Tanzania provides a valuable case study to examine irrigation water 
distribution, given that this is a strategic target of national water and irrigation management 
policies. Second, the potential for investigating spatial inequalities would have been limited in 
the Zimbabwean and Mozambican schemes given their small sizes. Third, the homogeneity in 
rice cultivation in the Magozi scheme in Tanzania greatly facilitates the study of yield variations 
– something that would be much more complex when considering a wide variety of crops, as 
occurs in the other schemes. 
2.4.1 Fieldwork survey 
The aim of the 2015 survey was to re-interview the same population sample as in 2014 in order 
to collect further information on water supply and economic inequalities. Human Ethics approval 
for the author’s fieldwork was granted by the ANU’s Chair of the Humanities & Social Sciences, 
on 11 November 2014. 
The 2015 questionnaire included open and close-ended, as well as quantitative and qualitative, 
questions. Most of the questions were common for Kiwere and Magozi, while a few were 
tailored to the specific situation of each scheme. The interviews were designed to take 
approximately 45 minutes, hence limiting the number of questions to around 40 (44 in Kiwere 
and 36 in Magozi). A copy of the questionnaires is provided in Appendix A. Interviews were 
conducted with the aid of an interpreter who translated from English to Swahili and vice-versa. 
During the interviews, answers were recorded both on questionnaire print-outs and on an 
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electronic database (Excel) using a tablet PC. With the consent of participants, interviews were 
audio-recorded. On average, five interviews were conducted each day, taking about one hour 
each, including presentations and greetings.  
The list of questions was divided into four main sections. First, details on the interviewees were 
collected, such as name and location of irrigation plots. The name of the household 
representatives were checked against their respondent codes in order to associate the 2015 
information to the 2014 baseline survey data. Also, names were verified against the land title 
registry to join the survey answers to spatial data (see Section 2.4.3 for details).  
The second part of the questionnaire focussed on water supply and distribution. As further 
described in Section 4.2, it is uncommon for traditional irrigation systems to record water 
deliveries using mechanical flow-meters because of high costs and technical difficulties. Keeping 
this in mind, the initial plan was to obtain manual records on scheduling, timing of supply, 
operation of distribution gates, etc. During the first meeting with the local leaders of the IOs, it 
became clear that no such manual records existed. Therefore, without the objective data, a proxy 
measure was defined based on irrigators’ perception of water supply and distribution. This was 
done by repeating questions 51 and 52 from the 2014 baseline survey on irrigators’ level of water 
supply satisfaction and perception of equitable water distribution. The validity of using 
perceptions as a proxy for water supply is discussed in Chapter 4, on the basis of previous 
literature (Chambers 1988; Starkloff 2001). In the survey developed for this thesis, other 
water-related questions were included such as timing of water deliveries, quality of the irrigation 
infrastructure and the linkages between water supply and crop production.  
In the last section of the questionnaire, the main objective was to explore the influences affecting 
socio-economic inequalities, with a particular focus on water distribution. Previous studies 
indicate disparities in crop yields and landholding as the two key mechanisms linking water 
supply and economic inequalities (Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 2002; Bhattarai et al. 2002). In 
order to expand on such findings, open-ended questions were used to enable irrigators to freely 
express their own concerns.  
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2.4.2 Infrastructure observations 
In each of the Tanzanian schemes, three days were dedicated to walk through and inspect the 
irrigation infrastructure to observe its functional condition and operation. A hand-held GPS 
device was used to take geo-coded pictures of all the irrigation structures and the canals at 
regular intervals (approximately every 50-100 m). Subsequently, pictures were imported into 
Google Earth and, subsequently, their location was exported into ArcMap 10.3.1. (Appendix B). 
The type of infrastructure and levels of functionality and maintenance were noted for each canal 
and structure observations (Appendix B). There were two canal types: earthen and stone/concrete 
lined. Structures included gates, flow diversion structures and bridges. Based on their 
functionality, canal reaches were classified as ‘functional’ or ‘defective’ (adapted from 
Vermillion et al. (2000)). ‘Functional’ canal reaches were those in relatively good state and able 
to convey most of the desired flow with low water losses. Conversely, canal reaches were 
considered ‘defective’ if they presented significant issues interfering with the desired hydraulic 
operation, e.g. enlargement of the cross-section, collapse of the banks/side slopes, cracks to the 
lining or seepage. Following the methodology employed by Dayton-Johnson (1999), canal 
maintenance levels were rated by the author on direct observation as ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’, 
based on the degree of cleaning (sediment built-up, presence of rocks, vegetation growth within 
the canal), grubbing (clearing of vegetation around the canals) and control of water filtration.  
Similarly, structures were deemed ‘functional’ if they were able to perform their basic design 
function (Vermillion et al. 2000 p. 18) or ‘defective’ if they presented significant damage to the 
civil works (bridges) or inability to control flow as intended (gates and diversion structures). 
Structure maintenance was rated ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ depending on the degree of repairs, 
weed growth, siltation, etc.   
2.4.3 Spatial data 
During the 2014 dry season (June-November), a team of researchers for Ardhi University (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania) conducted geospatial surveys of the Magozi and Kiwere schemes. Geo-
referenced information was then used to produce detailed maps depicting irrigation canals and 
farm boundaries (see Appendix C). Each farm plot was coded with an identification number and 
its size calculated using spatial analysis tools. Subsequently, the owner was identified and his/her 
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name matched to the corresponding plot identification numbers. In this way, the Tanzanian 
researchers built a comprehensive cadastre that provided information on custodial ownership, 
size and specific location of all plots in the Kiwere and Magozi schemes.   
Paper copies of the maps and land registries were used during personal interviews to facilitate 
discussion on water distribution and farm location. Also, digital maps were used to carry out 
spatial analyses with ArcMap 10.3.1 software (see Chapter 5 for details).  
2.4.4 Policy investigations 
Prior to commencement of the PhD fieldwork, a desktop review of Tanzania’s water and 
irrigation policies was conducted, including the National Water Policy (2002), Water Sector 
Development Strategy (2006), Water Resources Management Act (2009) and National Irrigation 
Act (2013). While in Tanzania, in-depth interviews were conducted with a six government 
officials in the regional capital, Iringa, to get a better understanding of the policy aspects of 
irrigation water distribution. The two main irrigation water management government bodies with 
regional presence in Iringa are the Rufiji Basin Water Office and the Iringa District Council (see 
Chapter 6 for details). The interviews were conducted following the ‘general interview guide’ 
approach, as outlined by (Daniel 2010). This consisted of semi-structured questions, yet with a 
high degree of flexibility allowing the interviewer to adapt the questions based on the 
participants’ responses. 
 Key data advantages 
The data available for research in this thesis has several advantages that make them valuable for 
the study of water supply and economic inequalities. First, the data were collected at the 
household level across six smallholder irrigation schemes in SSA, which provides the 
opportunity to study inequalities at the local scale. As explained in Chapter 1, this contributes to 
filling the current literature gap at the micro level.  
Second, data from open-ended questions provides insights into irrigators’ perspectives on an 
issue that is associated with a number of other human and social factors. Thus, qualitative data 
collected during this thesis is a major strength of this research adding to the exiting literature on 
quantitative measures of inequality. 
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Third, data from various kinds and sources help to build a holistic, multi-disciplinary 
understating of water and economic inequalities. In particular, qualitative, numeric and spatial 
household data allow to conduct various types of analyses, and then, to compare and contrast the 
findings. Moreover, detailed infrastructure observations and policy information give an 
important perspective on technical and institutional issues – two critical constrains affecting 
water and irrigation management within traditional systems across the developing world.    
 Data gaps 
The data used in this thesis have significant gaps due to two main reasons. First, the 2015 PhD 
survey did not to re-interview the entire population sample from the ACIAR baseline survey, 
resulting in a reduced number of observations. This was because a number of household 
representatives who participated in the 2014 survey could not be contacted or were away from 
the village at the time of the 2015 fieldwork. While other members belonging to the same 
household were searched for, in most cases, they were also not available. Thus, out of the 200 
households interviewed in 2014, only 128 could be re-interviewed in 2015 (70 in Kiwere and 58 
in Magozi). The loss of participants overtime can result in attrition bias, when drop-out 
individuals have unique characteristics associated with the variables of study (Hausman & Wise 
1979). Non-parametric tests of statistical significance (Wilcoxon rank-sum and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov) were applied to detect differences between “drop-out” and “retained” households 
(Miller & Hollist 2007). The tests showed no statically significant difference between both 
groups in relation to the variables of this study, such as household income, crop income, crop 
yields and water supply satisfaction, among others. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
irrigators re-interviewed in 2015 (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) are a random subset of all 
observations and not a subset with systematic differences that can be explained by other 
observed variables (Bhaskaran & Smeeth 2014).  
To compensate for the loss of participants, additional interviews were conducted with 28 
irrigators who had not been previously surveyed. These were selected following the same 
stratified random sampling approach based in the 2014 ACIAR survey. The data from these 
additional interviews was used in the study of irrigators’ perceptions (Chapter 4), but their 
application for regression analyses (Chapter 5) was limited because of the missing 2014 data.  
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The second data gap results from the difficulty in identifying plot owners and their location 
within the scheme. In most cases, matching survey and land registry data was straightforward as 
the household head was typically the landowner of the plots. However, in some instances, 
interviewees were unaware of the rightful landowner of the plots they cultivated. It also occurred 
that they were mistaken about the owner’s official name, as the name they indicated did not 
appear in the land registry. As a result, from an initial sample of 200 households, only 126 could 
have their plot location identified (see Table 2-3). 
Table 2-3 Population sample sizes by year and data available 
Scheme 
Interviewed 
in 2014 
Interviewed in 2015 
Interviewed in 
2014 and plot 
location identified 
Interviewed in 
2014, 2015 and 
plot location 
identified 
Total 
Re-interviewed 
from 2014 
sample 
Only 
interviewed 
in 2015 
Kiwere 100 80 70 10 69 58 
Magozi 100 76 58 18 57 50 
Total 200 156 128 28 126 108 
 Summary 
This chapter describes the sources, content and limitation of the data used in this thesis. This 
PhD thesis is affiliated with an overarching research project in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Mozambique funded by the Australian Government’s ACIAR agency. Drawing from the 
project’s support, the two main sources of data are: 
1. 2014 Baseline survey conducted by African research partners as part of the ACIAR 
project. The data originates from a 65-question household survey carried out in May-July 
2014 across six irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique. 
2. 2015 Fieldwork data carried out by the author in Kiwere and Magozi schemes in 
Tanzania in May-August 2015. The information collected comprised: 1) detailed 
household face-to-face answers from two household surveys with around 40 questions 
each; 2) technical infrastructure observations; 3) spatial data (maps and land title 
registry); and 4) answers to in-depth interviews with government officials on water 
policy. 
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The data have two key limitations. First, there were no empirical, objective measures of water 
supply as IOs keep no record of water scheduling or infrastructure operations. Second, out of 200 
participants in the 2014 survey, 62 were unavailable in 2015 and thus, only 128 were 
re interviewed. In addition, not all of the 2015 interviewees were able to identify the landowner’s 
name in the title registry, which meant their answers could not be matched to spatial data. As a 
result of these data limitations, certain approaches to data analysis were not possible.  
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Chapter 3 Income inequality within smallholder irrigation schemes in 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique 
 Chapter objectives 
This chapter analyses income inequality within the six irrigation schemes that are part of this 
PhD research. While national inequality statistics are readily available for Zimbabwe, Tanzania 
and Mozambique, broad-based figures are not necessarily representative of the situation at 
smaller scales, calling for a closer analysis at the micro (local) level (Ravallion 2001). The aim 
of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the levels and composition of economic 
inequalities within the Mkoba, Silalatshani, Kiwere, Magozi, 25 de Setembro and Khanimambo 
irrigation schemes. The findings of this chapter will serve as the basis for the rest of the thesis to 
investigate economic inequalities in further detail. 
 Introduction 
It is estimated that 1.2 billion people across the world live in extreme poverty (UN 2013b). 
Alongside with growth, mitigating socio-economic inequalities is widely recognised as a key 
component of effective poverty reduction strategies (Groll & Lambert 2013; Kabubo-Mariara et 
al. 2012). As Bourguignon (2004) explains, these links are captured in the poverty-inequality-
growth triangle given that: 
Poverty reduction in a given country and at a given time is fully determined by the rate of 
growth of the mean income of the population and the changes in the distribution of 
income (p. 2).  
Without adequate redistribution interventions, rapid development can lead to excessive economic 
inequalities, often resulting in severe issues such as persistent poverty (Ravallion 1997), violent 
crime (Hsieh & Pugh 1993), corruption (Khagram 2005), political instability (Alesina 1996), 
worsened health (Kawachi & Kennedy 1997) and low education levels (De Gregorio & Lee 
2002). 
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The poverty-inequality-growth triangle is especially crucial in rural areas, home to 70 percent of 
the developing world’s extremely poor (Ferreira 1996; Ortiz & Cummins 2011; Watkins 2013). 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in particular, suffers from deep and persistent poverty and inequality, 
which undermines the gains from technological advances, including agriculture (Go et al. 2007). 
Most of the existing inequality literature is based on national or regional investigations (typically 
derived from governmental census), yet fewer studies exist at the level of villages or rural 
communities, where more detailed data collection is required (Silva 2013). As explained by 
(Ravallion 2001): 
Crosscountry correlations are clouded in data problems, and undoubtedly hide welfare 
impacts; they can be deceptive for development policy. There is a need for deeper micro 
empirical work on growth and distributional change. Only then will we have a firm basis 
for identifying the specific policies and programs that are needed to complement growth-
oriented policies (p. 1807). 
The analyses in this chapter are structured into three sections. First, income inequalities (Gini 
indices) are calculated at the local level (farming communities) and then compared to national 
figures. Second, a decomposition analysis is carried out by households’ economic activity 
(agricultural or diversified) to assess the relative importance of the between and within-group 
components. Finally, a decomposition analysis by income source (agriculture, wages, business 
and self-employment and other) determines the relative contribution of each source to total 
inequality and identifies which sources have an ‘equalising’ or ‘unequalising’ effect.  
 Growth, poverty and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa 
Between 1995 and 2012, SSA experienced an average annual GDP growth of 4.5 percent, 
accompanied by a 13 percent drop in the poverty headcount ratio (The World Bank 2017). 
Nevertheless, the sub-continent is still home to 30 percent of the word’s extreme poor and 
undernourished population. After Latin America and the Caribbean, SSA is the second most 
income-unequal subcontinent, although with no clear trend over the last three decades (Ravallion 
2014). Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana are the most unequal SSA countries, with Gini 
coefficients above 0.63, while Niger and Ethiopia have the lowest disparities, with Gini 
coefficients below 0.35 (CIA 2014).   
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Zimbabwe ranks among the ten most unequal SSA countries, with a Gini coefficient of 0.50 in 
2006 (CIA 2014). Such economic disparities are partly derived from its agrarian socio-economic 
situation, still reflecting the legacy of the colonial era, the civil war and the reforms of the late 
20th century. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, Zimbabweans’ livelihoods deteriorated 
significantly, as a result of repetitive droughts and issues associated with its land reform (Kinsey 
2010; Mazingi & Kamidza 2011). The national poverty headcount ratio is 72 percent, while in 
rural areas it is 84 percent (ZIMSTAT 2013). Zimbabwe’s Human Development Index (HDI) for 
2012 was 0.397—in the low human development category—ranking 172 out of 187 countries 
and territories (UNDP 2013). 
Tanzania is one of the four most income equal countries in SSA, with a Gini coefficient of 0.38 
in 2007 (CIA 2014). Its economy is largely dependent on rural activities, with agriculture, 
hunting and forestry accounting for 27 percent of GDP, only second to the service sector (48 
percent) (The United Republic of Tanzania 2013b). During the 1980s and early 1990s, Tanzania 
experienced significant economic growth, which brought poverty reduction, but also an increase 
in economic inequality (The World Bank 2011). Over the first decade of the 2000s, the average 
annual GDP grew by seven percent and the national HDI was lifted from 163rd to 151st position, 
on a world rank of 189 countries (UNDP 2011). The poverty headcount ratio across mainland 
Tanzania is 34 percent, whereas in rural areas it is 38 percent (The United Republic of Tanzania 
2009a).  
In Mozambique, income inequality is relatively high, with a 0.46 Gini index, above the SSA 
median of 0.43 (CIA 2014). Between 1995 and 2003, agriculture was the second largest 
contributor to GDP growth (1.7 percent out of 8.6 percent) and the main driver of poverty 
reduction. Over this period, agriculture experienced an average annual growth of 5.2 percent, yet 
this mainly represented a recovery after the 1977-1992 war, rather than productivity gains from 
innovation and investment (Virtanen & Ehrenpreis 2007). In 2008/09, the national poverty 
headcount ratio was 55 percent, with rural areas still being more affected (57 percent) than urban 
centres (50 percent) (Arndt et al. 2010). Worldwide, Mozambique is the tenth least developed 
nation, with a HDI of 0.393 in 2013 (UN 2014b). 
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 Data  
The data used in this chapter originate from the 2014 baseline survey, as described in Chapter 2. 
The analysis covers the six irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique that are 
part of the overarching ACIAR Africa project. An irrigation scheme can be defined as an area 
where crops are grown under irrigation (The United Republic of Tanzania 2013a). However, the 
idea of a ‘scheme’ often goes beyond physical and hydraulic infrastructure, to encompass social 
structure, such as rights, rules and procedures (Saldias et al. 2013). In this chapter, the term 
irrigation scheme is used to refer to the agricultural community whose members cultivate land 
within the same irrigated area, sharing the same water source and supply infrastructure. 
The six schemes in this study range in size from 10 to 939 hectares, each of them having 
between 27 and 578 registered member households (Table 3-1). The average family landholding 
varies from 0.1 to 1.6 ha, in-line with average smallholder landholding at the respective national 
levels: 0.12 ha in Zimbabwe (FAO 2006), 0.9 ha in Tanzania (FAO 2015b) and 1.4 ha in 
Mozambique (FAO 2007). While there is not one consistent definition of smallholder farms, the 
most common approach it to classify them as those with less than two hectares of cropland 
(Hazell et al. 2007). Other usual smallholder characteristics include low-technology, reliance on 
household members for most of the labour and dependence on the farm as a principal source of 
family income (Nagayets 2005). All of these defining characteristics of smallholder farms are 
applicable to the six irrigation schemes examined in this chapter.   
Table 3-1 Characteristics of the irrigation schemes and surveys undertaken 
Country  
Irrigation 
scheme 
Total area 
(ha) 
Number of irrigating 
households 
Average household 
landholding (ha) 
Surveyed 
households 
Zimbabwe 
Mkoba 10 75 0.13 68 
Silalatshani 110 212 0.52 100 
Tanzania 
Kiwere 189 199 0.95 100 
Magozi 939 578 1.62 100 
Mozambique 
25 de Setembro  38 38 1.00 25 
Khanimambo 16 27 0.59 9 
Source: Rhodes et al. (2014) 
Data used in this chapter include household revenues and expenditure over the 12-month period 
prior to the interview. Monetary figures were collected in each country’s local currency, i.e. US 
dollars (USD) in Zimbabwe, Tanzanian shillings (TZS) in Tanzania and Metical (MZN) in 
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Mozambique. In this chapter, these figures are not converted into a common unit (e.g. USD) 
because the purpose of the analyses is to examine income inequalities within irrigation schemes 
and not between them. Income comparison across countries would require careful consideration 
of macroeconomic factors such as currency fluctuations, inflation, cost of living, consumer price 
indices, etc. (Ravallion 2001), which are outside of the scope of this thesis.     
Information on the households’ financial accounts were collected according to the source of 
revenue and type of expenditure (question 65, Appendix A), which were later aggregated into 
on-farm and off-farm categories (Table 3-2). Following the data check carried out during the 
review process (see Chapter 2), a subsequent investigation was conducted to detect possible 
abnormal values. Using summary statistics, calculation of extreme values and graphical tools, a 
number of observations were highlighted with income or expenditure figures that seemed 
inconsistent with the rest of the sample. Abnormal observations could be due to errors or to the 
household’s particular characteristics. For example, unusually high expenses in crop inputs could 
be due to the household cultivating a very large area. After a detailed data review and 
consultation with in-country research staff, only one extreme value remained unexplained 
(income from irrigated crops for household mgz073 in Magozi, Tanzania). The influence of this 
observation was checked through a sensitivity test where levels and decomposition of income 
inequality in Magozi were computed with and without household mgz073. The results differed 
substantially, chiefly regarding the contribution of agricultural income to total inequality and its 
marginal effect. Given the unexplained nature of such high income value and its disproportionate 
impact on the analyses results, observation mgz073 was dropped from the population sample.      
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Table 3-2 Revenue and Expenditure categories used in household survey 
 Revenue Expenditure 
On-farm Rainfed crops Crop inputs 
Irrigated crops Harvesting/transport 
Livestock sales Livestock inputs 
Milk sales Hired labour 
Other Irrigation 
 Other 
Off-farm Agricultural labour Food 
Non-agricultural labour Education 
Regular employment Health 
Business/self-employment Social events 
Remittances Housing 
Seasonal work Personal transport 
Other  
 Analytical framework 
Economic inequality can be defined in many ways, but it is typically considered to be the uneven 
distribution of wealth, income and/or assets among individuals of a group, or between groups of 
individuals (McKay 2002). The preferred indicators of poverty and living standards tend to be 
money-metric, i.e. income or consumption expenditure (Sahn & Stifel 2003). Alternative non-
monetary measures exist, such as asset ownership (Filmer & Pritchett 2001; McKenzie 2005) 
and the Multidimensional Poverty Index, which combines education, health and living standards 
indicators (Alkire & Santos 2011; Kovacevic & Calderon 2014). In this chapter, monetary 
indicators were used to compare local and national inequalities and to investigate how various 
income sources contribute to total inequality. Out of a wide range of inequality measures, the 
section below presents a summary of the two selected indicators: Gini coefficient and Theil 
index. 
3.5.1 Gini coefficient  
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of wealth within a group 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, with its values ranging from 0 to 1 (The World Bank 
2011). Its advantages include it being commonly used and relatively easy to calculate; having a 
visual representation and allowing comparison between different size populations.  
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The Gini coefficient can be estimated based on the representation of the Lorenz curve, plotting 
cumulative income vs. cumulative population. It can also be mathematically calculated as 
follows: 
𝐺 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))
2
?̅?
      (3.1) 
where Cov is the covariance between income levels y and the cumulative distribution of the same 
income F(y) and ȳ is average income.  
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) developed a method to decompose the Gini coefficient as the sum 
of the inequality contribution of each income source, such that: 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑅𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝐺𝑘𝑆𝑘                 (3.2) 
where, Sk is the share of income source k in total income, Gk is the Gini coefficient of income 
source k and Rk is the Gini correlation of income from source k with the distribution of total 
income. By calculating partial derivatives of the Gini coefficient with respect to a percent change 
e in income source k, it is possible to estimate the percent change in total inequality resulting 
from a small percent change in income source k: 
𝝏𝑮
𝝏𝒆⁄
𝑮
=
𝑹𝒌𝑮𝒌𝑺𝒌
𝑮
− 𝑺𝒌              (3.3) 
This property is particularly useful in this study because it allows for the identification of 
equalising or unequalising effect of each income source on total inequality (López-Feldman 
2006). 
The Gini coefficient also has several limitations. Firstly, it does not satisfy the properties of 
aggregativity and additive decomposability (Bourguignon 1979 p. 902), thus limiting its ability 
to analyse inequality between and within population subgroups. Moreover, in presence of 
negative incomes, the Gini coefficient presents abnormal behaviours, as detailed in Section 3.6.  
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3.5.2 Theil Index 
The Theil Index is a specific case of the generalised entropy indices (Bellù & Liberati 2006). Its 
lower value is zero (perfect equality) and it has no upper limit. The index is defined as follows: 
𝑇 =
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑦𝑖
 ?̅?
)𝑖 ln (
𝑦𝑖
 ?̅?
)     (3.4) 
where yi is the i observation and ?̅? is the average income. 
One of its key advantages is being decomposable and additive into groups, thus allowing 
distinction of between and within sub-group inequality components. Assuming m groups, the 
Theil Index is decomposed as follows: 
𝑇 = ∑ (
𝑛𝑘
𝑛
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
?̅?
) 𝑇𝑘 + ∑
𝑛𝑘
𝑛
(
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
?̅?
) ln (
𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
?̅?
)𝑚𝑘=1
𝑚
𝑘=1     (3.5) 
where the first term and second terms are, respectively, the within and between-group 
components. Similarly, the Theil index can also be decomposed by source of income, following 
the expression for m sources:  
𝑇 = ∑   
1
𝑛
∑ (
𝑦𝑖
𝑘
 ?̅?
) ln (
𝑦𝑖
 ?̅?
)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑚
𝑘=1     (3.6) 
In this study, the decomposition of the Theil Index in between/within sub-groups and by income 
source was calculated by computing equations (3.5) and (3.6). 
The Theil Index has also some drawbacks, such as not having an intuitive representation and not 
being suitable to compare populations of different sizes. Further, it does not support non-positive 
values, as ln 𝑥 is undefined for 𝑥 ≤ 0. As explained by Bellù and Liberati (2006) and Vasilescu 
et al. (2011), the limitation of zero values can be overcome by replacing zeros with very small 
values ε > 0, such that ITheil (x1, . . . ,xn−1, 0) ≡ ITheil (x1, . . . ,xn−1, ε). In this chapter, ε was taken 
equal to 10-10. 
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 Negative incomes and measures of inequality 
Two common measures of agricultural income are net cash income and net farm income. The 
former is a measure of cash flow representing the money available for debt repayment, 
investment or withdrawal (Statistics Canada 2000), while the latter is a value of farm production 
including cash and non-cash transactions (Edwards 2013). Net farm income could not be used in 
this chapter because there were no records of non-monetary income transactions, e.g. 
depreciation, income in-kind or commodities stored. Therefore, net cash income was chosen as 
the measure of household income from farm sources. Omission of non-cash transactions may 
impact the estimate of income inequality (Deininger & Olinto 1999), particularly within 
communities heavily reliant on the informal economy. While the poor and women may have a 
larger share of non-cash incomes (FAO 1986; Sarris et al. 2006), the wealthy would have greater 
business expenses such as asset depreciation and in-kind payments.  
Across the six irrigation schemes, 30 percent of the households reported higher on-farm expenses 
than on-farm revenues, thus resulting in negative net cash incomes from farming activities. 
Negative incomes pose a major constraint in the study of inequality, which has been discussed in 
the literature with different authors adopting different approaches.  
Walker and Ryan (1990) and Möllers and Buchenrieder (2011) note the existence of negative 
incomes in their data, yet neither discuss the implications or treatment methods for inequality 
calculation. Schutz (1951) and Stich (1996) indicate that the exclusion of negative incomes is a 
common method to deal with negative incomes in the measurements of income inequality. 
Examples of the application of this method include Cowell (2008), Cribb et al. (2013) and 
Sanmartin et al. (2003).  
Disregarding households with negative net cash incomes is not an ideal methodology for this 
study because it would ignore almost one-third of the sample. Furthermore, this approach is 
undesirable for agricultural redistribution policies given that it is normal for farms to record 
losses (Allanson 2005), and thus, it misses out on a key feature of household incomes (Rawal et 
al. 2008).  
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It is possible to calculate the Gini coefficient including zero and negative values, yet, the 
resulting modified coefficient violates several of its basic properties. Firstly, the principle of 
transfers (Dalton 1920), by which a transfer of income from a richer individual to a poorer one 
leads to a reduction in income inequality, is not always satisfied when the Gini coefficient 
includes negative incomes. Moreover, the modified Gini coefficient is no longer bounded 
between 0 and 1, making it inaccurate as a measure of comparison across populations or time. 
Appendix D provides a theoretical and empirical demonstration of why negative incomes violate 
the basic principles of the Gini index, thus limiting its application in decompositions analysis.   
In an attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by negative incomes, Chen et al. (1982) 
proposed a reformulation, referred to as normalisation, which was subsequently refined by 
Berrebi and Silber (1985). As shown by Raffinetti et al. (2014), this normalised Gini presents 
abnormal behaviours, such as providing the same inequality measure for two populations having 
completely different income distributions (total equality and total inequality). Furthermore, it 
does not allow for an accurate decomposition by income source (Mishra et al. 2009).  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2006) argues that negative incomes often reflect the 
households’ business and investment arrangements or may be a result of accidental or deliberate 
underreporting. Therefore, it is inappropriate for them to have a disproportionate influence on 
inequality measures. Following this argumentation, the equivalisation method is proposed, by 
which individual income components with negative values are set to zero before computing the 
total income of each household (OECD 2014). The process of equivalisation has been defined by 
the OECD and is used by government agencies such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 
2006) and the UK Department for Work & Pensions (2014). This technique of truncating the 
data to report negative incomes as zeros has been applied by Seidl et al. (2012) and Bray (2014), 
who showed consistency of results using various ways of treating negative incomes.  
When it comes to adopting one method or another, Smeeding et al. (1990) state that each 
researcher is left to deal with zero and negative incomes as he or she sees fit. Similarly, Deaton 
(1997) notes that the choice of inequality measures can be made based on practical convenience 
or theoretical preference.  
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Given the interest to maintain all households in the sample and to use the Gini and Theil indices, 
the equivalisation process is deemed to be the most suitable approach to deal with negative 
incomes in this chapter. Thus, negative farm incomes were converted to zero, before being added 
to other income components to obtain the total. In order to test the adequacy of the chosen 
method, a sensitivity analysis is conducted in Appendix E. 
 Results and discussion 
3.7.1 Income inequality at scheme and national levels  
This section describes the levels of economic inequality within six smallholder agricultural 
communities and compares them to their respective national figures. Household consumption 
expenditure and income were used at the scheme level, while family income served as the 
national indicator, given the available country statistics (Table 3-3).  
Table 3-3 Inequality at scheme and national levels 
  Scheme level National level 
Country Scheme 
Consumption 
expenditure Gini 
Income Gini Income Gini 
Zimbabwe 
Mkoba 0.54 0.60 0.50 
Silalatshani 0.47 0.48 0.50 
Tanzania 
Kiwere 0.54 0.60 0.38 
Magozi 0.39 0.56 0.38 
Mozambique 
25 de Setembro 0.59 0.65 0.46 
Khanimambo 0.55 0.58 0.46 
Source: Author’s computations for scheme level and CIA (2014) for national levels. 
Inequalities measured by expenditure are smaller than by income, which is common given that 
consumption expenditure tends to be more evenly distributed than income (Aguiar & Bils 2011; 
Finn et al. 2009; Krueger & Perri 2006). Income inequalities at scheme level are generally higher 
than at national levels. The greatest difference is in Tanzania, where Gini income coefficients 
within the agricultural communities are in the order of 50 - 60 percent higher than at the national 
scale.  
 The Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (The United Republic of Tanzania 
2009a) argues that, given the country’s relatively low levels of inequality, income redistribution 
is not likely to be effective in achieving significant poverty reduction. Instead, it suggests that 
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continued high rates of economic growth over the long-term will be required. By contrast, the 
results of this study show that significant income inequalities exist at smaller scales, which are 
currently being overlooked by country-wide statistics.  
3.7.2 Income dualism between agricultural and diversified sources 
In rural developing areas, non-agricultural earnings represent an important part of households’ 
incomes, but they can also create significant economic inequalities (Barrett et al. 2001b; Escobal 
2001; Reardon 1997). Hence, the aim of this section is to analyse income differences between 
and within two households groups, namely: i) those earning incomes exclusively from 
agriculture (including farm income and agricultural labour); and ii) those having diversified 
incomes (including non-agricultural labour, regular, seasonal or self-employment, business, 
remittances and other).  
Non-parametric tests of statistical significance, Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S), were used to analyse differences in the distribution of incomes between 
population subgroups. Common parametric tests could not be used because they require making 
assumptions on parameters characterising the populations’ distributions, which was not possible 
given the data available for this study. 
 In Zimbabwe, the vast majority of households have diversified incomes, while in Tanzania and 
Mozambique, only half obtain earnings outside of agriculture (Table 3-4). One common 
characteristic to all six communities is that households who make a living exclusively from 
agriculture had consistently lower mean and median incomes than those with diversified 
incomes. The results of the WRS and the K-S tests conclude that the distribution of income is not 
the same in both groups and that exclusively agricultural households’ rank lower in the overall 
income distribution. The WRS test (p < 0.10) indicated that the null hypothesis that incomes of 
agricultural households are not different from diversified-income households could be rejected. 
Similarly, the K-S test concluded that (p < 0.10) the hypothesis that both groups have the same 
distribution was also rejected in all schemes, except for Magozi.  
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Table 3-4 Income statistics by type of income 
Scheme n Mean HH Income† Median HH Income† 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test 
 Ag Div Ag Div Ag Div Z D 
Mkoba 6 62 179 1,098 67 475 -2.52** 0.66*** 
Silalatshani 20 80 411 940 180 700 -3.55*** 0.48*** 
Kiwere 56 44 1,006 2,026 436 1,203 -3.29*** 0.43*** 
Magozi 48 51 1,500 2,905 1,007 1,458 -1.79* 0.20 
25 de 
Setembro 
14 11 40,634 187,707 27,930 84,000 -2.63*** 0.55** 
Khanimambo 4 5 5,250 177,610 0 173,200 -2.49** 1.00** 
The values are statistically significant at ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
† Mkoba, Silalatshani in USD; Kiwere, Magozi in ‘000 TZS; 25 de Setembro, Khanimambo in MZN 
Ag: exclusively agricultural income household; Div: diversified income households 
Despite the remarkable contrast between agricultural and diversified income households, the 
Theil Index decomposition reveals that disparities within these two groups are actually the main 
contributor to overall inequality (Table 3-5). The only exception is Khanimambo, yet results 
from small samples should be interpreted with caution, given the low power of statistical tests 
(see Section 3.8). 
Table 3-5 Household income analysis and decomposition by activity group 
Scheme 
Percentage of 
Ag HH 
Percentage of 
Div HH 
Gini coefficient 
Theil Index decomposition 
(percent of total) 
Ag Div Within Between 
Mkoba 9 81 0.59 0.58 92 8 
Silalatshani 20 80 0.49 0.45 91 9 
Kiwere 56 64 0.59 0.69 90 10 
Magozi 48 52 0.55 0.59 92 8 
25 de Setembro 56 44 0.64 0.43 72 28 
Khanimambo 44 56 0.56 0.54 27 73 
Ag: exclusively agricultural income household; Div: diversified income households 
These results show that households with diversified earnings have higher incomes than those 
exclusively dedicated to agriculture, which is consistent findings elsewhere in Africa (Barrett et 
al. 2001a). As a result of entry barriers, poor households typically struggle to access highly-
profitable non-farming activities, whereas more advantaged families tend to profit from greater 
returns, thus creating a negative feedback loop between poverty, inequality and diversification 
(Barrett et al. 2001a; Woldenhanna & Oskam 2001). Furthermore, the findings in this section 
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contribute to the existing literature by showing that the contrast between diversified and non-
diversified income households only explains a minor portion of overall income inequality, while, 
inequalities within each group are, in fact, the major driver.  
3.7.3 Relative importance of income sources in total inequality 
An extensive literature review by Senadza (2011) concluded that, to better understand the effects 
of income on inequality, it is important to distinguish between the various components of non-
farm income. Hence, this section analyses the effect on total inequality derived from four distinct 
income sources: i) agricultural, including on-farm income and agricultural labour; ii) wages, 
including non-agricultural labour, regular employment and seasonal work; iii) business and 
self-employment; and iv) other, including remittances and other unspecified sources. 
In Tanzania, agriculture is the most important source of income, accounting for three-quarters of 
total earnings and circa 80 percent of inequality (Table 3-6). In Mozambique, agriculture and 
wages account for over 90 percent of income and inequality. Conversely, Zimbabwean schemes 
rely more heavily on other sources (mainly remittances), which also account for the largest 
portion of total income inequalities. On a national level, it is estimated that over three million 
Zimbabweans – a quarter of the total population – live in diaspora (Bracking & Sachikonye 
2010) and that their remittances sum up to USD 900 million– equivalent to almost two percent of 
the country’s GPD (Mishi & Mudziwapasi 2014).  
Table 3-6 Income and inequality decomposition by source (percent) 
Scheme 
Agriculture Wages 
Business and 
self-employment 
Other 
Income 
Share 
Inequality 
Share 
Income 
Share 
Inequality 
Share 
Income 
Share 
Inequality 
Share 
Income 
Share 
Inequality 
Share 
Mkoba 19 2 15 23 14 17 52 58 
Silalatshani 34 14 17 42 5 3 44 42 
Kiwere 79 83 7 6 11 9 3 1 
Magozi 66 43 9 15 23 42 2 0 
25 de Setembro 46 10 47 86 6 4 1 0 
Khanimambo 52 48 43 47 5 5 0 0 
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A key rationale for understanding inequality and formulating policies is to investigate how 
changes in a particular income source affect overall inequality (Shariff & Azam 2009; Singh & 
Dey 2010). In order to answer this question, a Gini decomposition following equations (3.2) and 
(3.3) was carried out. For each income source, the results summarised in Table 3-7 indicate the 
marginal effect on total inequality due to a one percent increase in that particular source, while 
holding all other sources constant. The direction and magnitude of the marginal impact are given 
by the % Change. A negative sign indicates a tendency to reduce total inequality, while a 
positive sign reveals an unequalising effect. To test the statistical significance of the marginal 
impacts, 99, 95 and 90 percent confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrapping 
techniques. 
Table 3-7 Gini decomposition by income source and marginal effects 
Scheme Agriculture Wages 
Business and 
self-employment 
Other 
 Gini % Change Gini % Change Gini % Change Gini % Change 
Mkoba 0.76 -0.07*** 0.93 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.76 0.04 
Silalatshani 0.68 -0.07** 0.94 0.10** 0.91 -0.01 0.70 -0.01 
Kiwere 0.66 0.01 0.94 0.00 0.92 -0.01 0.92 -0.01 
Magozi 0.57 -0.09** 0.95 0.02 0.91 0.08* 0.96 -0.01* 
25 de Setembro 0.54 -0.13*** 0.90 0.13** 0.91 0.01 0.90 -0.01*** 
Khanimambo 0.61 -0.06 0.69 0.06 0.75 -0.01 N/A N/A 
Note: The values are statistically significant at *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 
In four out of six schemes (Mkoba, Silalatshani, Magozi and 25 Setembro), agriculture has an 
equalising effect that is statistically significant. Conversely, wage incomes have an unequalising 
effect across the six schemes, although only two schemes (Silalatshani and 25 de Setembro) 
showed statistical significance. Little can be said about the effect of business and self-
employment, as the marginal impacts are mixed across the various schemes and only statistically 
significant in Magozi. Other income sources have mainly an equalising effect, with statistically 
significance in Magozi and 25 de Setembro.  
A literature review undertaken by Lay et al. (2008) on the equalising or unequalising effect of 
non-agricultural incomes concluded that the results of various studies were mixed and seemingly 
contradictory. These inconsistencies, similar to the ones found in this study, could be reconciled 
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by further investigating the underlying drivers of inequality that are specific to each income 
source.  
 Limitations 
This study has three major limitations. First, the populations of study consist only of members of 
irrigation schemes, but not the entire rural communities. This is because the data available for 
this study were collected as part of the ACIAR-funded project focused on irrigated agriculture 
(ACIAR 2013) that did not include dryland farmers or non-farmers. To allow adequate probably 
sampling across the entire community, more extensive surveys would be required that were out 
of the scope of the ACIAR project and this thesis. If more data were to become available, future 
research could be extended to examine differences in income and inequality within the entire 
rural communities, particularly comparing irrigators and non-irrigators, as well as farmers and 
non-farmers.      
The second limitation is the large proportion of households reporting negative net cash incomes 
from farming activities. It is possible that farm earnings were underreported and expenses 
over-reported, either accidentally or deliberately. Therefore, an improvement could have been 
made by identifying negative farm incomes during the interviews to then question participants 
about their financial losses. This would have improved the accuracy of the records and provided 
greater insight into why certain households experience negative incomes.     
The third limitation is the small population samples in Mozambique (n < 30), which undermines 
the robustness of statistical significance tests and can result in the underestimation of the Gini 
coefficient (Deltas 2003). This problem was partially addressed by using non-parametric tests, 
which are preferred for small samples (Vickers 2005). An alternative approach would have been 
to remove Mozambique from the study, yet it was a deliberate choice to use the six irrigation 
schemes, as an exercise to examine income inequalities within small communities. The fact that 
reduced sample sizes have important limitations for mathematical analyses, does not mean that 
small communities should be excluded from the study of economic inequalities. Indeed, these 
schemes represent an important research opportunity at the local (micro) level, which has been 
widely overlooked by previous literature dominated by inequality analyses at national and 
international (macro) scales.     
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 Conclusions 
This chapter analyses income inequality within six smallholder irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania and Mozambique using household survey data from 2014. The Gini and Theil indices 
are used to measure income inequalities and their decomposition by activity sector and source.  
The results indicate that income inequalities within the irrigation schemes are considerably 
higher (20 to 60 percent) than their respective countrywide figures. Moreover, across the six 
schemes, exclusively agricultural households earn consistently lower incomes than those with 
diversified incomes. In Tanzania, the largest source of income and inequality is agriculture, 
while in Zimbabwe other sources (including remittances) are predominant. In four out of the six 
irrigation schemes, agriculture has an equalising effect, whereas non-agricultural incomes had 
mixed effects that generally lack statistical significance.  
These findings in chapter 3 have important policy implications. First, it is crucial to recognise the 
existence of high levels of income inequality at small scales. Thus, national or broad-based 
strategies to reduce poverty and inequality should be carefully examined before being applied 
within local contexts, as they could overlook existing inequalities and thus perpetuate, or even 
worsen, economic inequalities. Policies incorporating income distribution considerations at local 
scales would be more effective in achieving poverty reduction, rather than those targeting only 
broad-based economic growth. 
Second, strategies aimed to lower inequality levels within smallholder irrigation schemes should 
be two-fold. On the one hand, removal of entry-barriers and diversification into more gainful, 
non-farm activates could help lift the income of poor, exclusively-agricultural households. On 
the other hand, it is also crucial to address inequalities existing within activity groups. One 
possible approach would be to target development efforts to those households who are most 
seriously affected by poverty within each activity group.  
Finally, because agriculture tends to have an equalising effect on income distribution, increasing 
farming productivity could also contribute to reducing income inequality in some cases. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to bear in mind that results from a certain community should not be 
generalised to larger extents without the appropriate evidence.  
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Chapter 4 Perceptions of Tanzanian smallholder irrigators on water supply 
and economic inequalities 
 Chapter objectives 
Chapter 3 showed that significant income inequalities exist within the six irrigation schemes 
studied in this thesis. Furthermore, within the Kiwere and Magozi schemes in Tanzania, 
agricultural incomes are the largest driver of inequality. One of the hypotheses of this thesis is 
that inequity in irrigation water supply aggravates socioeconomic disparities, as suggested by 
previous studies, in South Asia (see Sections 1.3 and 4.2). The aim of Chapter 4 is to test this 
hypothesis on the Kiwere and Magozi irrigation schemes by undertaking a qualitative study of 
irrigators’ perceptions on water and socioeconomic inequalities.  
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the absence of physical quantitative measures of water supply led to 
the use of irrigators’ perceptions as an indicator of inequities in water supply. This approach is 
not only closer to irrigators’ understating of water management, but it also provides an insight 
into possible drivers for collective action.  Thus, key research questions in this chapter are: What 
are the perceived reasons for inequities in water supply? What are the perceived mechanisms 
linking water supply and economic inequalities? Are such perceived mechanisms reflected in 
quantitative measures of agricultural production?  
 Literature review 
The issue of distribution of water is regarded as one of the most critical challenges of the 21st 
century, especially in water scarcity situations (Boelens & Dávila 1998; Maskey et al. 1994). 
Equitable access to water resources appears to be a major objective on all water management 
levels (Wegerich 2007) and stands as one of the three pillars of IWRM, given its importance for 
human welfare and development (Peña 2011). On a global scale, irrigated agriculture is by far 
the single largest water user, accounting for 70 percent of freshwater withdrawals (UN 2016).  
In developing countries, irrigation is widely recognised as a key strategy for rural development 
and poverty reduction (Chitale 1994; Makombe & Sampath 1998). Furthermore, a growing body 
of literature raises fundamental questions on the linkages between irrigation, equity and social 
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justice (Giordano & de Fraiture 2014; Gorantiwar & Smout 2005; Van Den Berg & Ruben 
2006). Bhattarai et al. (2002 p. 27) explain that, because irrigation civil works are mostly 
publicly funded, there is an inherent responsibility to ensure that its derived benefits ‘should be 
distributed, as far as possible, equally among all members of society’. Swyngedouw (2006 p. 15) 
argues that water supply and socioeconomic inequalities are interconnected because ‘controlling 
water generates considerable social power, while the latter permits re-enforcing or extending this 
control’. This relationship becomes more acute for agricultural systems that are dependent on 
hydraulic infrastructures (Ibid.). Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Conceição et al. 
(2016) note that agricultural productivity is a key pathway for equitable generation of income 
and that equitable water distribution is crucial to achieve such gains.   
Importantly, Sharma et al. (2008) argue that improper irrigation water overuse is an major factor 
contributing to income inequality, but that equity of supply has not been sufficiently addressed 
by irrigation impact studies. On a similar line, Bhattarai et al. (2002 p. v) point out that ‘a little 
explored topic is how exactly irrigation infrastructure affects inequalities in income distribution’. 
In fact, most of the existing literature revolves around three key points, with little exploration 
into other dimensions.  
First, empirical studies on irrigated agriculture tend to associate water inequities to inequality in 
landholding (Bardhan 2000; Dayton-Johnson 2000b; van Etten et al. 2002) and yields (Maskey et 
al. 1994; Ostrom 1993). Adding to the extensive body of literature, Bhattarai et al. (2002) note a 
connection between water access and government services yet such association is theoretical 
rather than empirical. Conversely, other possible linkages – human, social, institutional − remain 
largely unexplored. 
Second, the geographical scope of previous studies is typically at a large scale. Examples of 
studies of water equity within river basins include Kolberg (2012) − Guadalquivir, Spain; 
Wegerich (2007) −Amu Darya, central Asia; Silva (2013) − Limpopo, Mozambique; Cullis and 
van Koppen (2007) − Olifants, South Africa; and van Koppen et al. (2004) − Rufiji River, 
Tanzania. Other studies have compared water access disparities across various schemes 
belonging to a common geographical region, e.g. Saldias et al. (2013) − Abanico Punata, 
Bolivia; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2007) −Tamil Nadu, India and Guanajuato, Mexico; 
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Makombe and Sampath (1998) – Zimbabwe; and Anwar and Ul Haq (2013) − Punjab, India. 
Only a few studies − most of which are in South Asia − investigate inequities in water 
distribution within small traditional irrigation schemes using an empirical approach. For 
example, Lal Kalu et al. (1995) examines equity and efficiency in water distribution within a 
1,000 ha irrigation area in Nepal. However, the study does not estimate actual levels of inequity, 
but rather proposes various theoretical water management scenarios to evaluate their impact on 
equity of supply. In a similar study of a warabandi system in Punjab, Pakistan, Sharma and Oad 
(1990) employ mathematical calculations to assess various time-allocation rules aiming for 
equity of water distribution. However, this study does not discuss the implications of water 
inequality for socioeconomic or production disparities within the irrigation community. 
Similarly, Maskey et al. (1994) evaluate time-allocation and yield inequalities along hydraulic 
gradients (head vs tail) of two small Nepali irrigation schemes. While frequency of irrigation is 
greater in the upper sections than in the lower ones, the association with crop production remains 
unclear as differences in paddy yields are not statistically significant across reaches.  
The third point of commonality among previous studies on equity of water supply is the use of 
quantitative measures (e.g. volumes, depths, flows, etc.) and mathematical calculation of indices 
such as the Gini coefficient, Theil Index, Atkinson Index, coefficient of variation and 
interquartile ratio (see Chapter 6 for details). Although reliable measures of inequity are 
extremely important for effective policy making (Sampath 1988), such sophisticated methods are 
highly compromised by lack of adequate data, chiefly in low-technology irrigation schemes. In 
fact, metrics to quantify water are far removed from routine practices of traditional farmers’, 
whom rather think of their water supply in terms of morning/afternoon; start/end of the season; 
or canal clear/blocked. In an example taken from the Kimani rice-growing scheme in Usangu, 
Tanzania, Lankford (2006 p. 354) notes that tail-enders felt top-enders were wasteful because 
their water ‘should be ankle depth, whereas they take more’. 
The most obvious and common measure of irrigation water supply is quantity, expressed in 
terms of volume (Bos 1997; Kolberg 2012) or depth (Anwar & Ul Haq 2013; Bird 1991; Lal 
Kalu et al. 1995). Despite its clear advantages, flow metering remains largely inaccessible for 
most traditional irrigation systems due to technical limitations (e.g. irregular canal cross-
sections) and high maintenance and readings costs. In fact, the lack of data on volumes is a major 
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obstacle for water allocation and management in Tanzania. As noted by van Koppen et al. 
(2007), in Tanzania, it is only in large-scale, highly-controlled systems that volumes can be 
sufficiently known and regulated. Other technical measurement tools also exist, such as remote 
sensing (Ahmad et al. 2009), yet they pose similar operational and cost issues for their 
widespread application in traditional systems.  
In the absence of direct measurements of water supply, various proxy indicators can be found in 
the literature, e.g. number of irrigations multiplied by area (Makombe & Sampath 1998), 
frequency of irrigation (Maskey et al. 1994; Saldias et al. 2013) and presence/absence of wet 
land (Malhotra et al. 1984; Sampath 1988). When no systematic, quantitative data is available, 
location of farms within the schemes is typically used as an indicator of supply. This approach 
follows the assumption that head-end plots are better off in terms of quantity and reliability of 
water supply compared to tail-end ones. Nevertheless, distance to the head is not always a good 
predictor of water supply (Merrey 1997) as it ignores location heterogeneities along the 
secondary and tertiary canals (i.e. distance from farm to channel outlet).   
Besides volumetric measures of water supply and other quantitative proxies, irrigators’ 
perceptions are increasingly recognised as valuable indicators of water supply and equity 
(Chambers 1988). In Tanzania, the widespread lack of objective data leads water officers to rely 
on their subjective judgment in the collection of volume-based rates (van Koppen et al. 2004). 
Tisdell (2003) notes that perceptions of basic liberties and distributive justice are at the core of 
water disputes. Taking into account irrigators’ perspectives on water distribution is especially 
relevant for cooperation and conflict avoidance. For example, Starkloff (2001) takes into 
consideration irrigators’ perceptions on water-related issues as a determinant of social 
mobilisation for participatory water management. In particular, the author analyses perceptions’ 
about the state of water distribution by asking irrigators about their level of satisfaction. 
Theories of social action (Kawakami & Dion 1995) argue that perceptions of inequality (e.g. 
feelings of discontent and injustice) are recognised as an important predictor of individual and 
collective behaviours, including social protest and political violence. Mine et al. (2013 p. 168) 
indicate that ‘perhaps more so than the actual inequality, it is perceptions of inequality that can 
be the drivers of conflict’. Furthermore, understanding of how people perceive their problems 
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(such as inequality) is also crucial to developing management regimes that will improve their 
lives and their environment (Quinn et al. 2003).  
 Research methodology 
The research approach used in this chapter is mixed-methods; a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods (Creswell & Clark 2007). Data related to irrigators’ perceptions and views 
were collected using (open and closed-ended) qualitative questions, whilst measurable factors 
(e.g. crop production and land size) were evaluated using a quantitative approach. Information 
relative to the operability and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure was collected through 
direct observation (see Section 2.4.2).  
4.3.1 Qualitative data analysis 
Closed-ended qualitative questions were formulated using Likert-type rating scales. Most 
questions applied a 3-point scale, which is considered suitable when studying group behaviour 
(Lehmann & Hulbert 1972) and adequately reflects the directional component of the answers 
(Jacoby & Matell 1971; Peabody 1962). The questions regarding water supply equity and 
satisfaction applied a 5-point Likert scale to be consistent with other data collected during the 
2014 survey. For the purpose of this paper, responses were converted to a 3-point Likert scale 
where positive and negative replies were grouped at each side of neutral. This is justified given 
that the focus of this chapter is the directional component of a Likert-type scale, which is 
adequately reflected in trichotomous scales (Jacoby & Matell 1971; Peabody 1962). Conversely, 
a 5-point scale captures better the intensity components, as applied in regression analyses in 
Chapter 5.   
Open-ended questions were used to gain greater insight about more complex issues. Participants 
were asked to describe, in their own words, the reasons causing inequities in water supply and 
the mechanisms whereby equitable water distribution could help reduce the wealth gap within 
their communities. Subsequently, thematic analyses was conducted where narrative responses 
were synthesised into groups of information (themes) representing common ideas (Boyatzis 
1998). While there is no formal restriction on the number of themes, Creswell (2013) and 
Lichtman (2012) indicate that, even in large datasets, qualitative information shall be categorised 
into five to seven mean concepts. 
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In-depth interviews were also held with key informants to discuss specific topics that required 
further information. This method is often used to provide context to other data, offering a more 
complete picture of what has already been observed and why (Boyce & Neale 2006).  
No quantitative data were available regarding water supply within the schemes (see Section 4.4 
for details). To overcome this limitation, a qualitative proxy was used, based on irrigators’ 
perception of their adequacy of water supply considering a range of aspects, such as volumes, 
timing and reliability. This method has been adapted from Starkloff (2001 p. 31), who applied it 
in a study of irrigators’ perceptions in Pakistan where ‘respondents were asked about their level 
of satisfaction with the prevailing system of water distribution in their distributaries’. Similarly, 
Pasaribu and Routray (2005) investigates irrigators’ perceptions of water supply (adequacy, 
reliability, timeliness and fairness of distribution) and uses tests of statistical significance to 
explore asymmetries in irrigation schemes in Indonesia. More recently, Williams and Carrico 
(2017) use self-reported levels of satisfaction with irrigation water to differentiate between 
water-stressed and water-secure irrigators in Sri Lanka. Characterises of water-stressed 
households are then investigated through regression analysis to understand factors influencing 
rice yields and drought adoption strategies. 
4.3.2 Quantitative yields and yield gap analyses 
Yield and yield gap analyses were conducted for the Magozi scheme using paddy rice production 
data. These investigations were only carried out for Magozi, given the system’s relative 
homogeneity of crop production and ease of analysis. Conversely, in Kiwere irrigators grow 
varying combinations of horticultural crops (garlic, tomatoes, onions, fruits, etc.) throughout the 
year. This makes it very difficult to obtain an accurate measure of farm yield that would allow a 
fair comparison across the entire Kiwere scheme (see Section 5.5.2). Moreover, the direct impact 
of water on horticultural crop production is difficult to evaluate, as there are many other 
influencing factors such as fertiliser use, seasonality, agronomic practices, etc. By contrast, in the 
Magozi scheme, rice is virtually the only irrigated crop, it is cultivated without chemical 
fertilisers (Rhodes et al. 2014) and is harvested once a year, between April and May. The 
interviews in Magozi were conducted between May and June 2015, thus allowing irrigators to 
provide information relative to the latest irrigation season (December 2014-May 2015).  
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Interviewees in Magozi were asked to report on their paddy rice production, sown and harvested 
areas. Actual yields (YA in kg/ha) were calculated as output over harvested area (FAO and DWFI 
2015). A large number of irrigators reported they had not been able to harvest the entire area they 
had cultivated (sown) due to inadequate water supply. The situation where cropland is not 
harvested due to lack of adequate inputs, meteorological conditions or other factors is often 
referred to as land failure or crop failure (FAO 2002). Hence, the difference between total sown 
and harvested area was defined as failed area and is reported as a percentage of total sown area. 
Many Magozi irrigators who experienced partial or total land failure ended up losing money they 
had invested in early preparation tasks such as weeding, levelling, seeding, etc. Such monetary 
losses were defined as investment losses expressed in Tanzanian shillings per sown area 
(TZS/ha).   
Interviewees were also asked to report on their potential paddy rice output and harvested area in 
a hypothetical situation where their production would not be water-limited. Thus, potential area 
increase and potential yield (YP) were defined. The difference between the potential and the 
actual yield reflects the yield gap (YG). The yield gap to actual yield ratio (YG-to-YA) was 
calculated as yield gap over actual yield (van Ittersum et al. 2013). Strictly speaking, the 
definition of yield gap accounts, not only for water restrictions, but also for limitations in, 
economic, knowledge and agronomic factors. However, the objective of this study is to assess 
the impact of water supply, hence irrigators were asked to report on their potential production 
without water limitations, whilst leaving all other factors unchanged.       
Current global yield databases are mostly based on farmer-reported data, which inevitable entails 
biases and inaccuracies (FAO and DWFI 2015). Previous research in east Africa (Leach & 
Scoones 2015) detected that some farmers underestimated their yields in expectation of food aid 
from the research project, while others tended to overestimate yields with the intention of being 
viewed as ‘good farmers’ and thus receive preferential treatment from the project. Thus, reported 
yields should be evaluated by comparison against independently collected data and direct on-
farm measurements and monitoring (FAO and DWFI 2015). Ideally, YP  and YG should be 
estimated using simulation models based on high-quality data on weather, soil and crop 
management (Grassini et al. 2015). However, in many developing countries, weather and soil 
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data are of low quality and too spatially scarce for estimating YP and YG at specific locations or in 
small geographic regions (Ibid.).  
Frontier analyses in various locations across West and Central Africa (Neumann et al. 2010) 
estimate rice yield gaps of between three and seven tonnes per hectare. In a review of rice yield 
studies in Tanzania, Nhamo et al. (2014) note yield gains of 0.5-1.4 tn/ha between fields with 
and without treatment effects related to nutrient, soil and weed management. However, no 
comprehensive analysis on rice yield gap has been conducted in Tanzania (Sekiya et al. 2017). 
The reported 2015 YA mean in Magozi is 1.8 tn/ha, which is considerably below the national 
irrigated rice average yield of 3 - 8tn/ha (SAGCOT 2012). However, Magozi yields are close to 
those observed within similar smallholder irrigation schemes in southern Tanzania, including the 
districts of Usangu (2.5 tn/ha) (Lankford 2004), Kilombero (1.1-1.2 tn/ha) and Kyela A (1.3-2.1 
tb/ha) (Mwaseba et al. 2007). By comparing rice yields between water-abundant and water-
stressed sections of traditional irrigation schemes in Tanzania,  Lankford (2004) notes a 
difference of 1-1.5 tn/ha. This figure is in-line with the 1.0 tn/ha yield gap reported in by water-
dissatisfied irrigators in Magozi.  
 Site description  
The analyses in this chapter are based on the Kiwere and Magozi irrigation schemes in Tanzania 
(see Chapter 2 for further details). The data used originate from the 2015 fieldwork survey 
comprising 79 households in Kiwere and 76 in Magozi.  
Among all agricultural activities, irrigated crops account for the largest portion of revenues and 
inequality within the Tanzanian schemes (Table 4-1). Net incomes could not be calculated as 
there are no data available on expenses broken down by agricultural activities (see Section 2.3). 
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Table 4-1 Agricultural revenue and revenue inequality breakdown by activity (percent) 
 Kiwere Magozi 
Agricultural activity Revenue 
Revenue 
inequality 
Revenue 
Revenue 
inequality 
Irrigated crops 57 56 81 76 
Dryland crops 26 26 5 9 
Livestock 8 7 9 7 
Milk and other 5 4 3 3 
Labour 4 6 2 5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Author’s calculations from 2014 baseline survey data 
Without flow measuring devices, water-sharing rules in Kiwere and Magozi are defined on a 
time-basis. In Kiwere, plots at the tail-end of the main canal are scheduled to receive water in the 
mornings, while farms located closer to the intake should be supplied in the afternoons. Despite 
this rule, some upstream irrigators tend to divert water to their plots in the morning, thus 
restricting the flows downstream. In these situations, tail-enders have to walk along the head 
section of the main canal to find out which gates have been tampered with and by whom. When 
confronted, head-enders withdrawing water outside of their allocated schedule, typically make an 
apology and then close their gates. However, by the time the flows are restored and tail-enders 
go back to their plots, it is already the afternoon, and thus, no longer their turn to irrigate. In 
Magozi, the rules dictate that irrigators flood-irrigate their rice fields during a certain amount of 
time proportional to their plot size. This rule is very rarely followed given that rice growers have 
a strong incentive to over-irrigate in order to keep their fields flooded (Ostrom & Gardner 1993). 
Rice is very vulnerable to water deficit, yet highly tolerant to water excess, which also helps in 
keeping weeds under control.  
Water management within the Kiwere and Magozi scheme is further undermined by the system’s 
lack of operability. During fieldwork from May to July 2015, it was observed that most 
structures and canal sections were defective and unable to perform their basic functions (Table 
4-2).  
Perceptions of Tanzanian smallholder irrigators on water supply and economic inequalities 
42 
Table 4-2 Number of infrastructure observations by type, functionality and maintenance 
levels 
  Kiwere Magozi 
  
Canal 
reaches 
Control structures 
Canal 
reaches 
Control structures 
Functionality Defective 37 14 62 21 
Functional 14 0 39 8 
Total 51 14 101 29 
Maintenance Fair 12 5 25 9 
Good 3 1 17 7 
Poor 36 8 59 13 
Total 51 14 101 29 
Source: Author’s calculations from fieldwork 
In Kiwere and Magozi, most of the control structures − gates and diversion boxes − were missing 
the original iron boards aimed at regulating water flows. During fieldwork, it was mentioned that 
some boards were removed as they started to malfunction due to lack of maintenance, while 
others mentioned that some boards had been stolen to be sold as scrap metal. In absence of 
proper opening/closing mechanisms, makeshift gates are made out of materials such as wooden 
boards, mud and sand bags (Figure 4-1) 
Figure 4-1 Defective irrigation control structures at Kiwere and Magozi 
  
Kiwere – canal gate with missing iron board 
Magozi – diversion structure (left) and canal gate (right) 
with missing iron boards 
  
Kiwere – stone and sand bags used in replacement of 
missing iron gate 
Magozi – use of sand bags in an attempt to control flows 
into distributary canals 
Source: Author’s own photos from fieldwork  
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As a result of maintenance issues, only a few control structures remain functional in both the 
Kiwere and Magozi schemes (Figure 4-2). 
Figure 4-2 Spatial representation of functionality of irrigation control structures  
Kiwere Magozi 
Source: Author’s own maps elaborated with ArcMap using fieldwork data 
Poor maintenance along the earthen canals has resulted in eroded side-slopes and overgrown 
native vegetation, which considerably increased seepage losses. Within the middle section of the 
Magozi scheme and at the tail in Kiwere, several canal banks are collapsed, thus causing 
constant flooding of the surrounding areas (Figure 4-3). From the infrastructure observations it is 
apparent that both schemes suffer from very high levels of transmission losses. Inevitably, such 
losses aggravate water scarcity within the schemes, especially at the tail-end where flows are 
lower and infrastructure is generally in worse conditions. Most of the canal reaches that remain 
functional are stone or concrete lined, which require less maintenance and are less susceptible of 
deteriorating due to erosion, vegetation growth, etc. 
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Figure 4-3 Defective earthen canals in Kiwere and Magozi 
  
Kiwere flooded field due to overflow from main canal 
Magozi – flooded paddy filed due to complete collapse 
of the canal banks 
  
Kiwere Magozi 
Defective earthen canals (no integrity of side slopes) with poor maintenance (excessive vegetation overgrowth) 
 Source: Author’s own photos from fieldwork 
 Results 
This section is structured into three parts. The first examines irrigators’ perceptions on the 
importance and reasons for inequities in water supply. Next, qualitative responses are analysed to 
determine how greater equity of water supply could help mitigate economic disparities. Finally, 
tests for statistical significance are conducted to investigate how yields and other measures of 
agricultural production vary depending on water supply.   
4.5.1 The reasons behind inequity of water supply 
The most common reason attributed to inequity of water supply was water scarcity, which was 
mentioned by almost a quarter of interviewees across both schemes (Table 4-3). One irrigator 
from the rice-growing Magozi scheme mentioned that: 
‘Water is so scarce that even your mother, your brother, will block the water to you! ’ (male 
irrigator, age 54, Magozi) 
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Breakage of rules was the second most common explanation, although this was not understood 
as a generalised problem, but rather a result of the ‘occasional selfish behaviour of a few 
irrigators’. Two irrigators pointed out that: 
‘The ones who break the rules earn enough money to pay the fines, so they don’t care’ 
(female irrigator, age 52, Magozi) 
‘The poor break the rules out of frustration and desperation. The rich break the rules out of 
greed’ (male irrigator, age 45, Magozi) 
The third most commonly perceived factor for uneven supply was weak leadership of the IOs - 
often linked to bribery and conflict of interest. One irrigator in Kiwere expressed his 
discontentment saying that: 
‘Even the chairperson [of the IO] broke the rules and never paid the fine. He claimed that, 
as a chairperson, he had immunity to the rules’ (male irrigator, age 24, Kiwere) 
Finally, some irrigators blamed water distribution issues on the lack of understating of water-
sharing rules, while another small group listed a range of other causes, such as malfunctioning 
infrastructure and personal reasons. One elderly irrigator at the head-end of the Kiwere scheme 
explained that: 
‘My turn to irrigate is in the afternoon, but it gets too hot for me to work in the field’ (male 
irrigator, age 22, Kiwere) 
In order to get a better understanding of the issues surrounding water distribution, in-depth 
interviews were held with key members (secretaries) of the IOs management boards. In both 
schemes, leaders agreed that water-sharing rules are not always respected, which they believe is 
a result of ineffective deterrence and prosecution mechanisms.  
Deterrence is based on the application of monetary fines set by the IOs, yet significant income 
disparities among irrigators mean that, unlike poorer irrigators, wealthier individuals can easily 
pay for the penalties. In the Magozi scheme, breakage of rules is punished, on a case-by-case 
basis, with sanctions varying from 50,000 to 300,000 TZS (circa 23-138 USD). To put this into 
perspective, such fines only represent a minimal portion (one to four percent) of the mean 
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household annual revenue of the top quintile, yet they pose a much greater burden on poorer 
irrigators, taking up to 10 - 61 percent of the average yearly earnings of families in the bottom 
quintile. Irrigators who repetitively break the rules or fail to pay the fines can be taken to court. 
However, the nearest court is located in the regional capital of Iringa, which lies 20 km away 
from Kiwere and 50 km from Magozi. The need to attend several court hearings and the deficient 
public transport system become major impediments for poor-resourced irrigators to pursue legal 
action.  
The secretary of the Magozi IO noted that poor levels of infrastructure repair and maintenance 
(leading to significant water losses), were partially due to inadequate budgeting by the IO. It was 
explained that, under the current system, all fees and fines paid by irrigators contribute to a 
general budget, which serves to cover a range of aspects. Typically, mid and long-term 
requirements, including repairs and maintenance, are set aside to prioritise more immediate 
needs, such as interest repayment. 
Table 4-3 Irrigators’ perceptions of the reasons for inequity of water supply 
In your own opinion, why is water 
not equitably distributed within the 
irrigation scheme? 
% Responses 
Kiwere 
(n=79) 
Magozi 
(n=76) 
Combined 
(n=155) 
Water scarcity  18 29 23 
Individuals breaking rules  25 16 21 
Weak leadership   9 16 12 
Lack of understanding of rules   14 7 10 
Other 10 9 10 
Don't know/Don't perceive inequality 24 24 24 
4.5.2 How can equity of water supply mitigate economic inequalities 
There is a widespread perception of inequality among Kiwere and Magozi irrigators. Over two-
thirds of interviewees think water is not equitably distributed (Table 4-4), while 90 percent agree 
that significant economic inequalities exist within their communities. Interestingly, four-in-five 
irrigators believe the economic gap could be mitigated through the provision of more equitable 
water supply, chiefly in Magozi. As one irrigator explained: 
‘The only way of removing the wealth gap is by improving water supply. Then, motivation 
and hard work will be the sole limiting factors’ (male irrigator, age 42, Magozi) 
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The critical impact of water on irrigators’ welfare was highlighted by a Magozi irrigator who is a 
single mother: 
‘This year, I have harvested no rice at all and now I am even poorer. This is because I didn’t 
have enough water. People talk about improving many things, but for me water comes first. 
If I don’t have water, I have nothing’ (female irrigator, 28, Magozi) 
Table 4-4 Irrigators' responses to specific questions on water and inequality 
Question Answer 
% Responses 
Kiwere 
(n=79) 
Magozi 
(n=76) 
Combined 
(n=155) 
Do you think water is equitably distributed 
within your irrigation scheme? 
Yes 23 16 19 
No 70 68 69 
Neutral/Don’t know 7 16 12 
Do you think there is a significant economic gap 
among the members of the irrigation scheme? 
Yes 89 91 90 
No 11 9 10 
Neutral/Don’t know - - - 
Do you think more equitable water supply can 
help reduce the economic gap? 
Yes 74 92 83 
No 25 4 15 
Neutral/Don’t know 1 4 2 
During the interview process, irrigators who agreed that water equity could help reduce the 
economic gap were asked to elaborate on the possible linking mechanisms. The articulate 
responses provided by interviewees were synthesised into seven main common themes (see 
4.3.1), as shown in Table 4-5. The most frequent explanation is rooted in the belief that lack of 
adequate water supply is one of the main reason why disadvantaged irrigators remain trapped in 
poverty. Respondents argued that irrigators who suffer from insufficient and/or unreliable water 
supply cannot reach their full crop production potential. By contrast, water-abundant farmers do 
not experience such restrictions. Two interviewees explained that: 
‘Poor irrigators are the ones who don’t have water’ (male irrigator, age 60, Magozi) 
‘If poor irrigators had better water supply, they could improve their production. Then, they 
would have more time and resources to invest in other businesses’ (female irrigator, age 
38, Magozi) 
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The second most common argument was that equitable water distribution would improve 
irrigators’ working conditions by reducing risk and conflict; enabling planting and harvest at the 
right time; and stabilising crop production and food prices. Currently, the delay in the optimal 
irrigation schedule results in low quality crops (water supply doesn’t meet crop needs through its 
life cycle) and late harvest (when there is already an oversupply of the particular product in the 
market). The combination of these two factors means that rice that is inadequately irrigated can 
only be sold at a low market price. A more even water supply would mean that small irrigators 
could harvest at the same time and thus, benefit from stronger bargaining power when marketing 
their produce.   One irrigator summarised: 
‘If water is equitably distributed, we can all plant and harvest at the right time. Then, we 
would be able to market together and obtain better prices’ (male irrigator, age 54, Kiwere) 
In Kiwere, 65 percent of the interviewees reported that a lack of sufficient water supply during 
the day forces them to work in the evening and night. During this time, there is less competition 
because many irrigators have gone home and there is more water left in the canals. However, it 
hampers their productivity given the extra difficulty of cultivating with little or no daylight. It 
also poses a security issue, especially for female irrigators, who fear they become an easy target 
for violent attacks and robberies and, hence, they choose not work in the fields at dark.  
Two-thirds of respondents in Kiwere noted they experience regular or occasional conflict with 
upstream, downstream and/or neighbouring irrigators. Reportedly, conflict greatly disrupts their 
working life, as they end up spending significant amounts of time and energy being vigilant and 
arguing over water, instead of concentrating their efforts on cultivation and other non-farming 
activities. Such finding mirrors previous studies in domestic water access (Jemmali & Abu-
Ghunmi 2016; Sullivan 2002) that highlight significant opportunity costs (time and efforts) used 
to search for water. It is noteworthy that, both for irrigation and domestic uses, females tend to 
carry greater risks and burdens when trying to access water, compared to their male counterparts.  
Also, water-related quarrels deteriorate social relationships in such a way that disadvantaged 
irrigators become excluded from cooperative initiatives such as collective marketing, training 
opportunities or access to finance. Conflict and social exclusion are also relevant for food 
security in the Magozi scheme where, besides irrigated rice, only a very limited variety of 
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dryland crops are grown. Being relatively remote from the main regional town and other 
irrigation districts, villagers in Magozi rely on collective purchasing and transportation to access 
fruits and horticultural produce from outside their area.              
Increasing crop production, either through expansion of the irrigated area or higher crop yields, 
was also frequently stated as a factor that could help narrow the economic gap. For example, one 
rice-grower from Magozi indicated that insufficient water supply results in increased soil 
salinity, which greatly affects the quality and yield of his crop. Higher certainty of timing and 
volumes was also perceived as a critical factor, as it would allow irrigators to better plan their 
activities. Currently, uncertainty of water supply means that irrigators take a significant risk 
investing in land preparation at the start of the season, without knowing whether they will 
receive the water they require. As one irrigator said:  
‘When farmers see they have no water, it breaks their heart because of all the money and 
effort they have invested. Then, they give up farming or go to dryland’ (female irrigator, 
age 54, Kiwere) 
Furthermore, one-in-eight sampled irrigators in Magozi believed that a more equitable 
distribution would give the poor the ability to irrigate their own land. As a result of water 
scarcity and subsequent crop failure, irrigators often have to abandon their own plots. Instead, 
they find themselves in precarious conditions renting land or working as labourers in water-
abundant parts of the scheme. Most of them feel considerably underpaid, yet with no other skills 
and a weak bargaining positon, this often becomes their only source of livelihoods. During the 
interviews, it was mentioned that ‘more equitable water supply will break the dependency of 
poor farmers on rich ones through labour’. It was explained that: 
‘At the start of the irrigation season, some farmers are not receiving enough water, so they 
have to labour for richer ones. Then, later in the season, the optimal time for cultivating 
has been missed. This means poor farmers cannot become self-sufficient because they 
depend on water supply’ (female irrigator, age not available, Magozi) 
Also, without being able to access formal financial institutions, struggling irrigators turn 
themselves to better-off ones for small loans. On the one hand, interviewees indicated they are 
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generally grateful to borrow money from fellow irrigators. On the other hand, they believe they 
are being taken advantage of through extremely high interest rates. In Magozi, borrowers would 
typically have to repay twice the amount borrow over the course of one irrigation season (circa 
six months).   
Table 4-5 Irrigators perceptions of the linkages between water and economic inequalities  
How do you think better water supply could help 
reduce the economic gap? 
% Responses 
Kiwere 
(n=79) 
Magozi 
(n=76) 
Combined 
(n=155) 
Opportunity for poor irrigators to increase production 19 16 17 
Improved farming conditions 18 12 15 
Opportunity to expand irrigated area 6 21 14 
Increased yields 13 11 12 
Higher certainty of supply 10 7 8 
Ability to irrigate own land - 13 6 
Other 8 14 11 
Water won’t help reduce the economic gap 27 8 17 
4.5.3 Yield and yield gap analysis in Magozi 
In the previous section, qualitative methods are used to investigate possible linkages between 
perceptions water supply and economic inequalities. In this section, the aim is to test such 
associations using statistical analyses. Most of the linkages identified (Table 4-6) relate to 
irrigation practices for which quantitative data from the 2015 survey is available. Therefore, a 
series of quantitative measures of agricultural production are defined (see Table 4-6 and Section 
4.3.2) mirroring the associations between water and economic inequality noted in Section 4.5.2. 
The next chapter, expands on the qualitative analyses by developing multiple regression models 
to investigate the association between income and yields with a series of natural, physical, human, 
social, financial and farm management factors.  
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Table 4-6 Qualitative and quantitative links between water and economic inequalities 
Qualitative answers 
Quantitative 
measures 
Benefit the poor the most Rice yields 
Improved farming conditions Investment losses 
Higher certainty of supply Failed land  
Opportunity to expand irrigated area 
Potential area increase 
Ability to irrigate own land 
Increased yields 
Yield gap 
YG-to-YA ratio 
For statistical analyses, irrigators were classified into three sub-groups according to their level of 
water supply satisfaction (satisfied, neutral and dissatisfied). The summary statistics (Table 4-7) 
show that the percentage of failed land considerably decreases with irrigators’ level of water 
supply satisfaction. On average, almost half of the land sown by dissatisfied irrigators could not 
be harvested, while the failed land among satisfied irrigators was only five percent of total sown 
area. Also, investment losses suffered by dissatisfied irrigators were, on average, 50 percent 
greater than those of satisfied irrigators and almost four times larger compared to neutral. Water-
dissatisfied irrigators obtain 30 percent lower mean yields compared to their satisfied 
counterparts. They also suffer from greater yield gaps, both in absolute (kg/ha) and relative (YG-
to-YA) terms.  
On average, dissatisfied irrigators achieve yields that are only half of their potential, whereas 
satisfied growers exceed 80 percent. This means that, with an adequate water supply, currently 
dissatisfied irrigators would be the greatest beneficiaries as they could potentially double their 
yields, compared to a much lower increase (22 percent) by satisfied irrigators. Similarly, a more 
abundant and reliable water supply would enable dissatisfied irrigators to expand their harvested 
area 1.6-fold, whereas the possible extension for satisfied famers would be much lower. Thus, 
combining higher yields and greater harvested area, an improved water supply could result in a 
240 percent increase in total paddy production (kg) for dissatisfied irrigators. 
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Table 4-7 Summary statistics of land and crop productivity 
Failed land (%) 
Water Satisfaction N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 5 0 18 0 60 
Neutral 15 23 0 35 0 93 
Dissatisfied 50 45 45 40 0 100 
Investment losses (’000 TZS/ha) 
Water Satisfaction N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 195 0 593 0 1,977 
Neutral 15 79 0 157 0 532 
Dissatisfied 50 296 254 282 0 1,112 
Actual yields (kg/ha) 
Water Satisfaction N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 2,487 2,348 479 1,606 3,274 
Neutral 15 2,239 1,853 545 1,483 3,212 
Dissatisfied 40* 1,751 1,016 690 371 3,048  
Yield gap (kg/ha) 
Water Satisfaction N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 491 330 561 0 1,977 
Neutral 15 859 834 714 0 2,780 
Dissatisfied 50 983 968 805 0 3,336 
YG-to-YA ratio  
Water Satisfaction N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 0.22 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.84 
Neutral 15 0.45 0.35 0.46 0.00 1.80 
Dissatisfied 40† 0.98 0.45 1.67 0.00 9.00 
Potential area increase (ha) 
Water Satisfaction n Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 0.32 0.00  0.88  0.00  2.95  
Neutral 15 0.63 0.00  0.90  0.00  2.63  
Dissatisfied 50 0.61 0.40  0.67  0.00  2.83  
Relative potential area increase (%)  
Water Satisfaction n Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Satisfied 11 34 0 81 0 270 
Neutral 15 148 0 337 0 1300 
Dissatisfied 40† 161 0 293 0 1700 
For the aim of comparison: 1 USD = 2,237 TZS at 07/06/2017 exchange rate 
Note: † 10 irrigators reported harvested area equal to zero. In these cases, yields and percentages calculated relative 
to harvested area were mathematically undefined. Hence, the smaller sample size (n=40).  
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Statistical significance tests (Table 4-8) were conducted using the Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal 1952) 
and the Dunn test (Dunn 1961). The Kruskal-Wallis test (the nonparametric equivalent of the 
one-way analysis of variance) indicates that the distributions of all measures differ significantly 
across groups. Subsequently, the Dunn test in the post-hoc analysis reveals which pairs of groups 
differ significantly from each other. All measures are significantly different between satisfied 
and dissatisfied. Conversely, the differences between neutral and the other two groups are only 
significant in four out of the seven cases.  
Table 4-8 Kruskal-Wallis and Dunn test results on irrigated agricultural production 
 
Kruskal-Wallis 
χ2 
Dunn’s z 
Dissatisfied / 
Satisfied  
Satisfied / 
Neutral 
Neutral / 
Dissatisfied   
Unproductive land 12.27*** 3.19*** 1.14 2.07**  
Investment losses 15.38*** 3.03*** 0.27 3.06*** 
Actual yields  17.54*** -3.68*** -1.07** -2.72*** 
Yield gap 4.52 2.13** 1.45* 0.49 
YG-to-YA ratio 5.76* 2.38*** 1.35* 0.90 
Potential area increase 7.03** 2.60*** 1.41* 1.04 
Relative potential area increase 7.42** 2.58*** 1.09 1.47* 
Note: The values are statistically significant at ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 
 Discussion 
Economic inequality is a major issue hindering effective poverty reduction and inclusive growth, 
chiefly in developing areas. Within the context of irrigation, access to communal resources plays 
an important role in determining how the benefits from agriculture are distributed. Drawing from 
irrigators’ perspectives, this chapter examines the association between irrigation water supply 
and economic inequalities within the Kiwere and Magozi schemes in Tanzania. Understanding 
irrigators’ opinions is particularly important given that collective action is often motivated by 
perceptions, rather than the actual level of inequality (Kawakami & Dion 1995; Mine et al. 
2013). Furthermore, sophisticated measures of water distribution commonly have limited 
application in low-technology, traditional systems, like the ones in this study. In fact, lack of 
metering instrumentation and impeded operability of control structures gravely hinder the 
acquisition of objective water supply data and the enforcement of water distribution rules.  
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The in-depth qualitative investigations in Kiwere and scheme indicate that, according to 
irrigators, inequities in water distribution are caused by a combination of technical, human and 
institutional factors. These findings are consistent with previous studies in Nepal, India and 
Pakistan pointing at various reason behind inequalities in irrigation water distribution, including  
scarcity (Lal Kalu et al. 1995); petty organisation rules, technical issues (Bhattarai et al. 2002); 
corruption, unaffordable legal costs (Rijsberman 2008); and ineffective means of enforcement 
and sanctioning (Starkloff 2001).   
Irrigators widely agreed that significant water supply and economic inequalities exist within their 
communities. In addition, most of them affirmed that greater equity of water distribution could 
help reduce the wealth gap. Open-ended questions allowed interviewees to express their own 
views on the issue, which led to the identification of important linkages between water and 
wealth, some of which had not been previously noted in the literature. While previous literature 
(Bhattarai et al. 2002; Chambers 1988; Sharma et al. 2008) focuses on yields and incomes, 
qualitative results of this research, described below, highlight the effect of water supply inequity 
on human and social capital.  
First, unreliable water supply makes it almost impossible for many irrigators to follow a regular 
irrigation schedule, either daily or seasonally. As a result, affected irrigators spend most of their 
time and efforts on irrigation, which is to the detriment of potential diversification into other 
non-agricultural, more profitable activities. This is particularly important because, as shown in 
Section 3.7.2, households with diversified sources of livelihoods tend to earn significantly higher 
incomes than those relying solely on agriculture. Second, inadequate timing of water supply for 
paddy irrigation results in late harvest and poor grain quality, thus dramatically reducing the 
crop’s marketing potential along the value chain (Nkuba et al. 2016). Third, uneven water 
distribution becomes a major source of conflict that deteriorates relationships between 
disadvantaged and powerful famers. Dissatisfied irrigators can be viewed as troublesome and 
thus, become marginalised from communal initiatives, such as decision-making, training, 
financial services, crop marketing, bargaining input prices, etc. While some benefit from pooled 
marketing, exclusion from such economies of scale translates into greater costs and lower 
earnings for the disadvantaged, thus feeding back into a widening economic gap. Another 
important factor of social power that connects water and economic inequalities is the dependence 
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of water-scarce irrigators on water-abundant for jobs, land rent and loans. Although in some 
cases these might be the only short-term livelihood strategies, water-disadvantaged irrigators 
stated the conditions imposed (e.g. low pay, high interest) were generally unfair.    
With regards to enforcement of water-sharing rules, this chapter finds that deterrence and 
prosecution means are biased against the poor. The fines due to non-compliance of rules are 
based on the gravity of the offence, irrespective of offender’s economic level. Hence, while poor 
irrigators are compelled to respect water-sharing rules, monetary fines provide much less 
incentive for wealthy irrigators. Likewise, ill-resourced irrigators are typically unable to access 
legal services or attend court hearings, which, in contrast, wealthy irrigators can better afford. 
Chapter 6 examines water and irrigation polices in Tanzania to identify current shortfalls in the 
legislative framework and to discuss possible interventions aimed at improving irrigation water 
distribution within traditional irrigation schemes.  
The results of the statistical analyses revealed that paddy rice yields in the Magozi scheme 
increase with irrigators’ level of water supply satisfaction. These figures are consistent with 
previous observations in Asia (Chambers 1988; Collins et al. 2014) in which head-end irrigators 
obtained greater rice yields than tail-end ones. Such parallelism suggests there could be an 
association between water supply satisfaction, location and yields.  
Comparison of agricultural production measures across population sub-groups revealed that 
irrigators who are not satisfied with their water supply are affected in two ways. First, 
dissatisfied irrigators suffer from lower yields and greater yield gaps than their satisfied 
counterparts. Second, water-dissatisfied irrigators also suffer from greater levels of unharvested 
land and investment losses. Crop yields and yields gaps are a common measure of agricultural 
productivity. However, given that, by definition, yields are calculated over harvested area, they 
ignore the impact of land failure on crop production. Thus, in the study of water supply and crop 
production disparities, a better understating can be gained by analysing, not only yields, but also 
differences in unharvested areas.  
For irrigators experiencing crop failure and investment losses, irrigation can push them further 
down into debt and poverty, rather than supporting their livelihoods. A more reliably water 
supply could potentially change this situation by lowering their risk of crop failure and securing 
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their investments. Similarly, high yield gaps can be interpreted as a great potential for 
improvement. In fact, if water becomes more equitably distributed, dissatisfied irrigators would 
be the greatest beneficiaries in terms of yields and harvested areas. From this perspective, it can 
be argued that adequate water distribution may have an inequality reducing effect on crop 
production, and therefore, possibly on incomes as well.  
Improving irrigation water distribution and increasing yields could, arguably, have beneficial 
environmental effects. While certain parts of the schemes do not receive enough water, other 
sections are systematically over-irrigated, leading to nutrient loss, rising water tables and 
excessive soil salinity (Francois & Maas 1999). Furthermore, greater yields may alleviate the 
pressure for expanding agriculture into new land, helping protect environmentally sensitive 
areas, such as forests (Conceição et al. 2016). This is particularly relevant for water-scarce 
irrigators who, as noted during the survey, may find themselves forced to abandon irrigation and 
move into dryland farming.        
Disparities in water supply, economic levels and yields also have important implications for food 
security. First, as noted by Devereux (2016 p. 58), ‘food insecurity is often correlated with social 
exclusion and political marginalisation’, both of which are common consequences of water-
related conflicts among irrigators. Moreover, communities with high levels of income inequality 
have also been found to suffer from greater levels of food insecurity (Kawakami & Dion 1995). 
Irrigators whose crop productivity is severely affected by inadequate water supply may become 
more prone to food insecurity because of lower revenues from their agricultural sales, and also 
due to insufficient crop production for self-consumption.    
In summary, equitable access to irrigation water supply is critical for rural livelihoods, as it holds 
the potential to impact economic inequalities in a number of ways, leading to either a positive or 
negative change. Such inequality interconnections are important, not only from a crop 
productivity standpoint, but also to build fairer and mutually beneficial relationships among 
irrigators. In addition, more equitable water distribution could also help to alleviate poverty, 
protect the environment and enhance food security. Importantly, irrigation development 
strategies should take into account the linkages between water supply and economic disparities, 
in order to promote equitable distribution of agricultural benefits and maximize social justice. 
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Beyond Tanzania, such considerations may also be relevant in other developing areas, such as 
South America, South Asia and the rest of SSA, which share similar challenges in terms of 
growing economic inequalities and the need to improve rural welfare.  
 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates water supply and economic inequalities within the Kiwere and Magozi 
irrigation schemes in Tanzania, using data on 155 households from the 2015 survey. A mixed 
methods approach is used to investigate: a) the reasons causing inequity of water supply; b) the 
mechanisms linking water and economic inequalities; c) variances in agricultural production 
based on water supply. 
The survey results identify four main reasons for inequity of water supply: water scarcity; 
individuals breaking rules; weak leadership and lack of understanding of rules. In-depth 
interviews with key members of the IOs management boards also reveal that current deterrence 
and prosecution practices are ineffective, chiefly due to inadequate fine systems and constrains in 
accessing the regional court.  
According to interviewees, there are several mechanisms whereby more equitable water 
distribution could help narrow the economic divide within their communities. These include 
providing a greater opportunity for the poor; improving farming conditions; expanding irrigated 
areas; increasing yields; providing higher certainty of water supply; and improving their ability 
to irrigate their own land. Tests for statistical significance indicate that irrigators who are 
dissatisfied with their water supply have significantly more unproductive land, higher investment 
losses, lower yields and greater yield gaps compared to those who are satisfied or neutral.  
The qualitative and quantitative results of this study are consistent in showing that water 
distribution within the two irrigation schemes seems to be biased against the most disadvantaged 
irrigators. Moreover, inequitable distribution of water may aggravate existing economic 
inequalities within the community. Based on yield gap analysis, the findings indicate that water-
dissatisfied irrigators obtain lower yields, but they hold the largest potential for increased 
production if water was not a limiting factor.  
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Chapter 5 The effect of water supply on incomes and yields: a quantitative 
assessment 
 Chapter objectives 
The previous chapter has highlighted the important linkages between water distribution and 
economic inequalities, as perceived by irrigators in the Magozi and Kiwere schemes. Building on 
this insight, the aim of this chapter is to further quantitatively investigate the association between 
water supply and agricultural incomes using regression modelling. Using both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques will allow greater insights into findings and help us to more 
comprehensively explore a range of issues. 
 Introduction 
It is widely understood that gravity-fed, low technology irrigation systems present considerable 
differences in water distribution between head and tail-ends (Hussain & Hanjra 2003; Maskey et 
al. 1994; Ostrom & Gardner 1993; Senaratna Sellamuttu et al. 2014). Typically, farms located 
closer to the system’s intake are able to withdraw larger volumes of water with greater frequency 
and reliability compared to those further downstream. Given that adequate water supply 
(volumes, reliably, timing, etc.) is crucial for successful cultivation of irrigated crops, this 
suggests that irrigators who are water-underprovided are less productive than their water-
advantaged counterparts (Ostrom 1993). Thus, if water affects irrigated crop production and crop 
production generates revenues, then water supply may impact incomes from irrigated agriculture 
(Bhattarai et al. 2002). Subsequently, from an inequality perspective, asymmetries in water 
distribution could potentially widen the income gap between irrigation community members. 
While the theoretical connection between water, location and incomes is consistent with the 
experiences reported by Kiwere and Magozi irrigators (see Chapter 4), an important question to 
ask is whether such association is also reflected by quantitative measures of crop production and 
farm income. This chapter formulates a set of hypotheses arguing that adequacy of water supply 
and proximity to the system’s intake are positively associated with irrigation incomes and crop 
yields and seeks to model it quantitatively with various regression models.   
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5.2.1 A Tanzanian national perspective 
Out of all agricultural activities in Tanzania, cropping is the largest contributor to national GDP, 
accounting for 71 percent of the sector share (Table 5-1) 
Table 5-1 Decomposition of Tanzania’s GDP in 2012 
Sector  GDP share (%) 
Services    47.6  
Industry and construction    24.0  
Agriculture    28.4  
Crops    20.2  
Livestock    4.3  
Forestry and hunting    2.4  
Fishing    1.6  
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania (2013b) 
In mainland Tanzania, cereals are the number one crop in terms of area planted area and total 
output (Table 5-2) (The United Republic of Tanzania 2013b). Maize accounts for 70 percent of 
the total area planted in cereal, while paddy rice comes second accounting for one-sixth of the 
cereal area. 
Table 5-2 Annual crop production and planted area in Tanzania in 2007/08 
 Crop production Planted area 
 ‘000 tonnes Percentage of total ‘000 ha Percentage of total 
Cereals  7,593 72 5,797 69 
Maize    48 
Paddy rice    11 
Sorghum    7 
Other    3 
Roots and pulses 1,688 16 894 11 
Oil crops 548 5 766 9 
Vegetables  757 7 905 11 
Total 10,585  8,362  
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania (2013b). 
Agricultural land is in Tanzania is estimated at 42 percent of the total area, divided into grassland 
(25 percent) and cultivation (17 percent) (FAO 2016). Dryland accounts for 98 percent of the 
land under cultivation, whereas only a small area is equipped for irrigation, predominantly, under 
traditional systems (Table 5-3). Irrigation in Tanzania has experienced significant growth, with 
irrigation users rising from 33,000 in 2005 to one million in 2012 (The World Bank 2013). 
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Between 2002 and 2013, the irrigated area doubled from 184,330 ha to 363,514 ha, and it is 
estimated that it could be expanded up to 2.1 million hectares across four high-potential regions, 
including Iringa (FAO 2016). Large-scale schemes controlled by the government or external 
agencies only account for 15 percent of Tanzania’s irrigated area. Conversely, the remaining 85 
percent is under traditional irrigation schemes, directly managed by smallholder farmers. Two-
thirds of the area under traditional irrigation schemes is equipped with improved infrastructure as 
a result of external intervention (e.g. government or donor agencies). These schemes – as it is the 
case of Kiwere and Magozi − are referred to improved traditional irrigation schemes. 
Table 5-3 Land use in Tanzania in 2013 
 Area (‘000 ha) 
Percentage 
of total 
Non-agricultural land 55,080 58.14 
Meadows and pastures 24,000 25.34 
Dryland Agriculture 15,286 16.14 
Traditional irrigation without external intervention 117 0.12 
Improved traditional irrigation 191 0.20 
Large-scale irrigation 55 0.06 
Total Area 94,730  
Source: Author’s calculations from FAO (2016). 
5.2.2 The case of Kiwere and Magozi schemes 
Households in Kiwere and Magozi obtain incomes from various agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, with irrigation representing the single largest source of livelihoods (Table 5-4).  
Table 5-4 Percentage of total household revenue by activity in 2013/2014 
 Kiwere Magozi 
Irrigated crops 48 67 
Dryland crops and livestock 32 22 
Off-farm activities 20 11 
Source: Author’s calculations from 2014 baseline survey 
In Kiwere, tomatoes, maize and onions are the predominant crops, while Magozi is mainly 
dedicated to rice (Table 5-5). Kiwere receives its water supply from the Little Ruaha River all 
year round. The scheme is located 20 km north-west of Iringa − the regional capital – along an 
easily-accessible, gravel road. The continuous water supply and proximity to markets allow 
irrigators in Kiwere to cultivate a variety of horticultural crops that are harvested and sold 
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throughout the year. This type of cash crops are not only important for the livelihoods of Kiwere 
growers, but in fact have become increasingly important for local and regional markets 
throughout Tanzania over the past decade (Lecoutere 2011). 
Magozi lies 50 km away from Iringa, along the same road as Kiwere, although it is much more 
difficult to access (chiefly during the rainy season) given the steepness and poor quality of the 
road over the last 20 km. The Magozi scheme is located along the Little Ruaha River, upstream 
from Kiwere, and has a water withdrawal license only for the rainy season, i.e. December to 
May. Without easy access to markets and seasonal water provision, rice is a preferred choice in 
Magozi, as it needs little inputs and is only harvested once a year. Rice is increasingly becoming 
a valuable cash crop in Tanzania, following a shift in consumers’ preferences and sharp rise in 
local demand (Mghase et al. 2010). While Asian imports partially fill the supply-demand gap in 
Tanzania and other sub-Saharan African countries, there is a strategic interest to increase 
domestic rice production (Seck et al. 2010; Therkildsen 2011). Rice yields in the Magozi scheme 
are comparable to those at the national level (Table 5-6), although there appears to be high inter-
annual variability.  
Table 5-5 Annual crop production and area planted in Kiwere and Magozi in 2014 
 Kiwere Magozi 
 Production (tonnes) Area (ha) Production (tonnes) Area (ha) 
Rice 8.0 4.5 390.9 101.4 
Tomatoes 614.4 28.8 0.0 0.0 
Maize 62.0 93.6 59.3 31.5 
Sorghum 0.0 0.0 18.0 7.0 
Onion 62.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 
Other vegetables 34.9 12.4 0.0 0.0 
Total 781.2 146.2 468.2 139.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2014 survey data on 200 sampled households. 
 
Table 5-6 Paddy rice yields in Magozi and in Tanzania 
 Mean rice yield (tonnes/ha) 
Magozi 2014 3.7 
Magozi 2015 2.0 
Tanzania irrigated rice 3.8 
Tanzania rain fed lowlands 3.5 
Tanzania rain fed uplands 1.2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on all data available for Magozi in 2014 and 2015 and Barreiro-Hurle (2012), 
Mghase et al. (2010) for Tanzania. 
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 Literature review on crop yield and farm incomes 
5.3.1 Theoretical and empirical links between water, location, yields and incomes 
Inequity of irrigation water supply and its consequences have been widely explored in the 
agricultural economics and rural development literature. Most empirical and theoretical studies 
on gravity-fed, low technology irrigation systems find agreement on two main outcomes. First, 
water is inequitably distributed between head and tail sections and within distributary canals, 
with farms located further away from the water sources being the most disadvantaged. Second, 
such water asymmetries translate into other types of inequality including crop yields, incomes, 
wealth, cooperation and infrastructure maintenance.  
In an extended review of empirical investigations across South and South-East Asia, Hussain 
(2005) concludes that productivity and wealth are most often unevenly distributed between canal 
reaches. Anwar and Ul Haq (2013) provides evidence of considerable disparities in water depths 
thorough calculations of Gini and Theil indices within the Hakra Branch Canal (warabandi 
system in Punjab, Pakistan). Using empirical data from warabandi irrigation systems in India 
and Pakistan, Sharma and Oad (1990) and Khepar et al. (2000) show that tail-enders received 
less water than head enders due to seepage losses. In addition to head vs. tail end contrasts, 
Maskey et al. (1994) note significant differences between upper and lower sections of canal 
reaches (i.e. within branch and distributary canals) regarding frequency of water supply and 
wheat yields in Nepali irrigation schemes. Similarly, following a detailed examination of water 
supply in a south Indian irrigation scheme, Mollinga (2003) concludes that important differences 
exist along distributary canals and that rotation scheduling helps to transfer water towards 
downstream areas.  
Lipton et al. (2003) provide a framework for the analysis of irrigation and poverty in developing 
areas. Their approach considers that irrigation may affect the poor differently depending on their 
position along the distribution system and access to water. Drawing from experience in India and 
Pakistan, Bhattarai et al. (2002 p. 19) strongly argue that inequitable water distribution between 
head, middle and tail reaches of large scale irrigation systems ‘is one of the major factors 
contributing to income inequality in irrigated agriculture’. The authors provide an explanation of 
the theoretical reasons, citing disparities in crop yield, crop selection, water volumes, reliability 
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of supply, infrastructure, water quality, inter-personal conflict, governmental services, incomes 
and wealth accumulation. A recent study in the island of Palawan, in the Philippines (Shively & 
Yao 2015) examines the impact of irrigation development on poverty and income inequality. The 
study concludes that irrigation has an ambiguous impact across various sections of the study area 
and that other financial (availably of off-farm work) and natural (cropping conditions) factors are 
major factors impacting poverty and inequality. 
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) propose that the intrinsic head-end location advantage will, 
in the long run, capitalise into higher land value, thus constituting another form of wealth 
inequality. Crop underproduction by tail-enders and yield inequality have also been noted as 
consequences of disparities in irrigation water access (Ostrom 1993). Ostrom (1993) and Lam 
(1996) argue that water asymmetries are caused by improper overuse by head-end irrigators, thus 
resulting in tail-enders not having predictable and adequate water flow.    
5.3.2 Review of variable selection in regression analyses 
The linkages between water access, yields, incomes and location have also been widely studied 
using regression-modelling techniques (Table 5-7). The choice of model (e.g. linear, spatial, 
probit, quantile, etc.) and variables commonly depends on the authors’ research goals and 
available data. In studies of continuous variables, such as crop yields and incomes, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) multiple linear regression model is one of the most common models, as 
highlighted in Table 5-7. The selection of independent variables is typically made by 
hypothesising which factors are expected to influence the dependent variable, drawing from 
existing literature and knowledge of the local context.  
Table 5-7 Literature summary on regression analyses on yields and incomes 
Source 
and country 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables and model methodology 
Reardon et al. 
(1992) 
Burkina Faso 
Net household 
income 
Share of non-cropping income, asset vector (livestock, land, foodstock, 
savings, out-migration, cultivated cotton land), household size, 
household structure, prices (non-food, food), dummy near main road 
OLS Multiple linear regression 
Battese and Coelli 
(1992) 
India 
Value of rice 
output 
Total irrigated land, total dryland, human labour, bullock labour, input 
costs 
Stochastic frontier production function  
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Table 5-7 Literature summary on regression analyses on yields and incomes 
Source 
and country 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables and model methodology 
Ostrom and 
Gardner (1993) 
Nepal 
Water 
availability 
difference 
Length of canal, labour input, headworks dummy, lining dummy, Terai 
(marsh, grassland, and savannah) dummy, farmer managed dummy 
Regression type not specified 
Makombe and 
Sampath (1998) 
Zimbabwe 
Maize yield  Area, fertiliser, water, water*fertiliser, labour/human capital 
OLS Multiple linear regression 
Becker and 
Johnson (1999) 
Cote D’Ivoire 
Rice yield; 
Weed mass; 
fertiliser 
efficiency 
Water control dummy, seeding method, seeding density, age of 
transplants, herbicide, time of weeding, nitrogen rate, nitrogen timing, 
phosphorous application dummy 
OLS Multiple regression 
Canagarajah et al. 
(2001) 
Ghana 
Non-farm 
income 
Female head of household, female, age, age squared, dependency ratio, 
attended primary school, attended high school, Central region, Eastern 
region, Western region 
OLS Multiple linear regression 
Sadras and 
Bongiovanni 
(2004) Argentina 
Maize yield  Nitrogen, area, season, yield inequality 
Correlation analyses 
Wan (2004)  
China 
 
Per capita 
disposable 
income 
 
Household size, the dependency ratio, per capita capital input, average 
level of education of household members, per capita possession of 
cultivable land, and proportion of labour force employed in rural 
industrial enterprises. 
Multiple linear regression 
Hussain et al. 
(2004) 
India and Pakistan 
Wheat yield dummy for middle location of farmers on the distributary, dummy for 
tail location on the distributary, dummy for improved varieties, sowing 
week, quantity of fertilisers, quantity of irrigation water applied 
measured at field outlet, total number of irrigations, time gap between 
pre-sowing and post-sowing irrigation, percentage of groundwater 
times electrical conductivity, dummy for season 
Multiple linear regression 
Pasaribu and 
Routray (2005) 
Indonesia 
Paddy 
production 
Plot size, seed use per area, labour expenditure per area, fertiliser use 
per area, pesticide use per area, irrigation intensity, age of head, 
education level, frequency of canal maintenance 
OLS Multiple linear regression 
Safa (2005) 
Yemen 
Farm income Family size; age of respondent, land size, number of animals, 
education, coffee production, agroforestry dummy 
Multiple linear regression (OLS and weighted least squares) 
Bhatta et al. (2006)  
Nepal 
Satisfaction with 
irrigation 
management  
Age, education, land, distance from main canal, leakage, equity 
distribution  
Logit regression 
Kato et al. (2006) 
Japan 
Rice Yield 
 
Water regime: flooded lowland, rainfed upland, irrigated upland, water 
deficit upland 
Correlation analysis 
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Table 5-7 Literature summary on regression analyses on yields and incomes 
Source 
and country 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables and model methodology 
Tittonell et al. 
(2007) 
Kenya 
Maize yield 
 
Soil type, fertility rating, area, slope, percentage of clay and silt, soil 
organic carbon, total soil nitrogen, delay in planting, plant density, 
diammonium phosphate, calcium ammonium nitrate, compost, residue, 
labour  
Multiple linear regression 
Tittonell et al. 
(2008) 
Kenya 
Maize yield 
 
General (site, wealth ranking, fertility ranking); management (distance 
between homestead and sampling point), plant population density, weed 
level, striga level, nutrient intensity score); soil and landscape (soil wet 
chemistry, slope, soil spectral data)  
Classification and regression tree  
Zhang et al. (2010) 
Iowa, USA 
Corn yield Vegetation index, precipitation, temperature, water holding capacity 
OLS Multiple linear regression and Spatial Lag 
Kurukulasuriya et 
al. (2011) 
11 African 
countries  
Irrigation choice 
and 
net revenue  
Temp winter, temp spring, temp summer, temp fall, precip winter, 
precip spring, precip summer, precip fall, plot area , log(household 
size), electricity, eutric gleysols, chromic vertisols, orthic luvisols, 
chromic luvisols, dystric nitosols, inverse mills ratio; flow winter, flow 
spring, flow summer 
Probit and multiple linear regression (OLS and corrected) 
Auffhammer et al. 
(2012) 
India 
ln(Rice yield) Weather (rainfall, drought dummy, extreme rainfall, minimum 
temperature, solar radiation); non-weather (area, area with high yield 
varieties, fertiliser, labour) 
Multiple linear regression 
Sarker et al. (2012) 
Bangladesh 
Rice yield Maximum temperature, minimum temperature, total rainfall 
OLS Multiple linear regression and Quantile Regression 
Barnwal and 
Kotani (2013) 
India 
Rice yield Year, area, irrigation (% sown area), fertiliser, drought (dummy), rain 
intensity, temperature, precipitation, temperature standard deviation, 
precipitation standard deviation, agroclimatic zone, temp× agroclimatic 
zone, precipitation× agroclimatic zone 
Quantile regression 
Ahmed et al. 
(2014) 
Nigeria 
Rice yield ln(fertiliser, pesticide, herbicide, labour, education, other area), 
dummy(irrigation used, land hired, seed source, age, other job, farmers 
organisation, training, rice major crop, livestock, flooding) 
OLS Multiple log-log regression (Cobb-Douglas production function) 
Collins et al. 
(2014)  
Cambodia 
Rice yield Distance to water source  
Correlation analysis 
Wang et al. (2015) 
Pakistan 
Crop income per 
capita 
Tubwell owner, tubwell water buyer, household size, age, education, 
labour, caste, water salinity, land fragmentation, soil quality, soil 
salinity, land holding 
Koirala et al. 
(2016) 
Philippines 
Rice yield Area, output value, seed cost, fuel cost, fertiliser, labour, capital, 
irrigation cost, male age, male education, female age, female education, 
household size 
Stochastic production frontier models 
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Table 5-7 Literature summary on regression analyses on yields and incomes 
Source 
and country 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables and model methodology 
Hirooka et al. 
(2016) 
Cambodia 
Leaf area index Seeding date, planting method, water score, carbon in soil, 
carbon/nitrogen ratio in soil, nitrogen fertiliser (excluded weed due to 
inadequate data) 
Analysis of Covariance 
Silva et al. (2017) 
Philippines 
Rice yield  
 
Cultivated land, farm size, rice yield, variety type, input use, seeds, 
nitrogen, phosphorus potassium, irrigation water, fertilisers, insecticide, 
herbicide, no. of operations, land preparation, crop establishment, total 
labour, crop establishment, harvest & threshing 
Stochastic frontier analysis (and yield gap) 
Most of the explanatory variables used in regression models of irrigated yields and incomes fall 
into six main categories: natural, physical, human, social, financial and farm management (Table 
5-8). This classification mirrors the Sustainable Livelihoods (Scoones 1998), Capitals and 
Capabilities (Bebbington 1999), Community Capitals (Emery & Flora 2006; Gutierrez-Montes et 
al. 2009) frameworks, which serve to analyse community development on the basis of a various 
types of capitals: natural, physical, human, cultural/social, economic/financial, political and/or 
built. 
Table 5-8 Key factors in irrigated agriculture for yields and farm incomes 
Category Definition Key factors in irrigated agriculture 
Human 
Skills, ability and physical capability of 
people to pursue livelihood strategies 
Household size, education, marital status, gender, 
training 
Social 
Social resources upon which people draw to 
pursue livelihood strategies 
Participation in community organisations, type of 
irrigation organisation, cooperation/conflict  
Financial 
Capital base that supports the pursuit of any 
livelihood strategy 
Area, incomes, expenses, asset ownership, 
livestock ownership, off-farm activities  
Natural 
Factors relative to natural resources (e.g. 
water, air, soil, etc.) from which benefits are 
derived and that exist in a particular location  
Precipitation, temperature, soil conditions (type, 
slope, fertility, nutrients), water quality, agro-
climatic zone 
Physical 
Factors relative to infrastructure supporting 
livelihood strategies  
Water access (volumes, frequency, reliability, 
etc.), location (distance to main canal, to canal 
intake, to markets, to main roads)  
Farm 
management 
Factors relative to improved agricultural 
practices 
Fertiliser, pesticides, herbicides, agronomic 
practices, cultivation/harvesting timing, crop 
variety, infrastructure maintenance, labour use 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Scoones (1998), Emery and Flora (2006) and studies cited in Table 5-7 
Chapter 5 
67 
5.3.3 Water, yields and incomes hypotheses 
This study extends the literature by using regression analyses to test the association between 
water access, location, irrigated incomes and yields within the Kiwere and Magozi schemes in 
southern Tanzania. Based on previous findings in the published literature and earlier chapters of 
this thesis, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H1.1: Irrigated crop income is positively associated with the adequacy of water supply;  
H1.2: Irrigated crop income is negatively associated with the distance between farm and the 
system’s intake; 
H2.1: Irrigated crop yields are positively associated with the adequacy of water supply;  
H2.2: Irrigated crop yields are negatively associated with the distance between farm and the 
system’s intake. 
 Methodology 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how incomes and yields vary in relation to irrigation 
variables, particularly water supply and location. The multiple linear regression model and its 
estimation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most widely used analysis technique in 
econometrics (Schmidheiny 2013), particularly when the dependent variable is continuous and 
without censoring. Thus, OLS multiple regression models used in this chapter allow 
identification of the partial effect of water (and other influences) on incomes and yields, while 
holding the rest of explanatory variables constant. Thus, following Stock and Watson (2003 p. 
198), the OLS multiple regression model adopted in this chapter is written in the following form: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ,   𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛  (5.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is i
th observation on the dependent variable (irrigated crop income or irrigated crop 
yields) and 𝑋𝑘𝑖 are the i
th observations on each of the k regressors and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term.  
In accordance with the formulated hypotheses (Section 5.3.3), two separate overall analyses were 
carried out, where the dependent variables are incomes from irrigated crops in the first model 
(hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2) and crop yields in the second one (hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2).  
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The first step in each of the analyses is to formulate a model including all independent variables 
that are theoretically expected to influence incomes and yields. This model is named the 
theoretical model hereafter. The choice of variables in the theoretical models was made on the 
basis of previous literature (Section 5.3.2) and findings in Chapter 4. A list of the selected 
explanatory variables and their definitions is provided in Section 5.5.5. In a second step, a series 
of stepwise statistical tests are run to empirically remove regressors from the theoretical model to 
arrive at the proposed specific or final model (Clarke 2014).  
Two different variable removal methods are used to verify consistency of results. First a 
backward elimination procedure is conducted whereby independent variables are eliminated 
according to a predefined selection criterion (Lai & Ing 2010). This consists of running an OLS 
regression and then removing the least significant variable, as long as the p-value is larger than 
the specified value to remove (in this case =0.10). Subsequently, the regression is re-run and 
the elimination process repeated until all remaining variables meet the selection criterion. 
Regression models were run with robust standard errors to mitigate any potential effect of 
heteroscedasticity. Second, a general-to-specific algorithm is applied, also with robust standard 
errors. As Clarke (2014) explains, this consists of running an elimination process by ranking 
each variable in the theoretical model based on its t-statistic and carrying out a series of tests.  
Given that there is no strict way to model the functional form of the specification, various 
versions of the regression models were tested in linear and non-linear forms and their results 
compared. Various transformations techniques exist (e.g. polynomial, square root, inverse) with 
logarithmic transformation being one of the most commonly used in the regression analyses of 
agricultural production (Ahmed et al. 2014; Auffhammer et al. 2012; Barnwal & Kotani 2013; 
Koirala et al. 2016; Silva et al. 2017). The logarithm function is particularly useful as it allows 
one to interpret changes in variables as percentage changes (Stock & Watson 2003). Thus, the 
theoretical regression models in this chapter are formulated and tested in linear, linear-log, log-
linear and log-log forms. To avoid the function discontinuity at ln(0), observations with zeros 
were replaced with a value of one, resulting in ln(1)=0.  
After running the four linear and log income models, sensitivity analysis was conducted on the 
plot location. In 2014, plot locations were noted according to the irrigators’ indications, whereas 
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in 2015 the locations were defined using geo-coded data and spatial manipulation techniques 
(see Section 5.5.4).  
5.4.1 Note on spatial regression analysis 
OLS multiple regression models are commonly used for crop yield prediction, yet the 
assumption of independence among observations may be violated given spatial autocorrelation. 
Spatial autoregressive models can be used to overcome this limitation, as shown by Florax et al. 
(2002) and Zhang et al. (2010) in their studies of crop yields.  
By observing the thematic maps (Figure 5-1) it appeared that paddy rice yields in Magozi could 
follow a spatial pattern, which could be investigated using Spatial Lag and Spatial Error models. 
Here, the validity of spatial models here is highly compromised by the small number of 
observations resulting in large data gaps between plots. While spatial regression analysis can 
handle limited data gaps, a large number of missing observations would result in a bias in the 
error term (Boehmke et al. 2015).  
Therefore, spatial variation in yields was explored through OLS regression using independent 
variables that accounted for farm location. These included distance between farm and main 
canal, distance between farm and system intake and location within the head/middle/end sections 
of the scheme.  
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Figure 5-1 Spatial representation of rice yields in Magozi 
 
2014 
 
2015 
Source: Author’s own maps elaborated with ArcMap using fieldwork data 
 Data description and limitations 
Three sources of data are used in this analysis: the 2014 baseline survey and the 2015 fieldwork 
survey and the spatial database (see Data sources, descriptions and limitations for details). Given 
data gaps and methodological limitations, different data subsets for the income and the yield 
models are used, as detailed below. 
5.5.1 Income analysis in the Kiwere and Magozi schemes 
In the analysis of irrigation income, populations from the Kiwere and Magozi schemes are 
combined to increase the number of observations (with a dummy to indicate the scheme). 
Regression analyses on each separate scheme was not possible given the small population 
samples. A two-year cross-sectional dataset was used, combining the 2014 survey (200 
households), with 128 of them re-interviewed in 2015 (see Table 2-3).  
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In this analysis, income from irrigated crops is defined as gross income, also referred to as 
revenue or cash receipts (Stretch 2014). Here, irrigated income is defined as the cash obtained by 
irrigators as a result of selling their irrigated crops over a 12-month period, as reported in the 
2014 baseline survey (see question 65 in Appendix A). A more accurate way of examining the 
financial success of irrigation would be to use net income, calculated as cash receipts minus cash 
costs (Wheeler et al. 2014). However, this is not possible because the baseline survey did not 
collect data on all cash costs derived from irrigation. Instead, farm expenses (e.g. labour, seeds, 
transportation, etc.) were recoded conjointly for irrigated and dryland crops. Expenses on 
herbicide, pesticides and fungicide were recorded as part of a separate question, explicitly 
referring only to irrigated crops (question 16). Therefore, they can be used as a separate variable 
in the irrigated crop income model.  
Irrigated crop incomes per farm in the Kiwere and Magozi scheme vary considerably within the 
sampled populations, ranging from zero to over 19 million TZS or 8,500 USD3 (see summary 
statistics in Table 5-10). Maps depicting the spatial distribution of incomes in Kiwere and 
Magozi were created with ArcMap and shown in Figure 5-2. 
                                                 
3 1 USD = 2,237 TZS at 07/06/2017 exchange rate 
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Figure 5-2 Spatial representation of irrigated crop incomes in Kiwere and Magozi 
Kiwere scheme Magozi scheme 
Source: Author’s own maps elaborated with ArcMap using fieldwork data 
5.5.2 Paddy rice yields in the Magozi scheme 
The second regression analysis is based on paddy rice yields in the Magozi scheme. Crop yields 
in the Kiwere scheme are not included in this analysis because of the high variety of irrigated 
produce (rice, sorghum, maize, tomatoes, other vegetables and fruits). Given the crops’ 
differences in weight, market value and input requirements, it is very difficult to obtain a 
measure of yield that would allow a reasonable comparison across both schemes. To compare 
production levels of various crops, a standard method is to convert the yield of each crop into a 
crop equivalent yield based on conversions across crop market prices (Dayton-Johnson 1999; 
Uddin et al. 2009; Vidyavathi et al. 2012). For the purpose of this thesis, such approach has 
important limitations. First, crop market prices in the Iringa area fluctuate widely over time, so 
the conversion rates would actually vary within one irrigation season and inter-annually. Second, 
there is no historic information on crop prices in Iringa that would allow an accurate estimation 
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of crop equivalences at the time of production. In Magozi, rice is the only irrigated crop, with the 
exception of some minor sorghum production. Such homogeneity facilitates the comparative 
study of paddy rice yields across the scheme.  
Given that the Magozi population sample is relatively small (n=100), the number of observations 
was maximised by combining data from 2014 and 2015. Information on irrigated area, 
production and water supply was recorded both in 2014 and 2015, thus allowing two sets of 
observations to be generated, i.e. one for each year. Variables that only have data for one year 
(e.g. education) are assumed to remain unchanged. Thus, stacking up the regression equations 
into one combined model obtains: 
𝑦 =
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   (5.2) 
where n is the number of observations for 2014, p-n is the number of observations for 2015, p is 
the total number of observations and k is the number of regressors (explanatory variables) 
included in the model. This model is run with clustered standard errors to account for pairs of 
values (2014 and 2015) corresponding to the same household, given the two year panel nature of 
the two year cross-sectional dataset4.  
In this analysis, rice output in measured by the weight (in kg) of paddy. Strictly speaking, paddy 
refers to harvested, un-milled rice with its protective husk in place (RGA 2017). Conversely, rice 
refers to the grain after removal of the husk (brown rice), germ and bran (white rice). Unlike 
most grains that are weighted clean and dry, rice production (and yields) is generally reported in 
terms of paddy instead of milled rice (FAO 2011). In the Magozi scheme, irrigators weight their 
                                                 
4 A fixed effects model for panel data could not be estimated since most of the variables of interest do not vary 
between the two years. In addition, a random effects model for panel data has a too strong assumption on the error 
term and, hence, is not appropriate. Therefore, a pooled regression model with clustered standard errors was used, 
following the example of Baylis et al. (2011), who model the effects of agro-climatic and human variables on farm 
value . 
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paddy during the bagging process, where each bags equates to 50 kg (Figure 5-3). However, it 
should be noted that the terms paddy, rice paddy and rice are often used interchangeably in the 
literature (Becker & Johnson 1999; Mghase et al. 2010; Saito et al. 2015).    
Figure 5-3 Paddy bags in Magozi in July 2015 
 
Source: Author’s own photo from fieldwork 
An important consideration in crop productivity calculations is the distinction between sown and 
harvested area. Due to various reasons, e.g. resource constrains or adverse climatic conditions, 
certain areas planted or sown may not be harvested (FAO 2011). Data collected during the 2015 
survey shows important differences in sown and harvested areas for a number of rice growers in 
Magozi. Reportedly, failed harvests in 2015 were a result of reduced rainfall, low river flows and 
consequent water scarcity within the irrigation system (see Section 4.5.1). Interviewees also 
noted that during the previous season (2014) water availability had not been such a significant 
issue. Meteorological data recorded in the Iringa station (The United Republic of Tanzania 2016) 
shows that annual rainfall in 2015 was almost 40 percent lower than in 2014, i.e. 555 mm and 
885 mm, respectively.  
Crop output per harvested area responds to the proper definition of yields, which is used in 
international crop statistics (OECD 2015) and most commonly in the literature − e.g., Kato et al. 
(2006); Sadras and Bongiovanni (2004); and Hussain et al. (2004). Nevertheless, a number of 
studies employ other measures of area, such as total irrigated area (Battese & Coelli 1992), sown 
area (Barnwal & Kotani 2013) and farmland area (Kurukulasuriya et al. 2011; Tittonell et al. 
2007). In this chapter, irrigated (sown) area is used for a number of reasons. First, data on 2014 
irrigated area does not distinguish between sown and harvested land. Second, using total 
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irrigated area is of particular interest as it allows us to consider the effects of water scarcity on 
land abandonment and rice productivity, as reported qualitatively in Magozi.  
5.5.3 Detection of outliers 
Unusual values, often referred to as outliers, can be a result of errors or may carry important 
information. The exact characterisation depends on the underlying assumptions and detection 
method, but a general definition of an outlier is an observation that appears to be inconsistent 
with the rest of the data (Ben-Gal 2005). A number of advanced statistical techniques exist 
(Ibid.) to detect abnormal values in large, complex datasets. Conversely, when dealing with 
small sample sizes and a limited number of unusual values, other techniques such as summary 
statistics and graphical methods are particularly useful (Williamson et al. 1989). 
In the Kiwere and Magozi income model, two outliers in the income variable were detected 
(respondent codes ‘kwr092’ and ‘mgz073’ in Figure 5-4). Considering the economic context of 
both schemes, such extreme values are highly improbable and therefore it is reasonable to 
assume that they are errors. In a sensitivity analysis, regression models in linear form were run 
with and without the possible outliers. After the elimination process, the model in which all 
observations were kept had an adjusted-R2 of 0.39 and only four statistically significant 
explanatory variables. Conversely, the regression without unusual income observations had an 
adjusted-R2 of 0.49 and 11 significant regressors. Given the abnormality of extreme incomes and 
the poor performance of the model, the two income outliers were dropped from the sample. 
Fertiliser expenses and tomato production also presented one abnormal observation each. 
However, dropping these observations did not significantly affect the results or performance of 
the models and, hence, they were kept.  
In the Magozi rice yield model outliers in the dependent and independent variables were 
investigated following the same process. No unusual values were found and hence no 
observations were dropped from the sample.    
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Figure 5-4 Box and scatter plots of irrigated income and irrigated area by scheme 
 
 
Kiwere 
 
Magozi 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata 
5.5.4 Spatial manipulation 
One of the key variables of interest in this chapter is location of the farm plots, which is 
hypothesised to influence incomes and yields. In the agricultural literature, location is often 
referred to as the position within the head, middle or tail sections on an irrigation scheme. In this 
chapter, location is analysed in various ways.  
First, based on the 2014 survey data, location is defined as a trichotomous variable according to 
the interviewees’ responses to the question: ‘Where is your plot located? Head, middle or tail 
section of the scheme?’ 
Second, using Geographic Information System (GIS) data collected in 2015, plot location was 
defined as a continuous variable (in m or km) representing two distances: a) between farm and 
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irrigation canal (‘transversal distance’) and b) between farm and system intake. Using the digital 
files provided by Tanzanian research colleagues (see Section 2.4.3), spatial analyses were carried 
out with ArcMap 10.3.1 software. First, for each farm plot (polygon) ‘near analysis’ function 
was used to identify the closest point on the irrigation canals. Because there is no data available 
on distributary canals, it was assumed that for each plot, the closest point on the irrigation canals 
is its’ off-take. The distance between the farm polygon and the off-take was recorded as the 
transversal distance. Second, ‘network analysis’ function was used to calculate the linear 
distance along the main irrigation canals between the farm off-take points and the system intake. 
A graphical example of the distance calculations is presented in Appendix F. 
In Kiwere and Magozi, families often own and/or rent multiple plots located in scattered 
locations across the irrigation schemes. Because the survey data in this thesis are associated to 
households and not farms, an adjustment in distances is needed to be made for households 
cultivating multiple plots. In these cases, distances were calculated as a weighted average across 
all plots. The weighted average distance takes into account the size of each plot, assuming that 
the larger the size, the greater the importance for crop production:  
𝑊𝐷𝑖 =
∑ 𝐷𝑗𝐴𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
     (5.3) 
where, WDi is the weighted average distance of household i, n is the number of plots own/rented 
by household i, Dj is the distance associated with plot j and Aj, is the area of plot j. For 
households with one single plot, WDi=Dj.  
Weighted average distances expressed in meters (or km) can be used only when analysing each 
scheme separately. This is because the Kiwere and Magozi schemes differ significantly in size 
(6.8km and 9.4km, respectively in the main canal length) and, therefore, the same distance would 
not reflect the same proximity to the intake. Thus, relative distance was expressed as the ratio of 
the distance between farm plot and system’s intake over the total system’s length. The formula 
is: 
𝑅𝐷𝑖 =
𝑊𝐷𝑖
𝐿
       (5.4) 
where, RDi is the relative distance of household i, WDi n is weighted average distance of 
household i and L is the length of the main canal. 
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The third method consisted of converting relative distances into a trichotomous scale (head, 
middle, end), which is common in the literature. Schemes were divided in three equal parts, each 
measuring one third of the total length. The formula is as follows:  
𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖 =
{
 
 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑       𝑖𝑓                    𝑅𝐷𝑖  <  
1
3⁄
𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒   𝑖𝑓      1 3⁄ ≤  𝑅𝐷𝑖  <
 2
3⁄
𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙         𝑖𝑓                     𝑅𝐷𝑖  ≥
 2
3⁄
    (5.5) 
where LOCi is the location in trichotomous scale of household i and RDi is the relative distance 
of household i. 
5.5.5 Variable description 
The variables in the income and yield models were selected from each of the six ‘capitals’, as 
detailed in Section 5.3.2 and Table 5-8. Based on the literature review, the expected sign (e.g. 
positive or negative) of each variable on irrigated crop incomes and yields is provided in Table 
5-9. Both dependent variables of income and yield are hypothesised to be influenced in the same 
direction by each independent variable below. In those cases where the literature provides mixed 
results, a question mark is used to indicate mixed results. Summary statistics and definitions of 
all model variables are provided in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-9 Modelled variables for income and yield models 
Category Variables 
Human Female gender (-), Age (?), Education (+), Household size (+)  
Social Irrigation scheme (?) 
Financial Crop production (+), Area (+), Off-farm income (?), Asset ownership (+) 
Natural Soil fertility (+), Clay soil (+), Sandy soil (-), Year (?) 
Physical 
Perception on Equity of water distribution (+), Satisfaction with water supply (+), 
Timing of water supply-End (-), Distance to intake (-), Distance to main canal (-)  
Farm management Herbicide, pesticide and fungicide input (+), Fertiliser input (+) 
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Table 5-10 Variable description and summary statistics for the income and yield models 
Variable Definition Model N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Gender (dummy) Gender of household head 0= male; 1=female Income 200 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Yield 248 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Age Age of the of household head Income 196 43.54 13.26 18 91 
Yield 200 42.76 13.08 18 77 
Education of household 
head (dummy) 
0= no education or some primary; 1= completed primary education or 
beyond 
Income 196 0.79 0.40 0 1 
Yield 198 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Household size Number of people living in the household Income 200 5.71 2.17 1 10 
Yield 200 5.46 2.01 1 10 
Scheme (dummy) 0= Kiwere; 1= Magozi Income 200 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Irrigated income Gross income from irrigated crops in ‘000 TZS Income 198 1,292 1,994 0 19,001 
ln (Irrigated income) Natural logarithm of gross income from irrigated crops in '000 TZS Income 198 5.96 2.27 0 9.85 
Rice production Annual rice production in kg Income 200 1,994 4,002 0 30,150 
Maize production Annual maize production in kg Income 200 2,099 5,093 0 48,000 
Tomato production Annual tomato production in kg Income 200 3,072 26,106 0 360,000 
Sorghum production Annual sorghum production in kg Income 200 90 623 0 8,000 
Onion production Annual onion production in kg Income 200 310 2,060 0 24,000 
ln (Rice production) Natural logarithm of annual rice production in kg Income 200 4.01 3.96 0 10.31 
ln (Maize production) Natural logarithm of annual maize production in kg Income 200 4.19 3.81 0 10.78 
ln (Tomato production) Natural logarithm of annual tomato production in kg Income 200 1.73 3.32 0 12.79 
ln (Sorghum production) Natural logarithm of annual sorghum production in kg Income 200 0.40 1.61 0 8.99 
ln (Onion production) Natural logarithm of annual onion production in kg Income 200 0.47 1.88 0 10.09 
Production of other 
irrigated crops (dummy) 
0=no other irrigated crops produced; 1=other irrigated crops produced Income 200 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Paddy yields Paddy yield in kg/ha/year Yield 170 2,828 1,846 0 10,383 
ln (Paddy yields) Natural logarithm of paddy yield in kg/ha/year Yield 170 7.43 1.85 0 9.25 
Irrigated area Area under irrigation in 2013/14 season, in m2 Income 200 10,152 8,985 0 4,856 
Yield 174 10,451 9,767 0 60,703 
ln (Irrigated area) Natural logarithm of area under irrigation in 2013/14 season in sqm Income 200 8.78 1.45 0 10,79 
Yield 174.00 8.83 1.38 0 11.01 
Off-farm income 
(dummy) 
0=household has no off-farm income; 1=household has some off-farm 
income 
Income 200 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Water pump (dummy) 1=ownership of borehole or water pump; 0=otherwise Income 199 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Mobile phone (dummy) 1=ownership of mobile phone; 0=otherwise Income 199 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Farm tools (dummy) 0= Ownership of only hand tools; 1= ownership of animal or motor-driven 
farming tools 
Yield 200 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Soil fertility (dummy) 0= infertile or moderately fertile; 1= very fertile Income 199 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Yield 200 0.45 0.5 0 1 
Sandy soil (dummy) 1= Sandy; 0=other Income 199 0.28 0.45 0 1 
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Table 5-10 Variable description and summary statistics for the income and yield models 
Variable Definition Model N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Clay soil 1= Clay; 0=other Income 199 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Year (dummy) 0= 2014 observation; 1= 2015 observation Yield 236 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Perception of equity of 
water distribution 
Agreement with the statement ‘water is equitably distributed among the 
irrigators in your irrigation system’: 1= Totally disagree, 2=Disagree, 
3=Neutral/Don’t know, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree 
Income 197 3.29 1.13 1 5 
Yield 175 2.74 1.04 1 5 
Satisfaction with water 
supply 
1= Very dissatisfied, 2= Dissatisfied, 3=Neutral/Don’t know, 4= Satisfied, 
5= Very satisfied 
Income 197 3.49 1.01 1 5 
Yield 176 3.14 1.12 1 5 
Timing of water supply 
(dummy) 
1= only receive water at the end of the irrigation season, 0 = otherwise Yield 152 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Reported head location 
(dummy) 
Head location reported by interviewee where 0= Middle or tail; 1= Head Income 195 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Reported tail location 
(dummy) 
Tail location as reported by interviewee where 0= Head or middle; 1= Tail Income 195 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Geo-coded head location 
(dummy) 
Conversion from relative distance where 0= Middle or tail; 1= Head Income 126 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Yield 144 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Geo-coded tail location 
(dummy) 
Conversion from relative distance where 0= Head or middle; 1= Tail Income 126 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Yield 144 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Relative distance to 
intake 
Distance from farm off-take to system intake over total canal length Income 126 0.40 0.26 0 1 
Distance to canal Average weighted distance between farm plot and irrigation canal in km Yield 144 108 135 0 573 
Distance to intake Average weighted distance between farm off-take and system intake in km Yield 144 3,916 2,587 196 9,380 
Herbicide, pesticide and 
fungicide input 
Annual expenses (‘000 TZS) of herbicide, pesticide and fungicide Income 200 88 215 0 1,610 
Annual expenses (TZS) of herbicide, pesticide and fungicide per ha Yield 194 14,706 15,146 0 84,016 
ln (Herbicide, pesticide 
and fungicide input) 
Natural logarithm expenses of herbicide, pesticide and fungicide Income 200 2.83 1.96 0 7.38 
Natural logarithm expenses of herbicide, pesticide and fungicide per ha Yield 194 6.58 4.66 0 11.34 
Fertiliser input Annual expenses (‘000 TZS) of fertiliser Income 200 450 2,865 0 40,400 
ln (Fertiliser input) Natural logarithm of annual expenses (‘000 TZS) of fertiliser Income 200 2.89 3.07 0 10.61 
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 Results from the irrigated crop income models in Kiwere and Magozi  
5.6.1 General model considerations 
Correlations and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) among model regressors were checked for 
serious multicollinearity. Onion and tomato production had the strongest correlation (r= 0.80), 
which can be explained by households’ preferences in terms of crop selection. Second, clay and 
sandy soil types had a relatively high correlation (r = -0.49), which can be explained because 
they are both dummies coded from the original soil type categorical variable. Rice production 
was correlated with scheme (r = 0.48) and irrigated area (r = 0.49), which is because rice is the 
predominant crop in Magozi and is usually cultivated over larger areas, compared to horticultural 
crop that are most common in Kiwere. The mean VIFs for specific models did not exceed 1.70, 
while the highest VIF score for any of the independent variables was tomato production (3.15) in 
the linear model. Hence, it was concluded that there was no serious multicollinearity present in 
the final models (i.e. no VIFs over 5), and no variables were dropped in the regression.  
In this chapter, all models results were checked for robustness. The results from the backward 
elimination process and the general-to-specific method are generally consistent. With the 
exception of the linear model in the general-to-specific method, all the rest show robustness of 
results in the selection of significant regressors and their coefficients. In the first linear model, 11 
out of 24 independent variables remain significant at least at the 0.10 level, whereas in the rest, 
only eight variables or less remain significant at this level after the elimination process (see 
Table 5-11). The linear models have a reasonable overall fit based on their adjusted-R2 (0.49 and 
0.47), considerably better than the linear-log model (adjusted-R2 = 0.22). However, the 
adjusted-R2 cannot be used to compare linear and log models, as the dependent variables are not 
the same (one is Yi and the other is ln(Yi)).  
5.6.2 Hypotheses testing 
The first hypothesis that irrigated crop income is positively associated with the adequacy of 
water supply is not supported by the results of the regression analysis given that the independent 
variable satisfaction with water supply is not significant across all models. This suggests that 
perceptions of adequacy of supply are not significant for irrigated crop incomes when other more 
relevant human and financial factors are controlled for. This is consistent with information 
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gathered during qualitative interviews, as many irrigators explained that (besides water access) 
differences in capital (including land assets) were one of the main factors contributing to the 
economic divide within their communities.   
The second hypothesis (irrigated crop income is negatively associated with the distance between 
farm and the system’s intake) is supported by the linear and linear-log models, which indicate 
that (reported) location in the tail-end of the schemes has a negative effect on irrigated crop 
incomes. Interestingly, the log-linear model suggests that (reported) head-end location also has a 
negative effect on incomes. The implication of these results is that the effect of distance between 
farm and intake may not be linear, but actually cluster around head, middle and tail areas of the 
schemes. In a sensitivity test, two models were tested using GIS-calculated farm location 
(continuous distance and trichotomous variables), as described in Section 5.5.4. Both models 
resulted in the same specific model, where location measured with GIS methods is not 
significant at the 0.10 level. Linear distances were centred and squared to check the presence of a 
quadratic, U-shape relationship, but the variable was not significant. Contrasting results between 
reported and GIS locations could be due to the variation in population sub-sample, as not all 
households had spatial data available. Moreover, self-reported location is subject to irrigators’ 
understating of the entire scheme. In some cases, irrigators seemed to associate their farm 
location to their place of residence. This was particularly marked in the Magozi scheme, where 
the farming community is split into three villages, Magozi, Ilolo mpya and Mkombilenga, which 
are aligned with the head, middle and end sections of the irrigation system (see Magozi map in 
Appendix C).  
5.6.3 Other variables of interest 
Out of the four household characteristic variables, age, household size and education are 
statistically significant (at least at the 0.10 level) across several models. Age is found to have a 
negative statistically significant influence on irrigated incomes, contrasting with some previous 
research (Safa 2005) suggesting age was not significant for farm incomes. The influence of age 
in Magozi and Kiwere could be explained by the greater capacity of the young to undertake 
physically demanding irrigation work. Moreover, the willingness of younger irrigators to adopt 
innovative, more profitable farming practices could be explored as another linkage between age 
and incomes. The positive and statistically significant influence of household size may indicate 
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the important contribution of children or elderly to family livelihoods, as noted by Wan (2004). 
By contrast to the short-term benefits, employing school-age family members in irrigation could 
become detrimental for their long-term wellbeing, if their formal education were to become 
compromised. Notably, during qualitative discussions, a few interviewees mentioned that, 
because of their poor financial situation and uncertainty of water supply, they were unable to 
employ professional labourers. Instead − chiefly in Magozi – irrigators often have to engage their 
own children to assist with farming activities whenever required, although this may conflict with 
regular school attendance or even important activities, such as end-of-year examinations. 
Household head’s education level is statistically significant across most models, yet it has an 
unexpected negative sign. Given this unusual association, sensitivity tests were carried out using 
education level of the head’s spouse and a combination of head and spouse’s education levels. 
Different scales (binary and multilevel) were also tested. Regardless of how education was 
accounted for, the results were statistically insignificant or significant with a negative coefficient. 
A possible explanation could be that educated households are more focused on other highly 
skilled activities, thus relying less on irrigation. Thus, it could be expected that a) households 
with higher education levels earn higher incomes from non-irrigated activities and b) non-
irrigated incomes represent a greater portion of their total earnings. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests of statistical significance showed no difference in 
non-irrigated incomes, neither in absolute figures nor as a proportion of total household incomes. 
Therefore, the negative influence of education on irrigated incomes remains unexplained.  
Gender of the household head is not statistically significant at the 0.10 level for irrigation 
incomes across all models. While this may seem to contradict conventional wisdom, there is 
increasing evidence that female-headed households in sub-Saharan Africa are not necessarily 
income-disadvantaged and that gender inequalities are not always well captured by only 
observing household headship (IFAD 2001; van Koppen et al. 2007). Hence, the influence of 
gender was also tested using a decision-making index5 developed by Bjornlund et al. (2017b) for 
                                                 
5 For each production type (irrigated crops; rain-fed crops; cattle; and small stock) the index was created by 
summing up six decisions on: i) crop/animal; ii) implements; iii) input; iv) work schedule; v) selling 
produce/animals; and vi) use of farming proceeds, and rescaled to five decision-making categories: decisions made 
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the six irrigation schemes included in this thesis. The index reflects the relative level of 
participation of men and women in decisions regarding irrigation and overall household matters. 
Two forms of the index were tested – for irrigated crops and overall farming decisions – both 
alone and in combination with household head gender dummy. In none of the cases was the 
decision-making index significant, hence confirming the results found from the simple dummy 
of gender. 
As expected from the literature review, irrigated area is statistically significant and positively 
associated with irrigated crop incomes. Households cultivating greater areas have the potential to 
obtain greater agricultural outputs and, in turn, earn greater revenues from selling their crops. 
This finding is consistent with numerous previous studies highlighting the association between 
landholding disparities and the distribution of agricultural benefits (Hussain & Hanjra 2003; 
Lipton et al. 2003; Maskey et al. 1994; van Etten et al. 2002). Such a connection was also noted 
by irrigators in Kiwere and Magozi (see Section 4.5.2), and noted as one of the key mechanisms 
linking irrigation water supply and socio-economic inequalities within the farming communities. 
Indeed, households with higher incomes are in a better position to expand their irrigation 
activities by buying more land. In turn, greater irrigated area provides an opportunity to increase 
their incomes. This creates a feedback loop whereby wealth inequalities (landholding and 
incomes) may be exacerbated by irrigation.6  
Production of rice and high-value crops (onion and ‘other’) are statistically significant and 
positively associated with incomes. This link is consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, 
indicating that yields are connected to economic inequalities. Tomato production (linear and log) 
is statistically significant across five models, yet the sign is inconsistent between the linear and 
logarithmic forms. During fieldwork in 2015, it was observed that many irrigators struggled to 
sell their tomatoes either due to oversupply relative to the market demand or poor quality of the 
                                                 
by 1—all females; 2—mainly females; 3—balanced between females and males; 4—mainly by males; 5—all males. 
An overall gender decision--making index was also defined by taking the average of the four production types 
 
6 Endogeneity issues in the model are not expected given that current season irrigation land input is used as an 
independent variable for current season irrigation crop revenue as a dependent variable. Hence, there should be no 
reverse causality, i.e. current season irrigation crop revenue should not be a predictor of current season irrigation 
land input.  
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produce. In fact, tomatoes grown in Kiwere were often affected by pests and diseases that are 
common in the Iringa region (MUVI-SIDO 2009). Such results raise questions about the 
importance of crop selection as a strategy to increase livelihoods, chiefly in the Kiwere scheme 
where a wide range of products can be cultivated.  
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Table 5-11 OLS regression model results of irrigated crop income in Kiwere and Magozi schemes 
 Theoretical model Backward elimination 
Independent  variables Linear Linear Linear-Log Log-Linear Log-Log Linear GIS distance Linear GIS dummies 
Gender 99.80 (232.85) . . . . . . 
Age -14.67* (8.25) -15.57** (6.42) . -0.04** (0.02) -0.03** (0.01) -12.55** (6.11) -12.55** (6.11) 
Education -407.51* (211.87) -427.36** (200.80) . -1.02*** (0.36) -0.80** (0.31) -71062.1977 -71062.1977 
Household size 11.16 (68.45) . . 0.19** (0.09) 0.16** (0.08) . . 
Scheme 229.65 (330.02) . . . 2.34*** (0.44) . . 
Rice production 0.18* (0.11) 0.19** (0.09)  0.00*** (0.00)  0.18* (0.10) 0.18* (0.10) 
 ln (Rice production)   189.32*** (51.93)  .   
Maize production -0.03 (0.02) -0.0008  .  . . 
ln (maize production)   .  .   
Tomato production -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01)  .  -0.01** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 
ln (Tomato prod.)   .  0.12* (0.07)   
Sorghum production -0.02 (0.08) .  . . . . 
ln (Sorghum prod)   -110.00** (46.19)  .   
Onion production 0.16** (0.07) 0.17** (0.07)  .  0.15* (0.08) 0.15* (0.08) 
ln (onion production)   .  .   
Other irrig. crops 875.35** (373.60) 677.79* (366.59) . . . 705.57* (380.20) 705.57* (380.20) 
Irrigated area 0.10*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03)  0.00* (0.00)  0.10*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 
ln (Irrigated area)   538.31* (292.34)  0.46*** (0.12)   
Off-farm income -309.52 (237.12) . . . . . . 
Mobile phone 308.68 (239.36) . 477.47** (225.27) . . . . 
Water pump -555.27 (579.09) . . . . . . 
Soil fertility 572.07** (274.52) 638.25** (284.68) 599.27* (332.16) . . 463.35* (279.48) 463.35* (279.48) 
Clay soil 213.27 (298.11) . . . . . . 
Sandy soil 515.85* (294.94) 400.05* (240.54) 505.80* (305.50) . . . . 
Equity of distribution 133.82 (124.11) . . . . . . 
Satisfaction water supply -25.82 (158.46) . . . . . . 
Reported head location 51.34 (338.03) . . -0.91** (0.40) . . . 
Reported tail location -667.11*** (218.20) -707.30*** (222.56) -1,055.48*** (308.65) . . . . 
Distance to intake      .  
Geo-coded head (dummy)       . 
Geo-coded tail (dummy)       . 
Fertiliser input 0.01 (0.01) .  . . . . 
ln (Fertiliser input)   .  .   
Herb. pest, fungicide 0.67 (0.62) .  . . . . 
ln (Herb. pest, fungi)   201.01*** (58.46)  0.24** (0.10)   
Constant 45.78 (902.53) 796.90** (378.14) -5,262.42** (2,496.99) 6.96*** (0.74) 0.66 (1.12) 586.79 (382.47) 586.79 (382.47) 
Observations 186 186 194 186 190 189 189 
R-squared 0.53 0.52 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.49 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.534 0.49 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.47 0.47 
F-Statistic 4.123*** 3.31*** 4.825*** 8.017*** 14.5*** 4.142*** 4.142*** 
.Variables are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level and dropped from the final model;  *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; Blanks indicate variables are not included in the models 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 5-11 OLS regression model results of irrigated crop income in Kiwere and Magozi schemes (cont’) 
 General – to - Specific 
Independent variables Linear Linear-Log Log-Linear Log-Log Linear GIS distance Linear GIS dummies 
Gender . . . . . . 
Age . . -0.03** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) . . 
Education . . -0.92*** (0.35) -0.80** (0.31) -0.84*** (0.29) -0.87*** (0.29) 
Household size . . 0.20** (0.09) 0.16** (0.08) . . 
Scheme . . 1.09*** (0.33) 2.34*** (0.44) 1.46*** (0.32) 1.28*** (0.30) 
Rice production .  0.00* (0.00)  . . 
ln (Rice production)  189.32*** (51.93)  .   
Maize production .  .  . . 
ln (maize production)  .  .   
Tomato production .  .  . . 
ln (Tomato prod.)  .  0.12* (0.07)   
Sorghum production . . . . . . 
ln (Sorghum prod)  -110.00** (46.19)     
Onion production .  .  . . 
ln (onion production)  .  .   
Other irrig. crops . . . . . . 
Irrigated area .  0.00** (0.00)  0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
ln (Irrigated area)  538.31* (292.34)  0.46*** (0.12)   
Off-farm income . . . . . . 
Mobile phone . 477.47** (225.27) . . 0.89** (0.39) 0.90** (0.39) 
Water pump . . . . . . 
Soil fertility . 599.27* (332.16) . . . . 
Clay soil . . . . . . 
Sandy soil . 505.80* (305.50) . . . . 
Equity of distribution . . . . . . 
Satisfaction water supply . . . . . . 
Reported head location . . -0.74* (0.40)    
Reported tail location . -1,055.48*** (308.65) .    
Distance to intake     .  
Geo-coded head (dummy)      . 
Geo-coded tail (dummy)      . 
Fertiliser input .  0.00* (0.00)  . . 
ln (Fertiliser input)  .  .  . 
Herb. pest, fungicide .  .  0.00** (0.00) . 
ln (Herb. pest, fungi)  201.01*** (58.46)  0.24** (0.10)   
Constant 1,291.69*** (141.72) -5,262.42** (2,496.99) 6.08*** (0.74) 0.66 (1.12) 4.36*** (0.42) 4.53*** (0.41) 
Observations 198 194 186 190 189 189 
R-squared 0.00 0.29 0.25 0.34 0.49 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.26 0.22 0.32 0.47 0.47 
F-Statistic 0.00 4.825*** 7.769*** 14.5*** 4.142*** 4.142*** 
.Variables are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level and dropped from the final model; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; Blanks indicate variables are not included in the models  
Standard errors in parenthesis 
The effect of water supply on incomes and yields: a quantitative assessment 
88 
Table 5-12 Summary statistics and significance tests for non-irrigation income by education 
level 
Income from non-irrigated 
activities (‘000 TZS) 
N Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max K-S p WRS z 
Under primary education 40 1,144 443 1,683 0 6,721 
0.454† -0.87† 
Primary education or beyond 156 1,225 615 2,075 0 18,500 
Proportion non-irrigated income 
over total gross income 
N Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max K-S p WRS z 
Under primary education 40 0.41 0.39 0.33 0.00 1.00 
0.398† -1.252† 
Primary education or beyond 153 0.48 0.48 0.35 0.00 1.00 
† The values are not statistically significant at p<0.10  
 Results from the paddy rice yield models in Magozi  
5.7.1 General model considerations 
Checking for multicollinearity, the greatest correlation coefficient is found between timing of 
water supply and tail location (r = 0.67). This can be explained by the fact that plots located at 
the tail-end tend to receive water later in the season. Water supply satisfaction and year are also 
correlated (r = -0.65), which responds to greater water scarcity in 2015, as reported in qualitative 
interviews. The mean VIF for the various ‘tested down’ models was less than 1.74, with no 
regressors having a VIF score greater than 2.79 (tail location in the log-linear model), indicating 
no serious multicollinearity was present and hence no variables were dropped. 
The backward elimination and general-to-specific methods converge into nearly identical final 
models, with the exception again of the linear model. The log-linear and log-log models have 
eight statistically significant variables and a reasonably good fit (adjusted-R 2= 0.43), and thus 
are considered to be the preferred models. The models in which location is tested as a 
trichotomous variable result in a different set of regressors compared to the models using 
distance to intake, although there is consistency across certain variables. 
5.7.2 Hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis 2.1 (that crop yields are positively associated with adequacy of water supply) is 
supported by the results of the regression analyses. Across the various yield models, the level of 
water supply satisfaction is positively associated with paddy yields. Assuming that irrigators’ 
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level of satisfaction is an accurate proxy of adequacy of water supply, the results of this analysis 
are consistent with the common view that improved water supply results in higher yields 
(Makombe & Sampath 1998).  
The hypothesis that rice yields are negatively associated with the distance between a farm and 
the intake of the irrigation system (H2.2) is not directly supported by the results of this analysis, 
although there are important location differences. While distance between farm and intake as a 
continuous variable is not statistically significant, location dummies for head and tail sections are 
good predictors of paddy yields. Interestingly, both appear to have a negative effect on yields 
with ‘tail’ having a stronger effect (greater coefficient in absolute value). While head-enders are 
typically regarded as having a location advantage over the rest, these results show that it is 
actually the middle section where higher (mean, median and maximum) yields are achieved 
(Table 5-14). The Kruskal-Wallis tests indicates that the difference in yields across the three 
groups is statistically significant, while the post-hoc analysis by pairs (the Dunn test) indicates 
statistical significance in the differences between tail/middle, and tail/head sections. 
Such differences are consistent with Hussain’s (2005) observations in South and East Asia, 
noting that, against common perceptions, it was in the middle reaches − but not at the head − 
where productivity was the highest and poverty the lowest. In an extensive literature review, 
Gorantiwar and Smout (2005 p. 13) remark that ‘the farmers at the head of the system generally 
apply more water than needed for potential yield and excess water will not improve the 
productivity but will reduce it’. Within the context of the ACIAR project in Tanzania, Stirzaker 
et al. (2017) notes that over-irrigation often results in leaching of nutrients (nitrate) from the soil.   
Another critical consideration regarding farm location is the relative distance between the plot 
and the irrigation channel. In the logarithmic models, the distance between farm and irrigation 
canal is statistically significant and negatively associated with paddy yields. This suggests that 
farms located further away from the main canal obtain lower yields, thus reflecting the 
importance of heterogeneities along the distributary canals, as noted by Merrey (1997) and 
Mollinga (2003). This is also consistent with qualitative evidence gathered during the 2015 
survey. A number or irrigators reported that, in addition to upstream/downstream issues, they 
experienced conflicts with ‘neighbouring irrigators’. For example, one irrigator noted that: 
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‘Differences in water are not only a question of upstream/downstream, but also 
‘transversal’ distance to the canal’ (female irrigator, Magozi, age not available).   
5.7.3 Other variables of interest 
Household characteristics including age, education and size are statistically significant across 
five models. By contrast with the income models, education has the expected positive sign. 
Gender is only significant in the models with location as dummies. The coefficient has the 
expected negative sign, but the results cannot be considered robust as they are not consistent 
across the various models. 
The year dummy has a strong statistically significant influence on yields, in nine out of ten 
models. These quantitative results mirror qualitative explanations provided by interviewees 
noting that 2015 paddy production had been severely hindered by low rainfall and water scarcity 
within the scheme. In fact, as noted in Chapter 4, when crops are damaged or lost due to lack of 
irrigation water, irrigators may suffer financial losses and even consider exiting irrigation and 
taking up dryland farming.  
Timing of water supply is statistically significant with a negative sign in three models. The 
interpretation of this result is that receiving water only at the end of the irrigation season is 
associated with lower paddy yields. As discussed in Chapter 4, late water supply affects rice 
production in several ways, including greater risk of crop failure and missing the optimal timing 
for rice cultivation. Summary statistics (Table 5-15) show that households who are supplied only 
at the end of the irrigation season obtain lower paddy yields, although the difference between the 
two groups is only statistically significant based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, but not 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) test (see Chapter 3). Similarities can be found in the literature with, 
for example, Ostrom and Gardner (1993) noting that Nepali rice irrigators at the head of the 
systems filled their fields with water during the pre-monsoon season, thus impeding tail-enders 
from cultivating water-intensive rice during that time. The importance of timing for water 
supplies ties in with the multiple dimensions of ‘water equity’ discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Table 5-13 OLS model results of rice paddy yield in the Magozi scheme 
 Theoretical model Backward stepwise elimination 
Independent variables Linear Linear Linear-Log Log-Linear Log-Log Log-Linear GIS dummies 
Gender -442.14 (313.71) .  .   . .  -0.29** (0.13) 
Age -27.03 (16.96) .  .  -0.03** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 
Education 869.70* (509.28) .  .  0.46** (0.19) 0.46** (0.19) .  
Household size 258.88** (116.27) .  .  0.17** (0.07) 0.17** (0.07) 0.13* (0.07) 
Irrigated area -0.01 (0.01) .  .  . 
Ln (Irrigated area)   .  .  
Farm tools 87.31 (385.68) .  .   .  .  . 
Soil fertility -775.37** (302.17) .  .  -0.69** (0.26) -0.69** (0.26) -0.53** (0.25) 
Year -1,617.36*** (471.28) -1,815*** (332.34) -1,815*** (332.34) -0.70*** (0.22) -0.70*** (0.22) -0.70*** (0.21) 
Equity of distribution -43.76 (185.93) .  .  .  .  .  
Satisfaction water supply 303.00 (209.28) 372.** (158.76) 372.** (158.76) 0.31** (0.13) 0.31** (0.13) 0.31** (0.13) 
Timing of water (END) -277.01 (435.30) .   . -0.71** (0.35) -0.71** (0.35)  . 
Distance to intake 0.04 (0.07) .   .  . .    
Distance to canal -0.38 (1.19) .   . -0.00* (0.00) -0.00* (0.00)  . 
Tail location          -0.98*** (0.32) 
Head location          -0.27** (0.13) 
Herb, pest. fung. 0.01 (0.01) .    .    .  
Ln (Herb, pest. fung.)   .  .  
Constant 1,701.93 (1,300.44) 2,279*** (647.93) 2,279*** (647.93) 7.14*** (0.71) 7.14*** (0.71) 7.88*** (0.59) 
Observations 98 171 171 98 98 105 
R2 0.46  0.38   0.38   0.42   0.42   0.42  
Adjusted R2 0.37  0.38   0.38   0.37   0.37   0.37  
F 7.12***  63.76***   63.76***   5.85***   5.85***   6.20***  
. Variables are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level and dropped from the final model;  
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 
Blanks indicate the variables are not included in the models  
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 5-13 OLS model results of rice paddy yield in the Magozi scheme (cont’) 
  Genera-to-specific 
Independent variables  Linear Linear-Log Log-Linear Log-Log Log-Linear GIS dummies 
Gender  .  .  -0.16 (0.21) .  -0.29** (0.13) 
Age  .  .  -0.03** (0.01) .  -0.03*** (0.01) 
Education  .  .  0.42* (0.21) .   . 
Household size  .  .  0.20** (0.09) .  0.13* (0.07) 
Irrigated area  .  .  . 
Ln (Irrigated area)   .  .   
Farm tools  .  .  -0.24 (0.35) .   . 
Soil fertility  .  .  -0.69** (0.28) .  -0.53** (0.25) 
Year  -1,814.99*** (332.34) -1,814.99*** (332.34) -0.63*** (0.22) .  -0.70*** (0.21) 
Equity of distribution   . .  0.09 (0.10) . .  
Satisfaction water supply  372.10** (158.76) 372.10** (158.76) 0.33** (0.14) .  0.31** (0.13) 
Timing of water (END)  .   . -0.74** (0.35) .  .  
Distance to intake  .   .  . .    
Distance to canal  .   . -0.00* (0.00) .   . 
Tail location         -0.98*** (0.32) 
Head location         -0.27** (0.13) 
Herb, pest. fung.  .     .   .  
Ln (Herb, pest. fung.)   .  .   
Constant  2,279.01*** (647.93) 2,279.01*** (647.93) 6.98*** (0.83) 7.24*** (0.15) 7.88*** (0.59) 
Observations  171 171 98 98 105 
R2   0.38   0.38   0.42   0.42   0.42  
Adjusted R2   0.38   0.38   0.37   0.37   0.37  
F   63.76***   63.76***   5.85***   5.85***   6.20***  
. Variables are statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level and dropped from the final model;  
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 
Blanks indicate the variables are not included in the models  
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 5-14 Summary statistics and significance tests for paddy yields in head, middle and 
tail sections 
Plot location N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
Kruskal-Wallis 
χ2 
Dunn p 
Head 50  2,572   2,286   1,489   229   7,388  
4.695* 
 Middle Tail 
Middle 24  2,964   2,533   1,827   988   8,402  Head -0.279 1.78** 
Tail 24  2,154   1,606   2,158   0   7,265  Middle  2.04** 
The values are statistically significant at ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5-15 Summary statistics and significance tests for paddy yields by timing of water 
supply  
Timing N Mean Median Std .Dev Min Max    K-S p WRS z 
Only at the end 24 2,303 1,656 2,142 0 7,265 
0.105* 1.570 
Any other time 74 2,650 2,286 1,625 137 8,402 
The values are statistically significant at * p<0.1 
 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the linkages between incomes from irrigated crops and crop yields with a 
series of natural, physical, human, social, financial and farm management variables. Two OLS 
multiple regression methods are employed to test the hypotheses that incomes from irrigated 
crops (in Kiwere and Magozi) and crop yields (in Magozi) are positively associated with 
adequacy of water supply and proximity to the system’s intake. Continuous variables are tested 
in linear and logarithmic forms, while plot locations are tested as linear distances and 
head/middle/end dummies.  
The results of the income model fail to support the hypothesis that adequacy of water supply is 
associated with irrigated crop incomes, which also contrasts with previous qualitative findings in 
this thesis and the literature. On the other hand, the location-income hypothesis is partially 
supported by the negative association between (reported) tail-end location and irrigation 
incomes. Size of the irrigated area is statistically significant, thus highlighting the important 
connections between land assets and economic inequalities within agricultural communities. 
The regression results of the Magozi paddy rice yield analysis maintain the hypothesis that 
[irrigators’ perception on] adequacy of water supply is positively associated with crop yields. 
While using perceptions as a proxy is not without limitations (e.g. highly subjective), it could be 
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a valuable approach for IOs to better understand water distribution within low-technology 
irrigation schemes − where actual deliveries cannot be empirically measured. 
The strong influence of the year dummy in paddy yields suggests a connection to inter-annual 
variability in rainfall and water availability. One of the purposed benefits of irrigation compared 
to dryland is its lower risk and greater certainly of water supply. However, the fact that rice 
productivity in the Magozi scheme is heavily influenced by inter-annual rainfall variations raises 
worrying questions about the effectiveness of irrigation in insuring growers from climatic 
uncertainty.  
Both the income and yield models suggest that proximity to the scheme intake is not statistically 
significant, yet tail and head location seem to have a significant negative effect. This potentially 
suggests that, not only water-stress is an issue for tail-enders, but also excessive water use is 
detrimental for head-enders. Such results call for a reconsideration of the common head vs. tail 
end dichotomy implying that water-location advantages are greater closer to the intake and then 
progressively decrease following the scheme’s hydraulic gradient.  
The statistical significance of human and household characteristics, such as age of the head and 
family size, suggest that policies targeting social aspects of irrigation development could 
potentially influence the positive outcomes of irrigation. Nevertheless, these linkages should be 
considered in further depth. For example, the fact that larger family sizes are positively 
associated with irrigated crop incomes and yields, could be a result of the contribution of 
children to farm labour.  
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Chapter 6 A review of Tanzania’s policies on equity of irrigation water 
supply 
 Chapter objectives 
Previous chapters in this thesis have identified significant water supply inequities within two 
smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania. The findings indicate that such imbalances at the 
local scale may have deep repercussions on various aspects of irrigators’ wellbeing, including 
economic inequalities, social power relationships, conflict, crop yield and risk of crop failure, 
amongst others. Several national water and irrigation policies in Tanzania (The United Republic 
of Tanzania 2002, 2013a) set equity of water supply as a key priority, although its definition 
remains somehow ambiguous, as explained in Section 6.5.5. Moreover, strong water supply 
heterogeneities within traditional schemes raise the question as to whether the equity goal has 
been actually achieved at small scales. The main objective of this chapter is to understand the 
reasons why Tanzanian polices have apparently failed to achieve equity of water supply within 
traditional irrigation schemes and to propose possible policy options. The data used in this 
chapter was collected through desktop policy research, as well as personal interviews with 
members of the IOs and government staff (see Section 2.4.4 for details).  
The first sections of this chapter provide a literature review and the definition of a new analytical 
framework for the study of equity of irrigation water supply. Then, Tanzania’s water and 
irrigation governing polices and authorities are examined. Finally, drawing from the case of the 
Kiwere and Magozi schemes, a discussion provides insights into the advantages and 
disadvantages of potential interventions to improve equity of water distribution.  
 Introduction 
Equity of water distribution is recognised as a top priority for water resources management 
(Kolberg 2012; Wegerich 2007) and is commonly among the key goals of public water polices 
(Peña 2011). Social equity stands as one of the three pillars of IWRM, together with economic 
efficiency, environmental sustainability. Within the context of IWRM, equity is defined as ‘The 
basic right for all people to have access to water of adequate quantity and quality for the 
sustenance of human wellbeing’ (Global Water Partnership 2000 p. 30). Access to adequate 
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domestic water supply is critical to sustain life and health, while access to water for productive 
uses (such as irrigation) is key to support incomes and development. Equitable access to 
irrigation water becomes particularly critical in rural areas of developing countries, where large 
parts of the population depend on agriculture as their main source of livelihoods. As Turner et al. 
(2004) highlight: 
In an inappropriate environment, e.g. where land is not evenly distributed, economic 
benefits of irrigation may be received predominantly by wealthy farmers and reinforce 
inequalities in the distribution of resources and wealth. The policy and institutional 
environments play critical roles in determining whether irrigation has positive impacts for 
poor people (p. 8). 
The United Republic of Tanzania is a valuable case study to investigate inequalities in irrigation 
water supply. Agriculture is the dominant economic sector in Tanzania, accounting for almost 
one-third of the GDP and providing employment for three-quarters of its more than 50 million 
citizens (Mashindano et al. 2011). At a national level, irrigation is considered a key strategy to 
increase incomes and food security in rural areas, given its potential for higher crop yields and 
lesser hydro-climatic risk than rainfed agriculture (The United Republic of Tanzania 2014a).  
Following legislative reforms in the early 2000s, Tanzania has developed a number of water and 
irrigation national policies calling for improved water management through the adoption of 
IWRM plans. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that such polices have not yet been 
successful in achieving adequate water distribution. Previous studies have highlighted the 
shortcomings of the Tanzanian legislative reforms at the scale of river basins and catchments 
(van Koppen et al. 2004; van Koppen et al. 2007). Adding to the existing literature, this chapter 
examines Tanzania’s policies at local scale (e.g. within smallholder irrigation systems) focusing 
on equity of irrigation water supply. Filling this policy and knowledge gap is particularly 
important because it is in the local context where possible water management and social equity 
solutions may be firmly grounded (Peña 2011).   
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 Literature review 
6.3.1 The compromise between equity and efficiency of irrigation systems 
The trade-off between equity and efficiency is a longstanding topic of discussion in welfare 
economics (Berg & Ostry 2011; Bourguignon et al. 2007; Browning & Johnson 1984; Okun 
1975). Similarly, within the context of irrigation, equity and efficiency7 are two fundamental 
water management goals (Lal Kalu et al. 1995; Sampath 1988; Steiner & Walter 1992), although 
in resource-scarcity situations, polices targeting one objective will typically fail to achieve the 
other. As Lal Kalu et al. (1995) explains: 
[in] most surface irrigation systems, particularly in developing countries, (…) the 
distribution canals are generally earthen and in delivering water to distant fields a 
substantial quantity of water is lost due to seepage. In such situations, if the water 
delivery is limited to fields in upper reaches alone, more water can be used efficiently by 
reducing conveyance losses, but such a distribution will not be equitable (p.336). 
Finding the optimal compromise between equity and efficiency remains a complex task, as the 
balance depends on varying climatic circumstances, water availability, demands and individual 
preferences. Field lab experiments in Tanzania on the trade-offs between equity and efficiency 
(D’Exelle et al. 2012; Lecoutere et al. 2015) show that irrigators predominantly choose rules 
favouring water equity. However, self-benefiting, water-efficient behaviours became more 
frequent under water scarcity scenarios. 
Adequate policies and institutional environments play critical roles in determining the positive 
impacts of irrigation (Turner et al. 2004), including equity and efficiency. Tisdell (2003) 
suggests that when institutional structures concentrate on ensuring efficient use of available 
resources, social equity can be achieved through other avenues, such as welfare programs and 
taxation. An example of this type of policy is the Private Irrigation Infrastructure Operators 
Program in New South Wales, Australia (Australian Government 2016), which targeted high 
                                                 
7 Discussions in this chapter focus on conveyance efficiency, which can be defined as ‘the ratio of the amount of 
water delivered at the turnouts of the main irrigation conveyance network to the total amount of water diverted into 
the irrigation system’ (Small & Rimal 1996 p. 26). 
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water efficiency within private irrigation schemes. Under certain circumstances, and among 
other strategies, the program supported water loss reduction through the permanent shut-down of 
tail end sections of open-channel systems. In exchange for fallowing their land, affected 
irrigators were offered a series of compensation measures, such as cash or relocation.  
While such initiatives may be effective and economically viable within large-scale irrigation 
schemes in developed countries like Australia, welfare and taxation interventions, as suggested 
by Tisdell (2003), remain widely unavailable for smallholder irrigators in many parts of the 
developing world. Thus, a large body of literature advocates for government institutions and 
public policies targeting greater equity of water distribution. Syme et al. (1999 p. 52) note that 
‘Government policies constantly state that resources will be allocated equitably’, while Boelens 
and Dávila (1998 p. 201) point out that ‘the theme of irrigation and equitable water distributions 
is one of the most important agrarian issues in various Andean countries’. Similarly, Makombe 
and Sampath (1998) indicate that equitable distribution of irrigation resources is a central policy 
objective for the government of Zimbabwe. Drawing from Mexican unidades de riego, Dayton-
Johnson (1999) notes that a fundamental task of any irrigation group is establishing water 
allocation rules, while Anwar and Ul Haq (2013) explain that a key objective of Pakistan’s 
warabandi system of irrigation management is to provide equitable water distribution. 
6.3.2 Geographical scales: macro, meso and micro scales 
Hussain and Hanjra (2004) developed a framework for policy and intervention analysis 
consisting of three spatially-defined levels (macro, meso and micro) through which access to 
irrigation water may impact socioeconomic factors in rural communities. This approach has been 
subsequently applied in the study of: a) the irrigation-poverty nexus (Hussain 2005); b) the value 
of agricultural water (Hussain et al. 2007); c) irrigation water equity policies (Kolberg 2012); 
and d) agricultural water efficiency (FAO 2015a).  
Geographically speaking, the macro, meso and micro levels of water management may 
correspond, respectively, to national, regional and local extents. The three levels (also referred to 
as pathways) are interlinked and influence each other, yet their objectives are very distinct (Table 
6-1). The macro/national level aims to define overarching policies promoting countrywide 
growth, sustainability, food security and derived benefits from irrigation. The goal of the 
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meso/regional level is to achieve territorially and socially equitable allocation of water and to 
reduce conflicts among competing uses (Kolberg 2012). The micro/local level is centred on 
households, farms and communities and aims to improve welfare (chiefly of poor households) 
through greater crop production and incomes from irrigation.    
Table 6-1 Macro, meso and micro levels of irrigation water management 
Levels  
Geographic 
extent 
Actors Objectives related to equity of water supply 
Macro Country 
National 
institutions 
Development of water policies, laws and regulations 
Socioeconomic welfare and food security 
Meso Region, Basin  
Regional 
institutions 
Equitable water allocation and conflict resolution among users  
Derived benefits (e.g. labour, markets, stakeholder profit) 
Micro 
Community, 
Irrigation system 
Farms and 
households 
Water efficiency and crop productivity 
Optimal allocation of productive resources 
Increased returns to poor households and risk minimisation 
Source: Adapted from Hussain and Hanjra (2004), Hussain et al. (2007) and Kolberg (2012). 
6.3.3 Irrigation systems as Common Pool Resources 
Irrigation systems are often conceptualised as a common pool resources (CPRs), which are 
defined as man-made or naturally occurring resources where exclusion is difficult and yield is 
substractable (Ostrom & Gardner 1993). The first attribute means that it is difficult or very costly 
to exclude outsiders from accessing the resource, for example enforcing property rights or 
fencing of the resource. Thus, strong institutional arrangements are required to stop (or at least 
reduce) free-riding use of the resource. The second concept – substractabilty – refers to the 
appropriation of the resource, whereby the amount withdrawn by one user (e.g irrigation water 
from the canals) is no longer available to others.  
Like other CPRs, irrigation systems face two distinct collective action problems: provision and 
appropriation (Janssen et al. 2011). Provision issues are related to the time-dependent, productive 
nature of investment and may include problems in construction and operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of the irrigation infrastructure (Jing et al. 2010; Ostrom 1990). Appropriation problems 
concern the allocation of resource units among its users in a manner that is fixed and time-
independent. In limited-access CPRs, users’ incentives depend on rules regulating quantity, 
timing, location and technology of appropriation and how these are monitored and enforced. 
Spatial heterogeneities in access to the resource can be a major appropriation problem, for 
example, the relative position of head-enders and tail-enders in gravity-fed, irrigation systems 
A review of Tanzania’s policies on equity of irrigation water supply 
100 
(Ostrom & Gardner 1993). When resource users are dissatisfied with the allocation of access 
rights and obligations (e.g. they perceive it as unfair or uncertain), their willingness to invest in 
provision activities (e.g. maintenance) may be adversely affected (Ostrom 1990). Then, if 
existing rules are not adequately enforced, there is even greater tendency for water users to avoid 
contribution of labour or fees to the system. Increasing water-use fees has been proposed as a 
way to increase agricultural production and wealth equality among smallholders in Pakistan (Bell 
et al. 2016), whereas evidence in Tanzania (van Koppen et al. 2007) shows that enforcing 
payment on small water users is an ineffective water management strategy.  
It has been argued that asymmetries between upstream/downstream users of large-scale irrigation 
systems require a central authority to solve collaboration problems (Janssen et al. 2011). Indeed, 
there is evidence that some government-managed schemes outperform those run by farmers and 
other cases where external intervention is indispensable to carry out complex civil works (Lam 
2006). On the other hand, there are many cases where farmers successfully govern complex 
irrigation systems without external control (Joshi et al. 1998; Lam 1996). In these systems, 
external rules can be perceived as impositions to be worked around rather than worked by (Lam 
1996). Thus, rather than questioning whether irrigations systems should be government or 
farmer-managed, the broader theory (Lam 2006) suggests that a more relevant question is what 
are the optimal institutions for sustaining collaboration between farmers and managers.  
Regardless of the degree of government intervention, the sustainability of traditional irrigation 
systems largely depends on individuals’ ability and willingness to cooperate with one another 
respecting water sharing rules and contributing to O&M of the infrastructure. Drawing from 
extensive observations of CPRs across the world (e.g. California, Spain, Nepal, Philippines, etc.), 
Ostrom (1990) identified eight key design principles used by those who are able to successfully 
manage their CPRs over extended periods of time. Within the context of irrigation (Ostrom 1992, 
1993), these principles can be summarised as follows:  
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1. Clearly defined boundaries of the irrigation systems and of the individuals who have 
rights to withdrawal from it 
2. Equivalence between benefits and costs, whereby water allocation is related to 
individuals’ contributions (labour, materials or money). This is also referred to as 
congruence between appropriation/provision rules and local conditions. 
3. Collective choice arrangements that allow individuals affected by rules to be part of the 
group who can modify these rules. 
4. Monitoring of behaviours conducted by irrigators themselves or by monitors who are 
accountable to irrigators 
5. Graduated Sanctions applied upon breakage of rules that are proportional to the gravity of 
the offence or to other agreed criteria.  
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms that are low-cost and accessible to irrigators within their 
local environments  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise, whereby irrigators’ institutions are not 
challenged by external authorities.  
8. Nested enterprises at multiple layers that manage actives regarding appropriation, 
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance of the irrigation 
system.  
Ostrom’s original work (1990) is cited thousands of times in the literature and her CPRs 
design-principles are widely discussed in subsequent studies (Deininger 1996; Jing et al. 2010; 
Lam 1996; Ostrom & Benjamin 1993; Pasaribu & Routray 2005; Quinn et al. 2007). More 
specifically, Dietz et al. (2003) add to Ostrom’s initial framework, by pointing out conditions 
under which effective governance of CPRs is more easily achieved. These include situations 
when (i) resources and their use can be monitored in a low-cost, transparent manner; (ii) rates of 
change in resources and populations are moderate; (iii) members of the communities maintain 
close relationships; (iv) outsiders can be excluded; and (v) users support effective monitoring 
and rule enforcement.  
Despite the general optimism surrounding CPRs design principles, Campbell et al. (2001) raise 
concerns about their applicability and success in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe. 
The authors argue that greater clarity is needed to understand nuances between different types of 
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boundaries (e.g. natural and administrative) and community members (e.g. users and 
stakeholders). In a study of 38 CPRs systems in 12 Tanzanian villages, Quinn et al. (2007) found 
that Ostrom’s eight design principles were often weak or absent, chiefly those regarding 
boundaries, monitoring and conflict resolution. Indeed, the political administration units created 
in Tanzania do not relate to the natural boundaries, thus creating an institutional overlap.  
6.3.4 Water Poverty Index 
The Water Poverty Index (WPI) (Sullivan 2002) is a holistic tool to measure various aspects of 
water stress that provides a consistent methodology applicable at large and small scales. The goal 
of the WPI is to serve governments and policy makers across the world in the identification and 
prioritisation of interventions towards improved water access. Furthermore, the WPI establishes 
a parallelism between water and socio-economic poverty, thus allowing to investigate linkages 
between the various dimensions of poverty (Kaczan & Ward 2011).  
The original index (Sullivan 2002) is focused on domestic water supply and accounts for water 
availability, access to safe water/sanitation and time required to fetch water. The WPI was 
initially defined on a 0-100 scale as a simple and easy to understand tool. Since its creation, 
numerous studies have revisited the WPI to propose new definitions addressing some of the 
initial weaknesses. For example, Sullivan et al. (2003) add to their initial work by addressing 
water quality, variability, management, as well as water for non-domestic uses such as food 
production and environmental sustainability. Further to this, Sullivan et al. (2006) formally 
redefine the WPI as a weighted average of five components: resources, access, capacity, use and 
environment.  
Subsequently, Pérez-Foguet and Giné Garriga (2011) define the enhanced WPI (eWPI) 
combining physical, environmental and social dimensions influencing sustainable development 
of water resources. Incorporating quantitative and qualitative data, Wilk and Jonsson (2013) 
elaborate the WPI+ , where higher scores represent water prosperity rather than poverty. Along a 
similar line, Jemmali and Abu-Ghunmi (2016) propose the modified WPI (mWPI) by applying 
an additive aggregation function to scores from nine indicators: availability, variability, access, 
domestic use, economic capacity, physical capacity, social capacity, institutional capacity and 
water quality. Forouzani and Karami (2011) conceptualise the Agricultural WPI (AWPI) by 
Chapter 6 
103 
synthesising relevant water-poverty aspects for agricultural use and list 31 indicators (e.g. river 
water withdrawals, farm location, crop productivity, education, pesticide use, etc.) that are 
classified into the five concepts proposed by Sullivan et al. (2006). A valuable feature of the 
AWPI is that, in addition to quantities, it incorporates many other critical factors such as land 
failure due to water scarcity, farmers’ level of education in water management, land levelling and 
conflict occurrence. The work, however, remains highly theoretical without an empirical 
formulation applicable to irrigation water poverty. Indeed, many of the proposed indicators (e.g. 
Productivity of water: income from the crop × per ha per year divided by total water volume 
used for irrigation per ha) would be very difficult to calculate given the limitations of data 
availability within smallholder irrigation schemes. 
The WPI has been criticised for being subject to distortion due to inadequate data (Komnenic et 
al. 2009) and for overlooking the in-depth, complex causes of water depravation (Molle & 
Mollinga 2003). Indeed, the causes and solutions for water scarcity may rise from multiple 
sources, including physical, economic, managerial, institutional and political constraints (Ibid.). 
Similar to the poverty line, the headcount index and the poverty gap, the WPI is useful for 
poverty comparisons between populations. However, as an aggregate measure, the WPI does not 
provide any information on disparities within the populations of study (e.g. country, region or 
community).  
Within the context of urban water supply and sanitation, the UN (2013a) propose the use of ‘The 
Equitable Access Score-card’ – a country-wide, self-evaluation tool aimed at measuring access 
disparities between regions and social groups. The method for analysis comprises multiple 
aspects such as rights and obligations of users, affordability, policy, education, physical access 
and quality of the service. No similar framework exists at the international or national levels to 
evaluate equity of access to irrigation water supply in such a comprehensive, systematic manner. 
 A framework for the analysis of equity of irrigation water supply 
In the study of economic and resource inequalities, an important and recurrent question is: 
equality of what? (Sen 1979). The most obvious measure of equity of water distribution is in 
relation to the quantity of water supplied, whether it is measured in terms of volumes (El-awad et 
al. 1991); flow (Bos et al. 1991); or allocated time (Malhotra et al. 1984). In addition, many other 
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aspects of equity exist, with several authors calling for considerations on obligations, decisions-
making, reliability, and cost, among others. Approaches from different authors share certain 
similarities (Table 6-2), but there is a no consistent framework for the evaluation of the various 
aspects of equity of water irrigation distribution. Given the current methodological gap, a new 
framework for the analysis of equity of irrigation water distribution in this chapter is proposed 
(Figure 6-1).  
Table 6-2 Literature review of irrigation water distribution equity aspects 
Equity aspects of irrigation water distribution Source 
Benefits (water and land); and responsibilities   Hussein et al. (1987) 
Quantity; labour contributed to maintenance; capital investment; land owned  
Ostrom and Benjamin 
(1993) 
Participation in decision-making; costs; benefits (income) water quality; allocation; 
environmental impact; sustainability 
Syme and Nancarrow 
(1997) 
Allocation; reliability and timeliness Joshi et al. (1998) 
Contributions; obligations; and amounts of water van Etten et al. (2002) 
Flexibility and rigidity to change water rights; certainty; security of tenure; 
transferability; allowance for in-stream water rights; and externalities resulting 
from trade. 
Tisdell (2003) 
Quantities; timing; water markets; pricing; decision-making institutions; access to 
inputs (land credit, seeds, fertiliser); externalities (heath and environment) 
Lipton et al. (2003) 
Water distribution and allocation; services involved in irrigation development; 
added agricultural production and other benefits under irrigation; burdens and 
obligations related to functions and positions; and rights to participate in the 
decision-making process 
Cremers et al. (2005) 
Access (entitlement, accessibility, affordability); socio-economic impacts; extent of 
use; and cost  
Prasad et al. (2006) 
Spatial; Social; Gender and Inter-generational equity Phansalkar (2007) 
Social equity (decision-making processes); practice of water resources 
management (extraction and discharges); and water-related services (obtaining 
benefits from water) 
Peña (2011) 
Water rights; decision-making; resource contribution to maintenance work; water 
allocation; amount of water actually distributed; information sharing; and conflict 
resolution 
Wong and Herath (2014) 
Irrigation infrastructure; timeliness of supply; water distribution/allocation; 
equitability of supply; other important factors 
Mdemu et al. (2017) 
 The first step in defining the framework was to compile a comprehensive list of all water equity 
aspects found in the literature (Table 6-2). Many aspects across various studies referred to the 
same concepts, although in some cases, synonyms or slightly different terms were used. For 
example, Wong and Herath (2014) use ‘water allocation’ and ‘amount of water actually 
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distributed’, while Cremers et al. (2005) refer to ‘water distribution and allocation’. Second, for 
the purpose of clarity and consistency, similar or synonym terms were merged into a shorter, 
more concise list of equity aspects. Then, equity aspects were grouped into common themes, 
which resulted in six main categories: 1) quantity; 2) reliability; 3) obligations; 4) 
benefits/externalities; 5) decision-making; and 6) land rights (Figure 1). Decision-making and 
land rights are set as overarching terms applying to all of the other four equity aspects. In fact, 
equity of ‘decision-making’ - as noted by previous studies - is not well defined per se, but it 
needs to specify what exactly is being decided. For instance, the local institution governing an 
irrigation system may have equity of decision making regarding water allocations, yet decision-
making on fees and repair work may be unilaterally decided by an external agent. Likewise, land 
property rights is fundamental for irrigators’ water equity, particularly in situations where water 
allocations and obligations are established proportional to land size. Also, for irrigators who do 
not own but rent land, securing land access from one season to another provides them with 
greater reliability to plan their irrigation investments. Thus, within the context of equity of 
irrigation water supply, the following definitions are proposed: 
 Quantity refers to the amount of water that is distributed among water users, whether it is 
measured in terms of volume, depth, time or other quantitative proxy indicators. Water 
quantity can refer to allocation, entitlement, extraction or actual water use.  
 Reliability refers to the characteristics of water access that make it more (or less) secure for 
water users. These include: frequency, certainty and flexibility of supply; adequacy of timing 
to meet cropping calendar; security of tenure of water rights; and transferability of water 
rights. 
 Obligations refer to the mandatory contributions that water users must make towards the 
common system. These include, for instance, respect of water-sharing rules, routine and 
deferred maintenance, water fees and additional contributions (e.g. cost of repairs). 
 Benefits/Externalities. Benefits derived from access to irrigation water may include crop 
production, incomes and access to development services (e.g. extension, subsidies, credits, 
market value-chain and training). Negative externalities refer to the undesirable impacts on 
other water users (e.g. worsened water quality) or the environment (e.g. depletion of natural 
resource, soil erosion or pollution).  
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 Decision-making refers to the ability of irrigators to participate and influence processes that 
determine the distribution of quantity, reliability, obligations and benefits/externalities 
related to water supply. ‘Equity of decision-making’ encompasses irrigators’ access to water-
governing institutions, participation in meetings and acceptance of their options by their 
peers and leaders.  
 Land rights refers to irrigators’ ability to own or rent land within the irrigation scheme and 
have this right recognised by the relevant institutions. 
Figure 6-1 Framework for the analysis of equity of irrigation water distribution  
 
Source: Author’s synthesis from literature and fieldwork 
The framework for analysis of equity of irrigation water distribution can be compared to 
Ostrom’s CPRs and the Water Poverty Index. While they differ in the main question of analysis, 
there is a certain correspondence between the concepts in each of the three frameworks (Table 
6-3).  
The water equity framework serves to define all aspects that are relevant for equity of water 
distribution. By contrast, Ostrom’s CPRs work addresses the institutional set up of irrigation 
schemes to define desirable governance principles. Another difference resides in the 
appropriation problem, which is concerned with fixed or time-independent resource allocation 
(Ostrom 1990). As discussed in Section 6.3.1, water allocations within an irrigation scheme 
cannot be fixed, as the optimal compromise between efficiency and equity change with water 
availability – a highly time-dependent factor.  
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Ostrom’s CPRs design principles on governance of the resources are aligned with decision-
making and the institutional set up of irrigation schemes, while land rights reflects the principle 
of clearly defined boundaries (access to the CPR). Equity of quantity, reliability and externalities 
are associated with monitoring, as it is fundamental to measuring and evaluating these three 
objectives. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs and graduated sanctions are 
related to irrigators’ obligations to contribute to scheme maintenance, respect rules and pay fines 
according to the established punitive system.  
In the WPI framework, capacity is defined as the users’ ability to manage the water resources, 
thus corresponding to decision-making and obligations. Access to irrigation water is associated 
with access to land within the scheme and also the security of supply (reliability). Resources 
(water available) and use refer to quantities of water, while environment relates to the impact of 
water on the ecosystem (externalities).  
Table 6-3 Comparison of frameworks for the analysis of water management 
Equity of irrigation water 
distribution 
Ostrom's CPRs design principles Water Poverty Index 
Decision-making 
Collective choice arrangements  
Capacity 
Conflict resolution  
Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
Nested enterprises 
Land rights Clearly defined boundaries  Access 
Quantity Monitoring 
Resources 
Use 
Reliability Monitoring Access 
Obligations 
Graduated Sanctions  
Capacity 
Equivalence between benefits and costs 
Benefits/Externalities Monitoring Environment 
 Water and irrigation legislative authorities in Tanzania  
6.5.1 From centralised to decentralised water policies  
Over the last decades, management of natural resources in Tanzania, as in other sub-Saharan 
countries, has undergone a significant transformation from a centralised to a decentralised 
system. During pre-colonial times, natural resources were governed by informal rules, which 
were subject to changes following interactions among various population groups (Sokile et al. 
2003). Formal water law in Tanzania dates back to the early 1900s, when it was first introduced 
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by German and British settlers as a way to grant water rights for agricultural development (van 
Koppen et al. 2004). By the 1950s, management of water and other natural resources was 
controlled by the colonial government. Quinn et al. (2003) argue that resource management 
imposed by central legislation was unsuccessful for a number of reasons, such as not accounting 
for biophysical and human heterogeneities at the local level. Following independence in 1961, 
the political focus was on strengthening the country’s unity. Accordingly, water remained under 
the control of the newly created United Republic of Tanzania (van Koppen et al. 2004). Principal 
water officers and regional officers – to be appointed by the Minister – are first mentioned in the 
Water Ordinance of 1959 and, successively, in the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) 
Act of 1974. 
Irrigation development in the 1960s focused on building large schemes for commercial and food 
security purposes, which were managed by state agencies and employed paid farmers (Mdemu et 
al. 2017). During the 1970s, rural water supply remained strongly controlled by the central 
government following its promise to cover capital, operation and maintenance costs (Mashauri & 
Katko 1993). By the late 1980s, many of the large irrigation schemes had developed significant 
issues such as high O&M costs, poor performance and negative environmental impacts, which 
became unbearable for governments and donors (Diemer & Vincent 1992). As a result, the 
attention started shifting towards a greater participation of regional and local stakeholders and 
thus, some schemes were privatised and others handed over to small-scale farmers.  
From 1981 onwards, basin boundaries were introduced to gradually replace regions as the first 
sub-level under the national authority (van Koppen et al. 2004). During the 1990s, the Tanzanian 
government amended the national water rights system and commenced a comprehensive reform 
which resulted in the current water and irrigation policies structured upon decentralised authority 
systems. This shift was introduced in line with Agenda 21 of the United Nations Environment 
Meeting held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, emphasising the subsidiarity principle, whereby water 
should be managed at the lowest appropriate level (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006). A 
key aim of the reforms was to collect fees and taxes from water users to cover a) acquisition of 
‘water rights’ and b) infrastructure O&M (van Koppen et al. 2004). Another paramount strategy 
of the reforms was to adopt IWRM, which included objectives such as increased water-use 
efficiency, crop productivity and equity of water supply. 
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Van Koppen et al. (2007) claim that the Tanzanian water reforms of the early 2000s failed to 
achieve two of their main objectives: cost-recovery and improved water management to alleviate 
water scarcity issues at a basin level. The authors argue that major weaknesses in the reform 
process included lack of scientific analysis and poor stakeholder consultation.  
6.5.2 Tanzania’s water-governing bodies  
Following the decentralisation process, Tanzania’s water governing authorities are currently 
structured on five levels of resources management: i) national; ii) basin; iii) catchment; 
iv) district; and v) community (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002). In accordance with the 
three-tier geographical framework of institutional water analysis (Section 6.3.2), national level is 
at the top; basin, catchment and district divisions fall within the regional level and community 
corresponds to the local level. A schematic representation of the institutional mapping is shown 
Figure 6-2, while a summary of roles and responsibilities of the main institutions is provided at 
the end of this section in Table 6-4.  
Figure 6-2 Water and irrigation institutional mapping of Tanzania  
 
Source: Author’s synthesis from legislative documentation 
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National level 
At the national level, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation is Tanzania’s uppermost authority 
governing water resources. In December 2005, the Ministry of Water – holding urban supply, 
sanitation and irrigation competencies − was formed following the dissolution of the former 
Ministry of Water and Livestock Development; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Security 
and Co-operatives. In 2010, irrigation was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, only to be 
brought back in 2015 to the current Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MoWI). Currently, the 
MoWI is responsible for the formulation and revision of the National Water Policy, policy 
implementation strategies and other regulations (The United Republic of Tanzania 2014b). In 
2013, the National Irrigation Act established the National Irrigation Commission (NIC) as an 
independent department under the Ministry responsible for irrigation. The NIC is responsible for 
the coordination, promotion and regulation of the irrigation sector and shall nominate offices to 
delegate its functions at regional levels.   
The National Water Policy 2002 is Tanzania’s primary legislation governing water resources 
management, replacing the previous 1991 policy (WREM International 2015). The National 
Water Policy establishes priorities in water resources allocation where human needs come first, 
followed by environmental uses second and economic uses third. Among the latter, irrigation is 
prioritised as a way of reducing poverty and enhancing food security (Mdemu et al. 2017). Key 
objectives include: equity in resource allocation; efficiency in resource utilisation; water quality 
management; environmental and ecosystem protection and conservation; stakeholder 
engagement; institutional strengthening; and financial sustainability. Other national polices and 
strategies addressing equity of water supply are National Water Policy 2002, Water Sector 
Development Strategy 2006, Water Resources Management Act 2009, National Irrigation Policy 
2010 and National Irrigation Act 2013 (further details on the equity aspects of each of these 
policies are provided in Appendix G). 
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Regional level 
The Basin Water Boards (BWBs) occupy the second level of water management authority in 
Tanzania, under the MoWI, which shall provide them with strategic guidance, technical and 
operational support. There are nine BWBs, one for each of the country’s major river basins (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2014b). Members of the BWBs are appointed by the Minister of 
Water and Irrigation and drawn from public institutions and the private sector. BWBs do not 
hold political power and their primary responsibilities are to allocate water resources, control 
water pollution and protect water sources. BWBs delegate their executive functions to Basin 
Water Offices (BWOs), who undertake resource management tasks and report to BWBs.  
The area of study in this thesis falls within the jurisdiction of the Rufiji Basin Water Board 
(RBWB). The RBWB comprises ten members and delegates its executive functions to the Rufiji 
Basin Water Office (RBWO). The head of the RBWO is a Water Officer who reports to the 
RBWB, of which he/she is also a secretary (IATI 2014). The RBWO has its headquarters in 
Iringa Municipal Town and carries out day-to-day duties related to management of water 
resources in the Rufiji Basin. In November 2015, the RBWO completed its Integrated Water 
Resources Management and Development (IWRMD) plan (WREM International 2015), the 
implementation of which is subject to funding availability.  
The Rufiji Basin covers an area equivalent to 20 percent of Tanzanian’s land comprising four 
distinct river catchments: Great Ruaha, Kilombero, Luwegu and Lower Rufiji (Figure 6-3). The 
Great Ruaha - where the Kiwere and Magozi schemes are located - is the largest sub-catchment 
of the Rufiji Basin (85,554 km2), accounting for 80 percent of the basin’s consumptive water 
uses (WREM International 2015). The Great Ruaha Catchment Committee and two sub-
catchment committees were formed after the launch of the IWRMD plan and are currently 
working on the definition of their own plans and by-laws. 
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Figure 6-3 Map of the Rufiji Basin 
 
Source: WREM International (2015) 
Catchment and sub-catchment water committees (CWCs) in Tanzania are being developed in 
accordance with the decentralisation strategy of the National Water Policy 2002. In the 
meantime, District Facilitation Teams (DFTs) cover IWRM activities at district and lower 
government levels, including capacity building of WUA and conflict resolution. A number of 
DFTs were created in the late 1990s, some of which still remain active amid a continuous 
transformation of catchment and district legislative structures. However, because the basins, 
catchments and sub-catchments follow natural boundaries, they do not coincide with Tanzania’s 
administrative divisions (see Rufiji Basin area in Figure 6-4).  
As part of the wave of institutional reforms launched in the 1990s, Tanzania’s Local Government 
Reform Program (LGRP) was rolled out between 1998 and 2008, with the aim of transferring 
resources and competences from the central to local government (Kessy & McCourt 2010; 
Tidemand & Msami 2010). Subsequently, a second phase, LGRP II (2009-2014) was carried out 
continue the decentralisation efforts and improve access and quality of services provided by 
Local Government Authorities (LGAs) (Kessy & McCourt 2010; The United Republic of 
Tanzania 2012). 
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Under the national government, mainland Tanzania is divided into 26 regions, which are further 
sub-divided into 177 LGAs, also known as councils. Councils are classified as follows: 137 
district councils (rural); 16 municipal councils (urban); and 24 town councils (urban) (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2017). The District Councils (DCs) cover rural areas and bear 
certain competencies in irrigation development such as: identification, selection and planning of 
schemes for development; procurement of services and mobilisation of funds; and provision of 
assistance to establish and strengthen IOs (The United Republic of Tanzania 2010). For instance, 
over the past few years in Magozi, the District Council has provided funding for infrastructure 
maintenance, facilitated training on rice production and delivered rice-processing machinery.  
Under the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP), DCs are eligible to apply for 
funding grants from the central government (Tanzania 2006). Elected district administrators have 
the discretionary budget and power to authorise irrigation infrastructure works, although they 
have no control over the water resources. DCs do not receive orders from RBOs and their points 
of interaction are based on specific projects or interventions. For instance, Districts Councils are 
supposed to seek water permits for developments from the RBOs, who have the competency to 
approve or reject such requests. For example, in 2013 ANU project staff witnessed a situation 
where an irrigation scheme was being built with funds and approval from the Mbarali District 
Council, yet the RBWO denied the approval of the requested water licence (personal 
communication, James Pittock, 16/06/2017).  
Besides BWBs and LGAs, other irrigation-governing institutions exists at the regional level 
under the NIC. The NIC delegates its executive functions into Zonal Irrigation and Technical 
Services Units (ZITSUs), each comprising three or four Regional Irrigation Offices (RIOs), 
which then trickle-down into several District Irrigation Offices (DIOs). ZITSUs serve to provide 
LGAs, IOs and the private sector with technical support regarding: design, construction and 
supervision of irrigation infrastructure; preparation of tender documents; capacity building, 
construction and technical services (The United Republic of Tanzania 2010).  ZITSUs may also 
collaborate with BWOs to promote IWRM in the basis. 
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Figure 6-4 Administrative boundaries of the districts within the Rufiji River Basin 
 
Source: UDSM (2017) 
Local level 
The Water User Associations (WUAs) – also referred to as Water User Groups (WUGs) − are 
the lowest level of water management in Tanzania (Kashaigili et al. 2005). WUAs may be 
formed by (but not limited to): Irrigators’ Organisation (IOs); domestic water users; livestock 
keepers; fisheries; or a combination of the above groups. According to the Water Management 
Act 2009 (The United Republic of Tanzania 2009b): 
A Water User Association may be formed by the agreement of the majority of a group of 
water users for one or a combination of the following purposes: (a) manage, distribute 
and conserve water from a source used jointly by the members of the water users 
association; (b) acquire and operate any permit under the provisions of the Water Act; (c) 
resolve conflicts between members of the association related to the joint use of a water 
resource; (d) collect water user fees on behalf of the Basin Water Board; and (e) represent 
the special interests and values arising from water used for a public purpose (…). (p. 397)  
Chapter 6 
115 
Overall, WUAs are responsible for local level management of issues related to their allocated 
water resources. Although national legislation provides legitimacy for the WUAs, financing 
measures are insufficient and poorly implemented (Kashaigili et al. 2009). Because WUAs are 
considered to fall outside of the government administrative system, they have no access to funds 
from LGAs (WREM International 2015). 
IOs’ main objective is to ensure crop production through optimal management of water resources 
and irrigation infrastructure. Moreover, as noted in the National Irrigation Act 2013 (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2013a), IOs shall promote equitable water distribution, water conservation 
and environmental protection. Other responsibilities comprise: preparation of O&M plans, 
maintain a register of landholders and irrigators; assist the NIC or LGAs in collection of fees; 
keep an inventory of irrigation assets; keep records of water flows; and resolve disputes. The 
National Irrigation Act 2013 also mandates that once an IO is registered, all irrigators with 
agricultural lands within a designated irrigation scheme shall become members of the 
organisation and will be bound by the by-laws of the IO.  
The Kiwere and Magozi irrigation schemes each have their own IO, constituting two WUGs 
within the WUA of the Little Ruaha River, which is the direct water source for both schemes and 
a tributary to the Great Ruaha River. Each IO has its own set of by-laws aimed at tackling water-
related issues within the irrigation schemes. At the time of completion of this thesis, both IOs 
were reviewing their current by-laws, but only the Magozi IO was able to provide a copy of the 
document to be studied as part of this thesis (see Appendix G). 
At the local level in Tanzania, administrative structures under DCs are wards, which in turn, are 
constituted by groups of villages. According to the National Irrigation Policy, wards act as a 
linking body between farmers and DCs. One of their main competencies in irrigation is to verify 
farmers’ requests for intervention to be provided by the district. To be considered by the ward 
councils, such requests must first obtain approval at the village level. Village authorities also 
have the responsibility to monitor the implementation of irrigation development programs (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2010) and, in consultation with IOs, allocate plots on an irrigation 
scheme (The United Republic of Tanzania 2013a).  
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Table 6-4 Key responsibilities of water management authorities in Tanzania 
Institutions Key responsibilities 
National Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation 
Assessment, management and planning of the nation’s water resources. 
Policy orientation, development and review 
Establishment of databases and information management systems 
Definition of perimeters of Basins, sub-basins and groundwater recharge areas  
Resolution of national level conflicts among sectors 
Implementation of the water law  
Coordinate the planning and preparation of Basin plans 
National Irrigation 
Commission 
Advise the government on implementation and review of the National Irrigation 
Policy and related legislation 
Plan, design, construct, supervise and administer irrigation projects 
Coordinate irrigation interventions by development partners and other stakeholders 
Approve construction of irrigation works, standards and guidelines for the 
development and management of irrigation and drainage 
Promote efficient water use and Integrated Water Resources Management approach  
Basin Water Boards Water resources assessment, monitoring and regulation 
Data collection, processing and analysis 
Water allocation, pollution control, preparation of water utilisation plans 
Collection of various fees and charges 
Resolution of conflicts 
Conduct research (solely or collaboratively)  
Catchment and sub-
Catchment Water 
Committees 
Preparation and implementation of catchment plans 
Resolution of conflicts within the catchments 
Zonal Irrigation and 
Technical Services Units 
Provide LGAs, IOs and the private sector with support on capacity building and all 
aspects of irrigation development 
District Councils Planning and development of water resources  
Participate in the preparation of Basin plans  
Assessment of water demands  
Protection of natural resources in villages and wards 
Establishment of water management by-laws and resolution of conflicts 
Water User Associations  Management of allocated water resources 
Mediation of disputes among users and between groups  
Collection of data 
Participation in the preparation of water utilisation plans 
Conservation and protection of water sources and catchment areas (pollution) 
Efficient and effective water use and ensuring return flows 
Enforcement of the law and implementation of conditions of water rights 
Representation in Basin Boards and Catchment Committees. 
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Table 6-4 Key responsibilities of water management authorities in Tanzania 
Institutions Key responsibilities 
Irrigators Organisations Promotion of equitable water distribution, water conservation and environmental 
protection 
Preparation of O&M plans and carrying out of maintenance works  
Regulation of land and water use 
Preparation and maintenance of registers of: landholders and irrigators; irrigation 
assets; and annual financial accounts 
Monitoring and keeping records of water flows 
Assistance in fee collection 
Dispute resolution 
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania (2002) and The United Republic of Tanzania (2013a) 
 
To summarise, Tanzania’s water and irrigation institutional framework is articulated upon three 
parallel lines of governance: a) IWRM institutions (BWBs, CWCs, WUAs and IOs); b) 
government administrations (LGAs); and c) technical structures (NIC, ZITSUs, RIOs, DIOs). 
Within each of these three institutional sectors, responsibilities are transferred from the national 
to the regional and local levels in a trickle-down manner. Over the past decades, continuing 
restructuring and decentralisation reforms in the public sector have created numerous institutions 
with vaguely defined and overlapping mandates (WREM International 2015). Hence, poor 
communication, conflict and competitions for revenue often arise among water-governing 
institutions both horizontally (across lines of governance) and vertically (across hierarchical 
levels). For example, IOs are expected to autonomously manage water resources within their 
designated areas, but their authority is often weak and even may be challenged by other 
concurrent governing bodies (Mwamakamba et al. 2017). Thus, IOs struggle to comply with the 
obligations transferred onto them through the subsidiarity principle, partially because of their 
limitations in terms of leadership, technical skills, financial resources and environmental 
consideration (The United Republic of Tanzania 2010). 
6.5.3 Informal irrigation water management 
In many developing countries, informal systems are an important mechanism for delivering 
justice and resolving conflict regarding matters such as land right and access to public services 
(UNDP 2012). These are often referred to as traditional or “customary. Across Africa, traditional 
institutional systems, rooted in pre-colonial times, still prevail, but are often at odds with formal 
justice set ups - a heritage from colonial ruling (Sokile et al. 2003). Such institutional pluralism – 
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the coexistence of various state, customary and religious laws - has important implications for 
land and water rights in Africa (Meinzen-Dick & Nkonya 2007). Water right tend to be linked to 
land rights, yet many rural Africans lack the literacy skills or financial resources to properly 
register their rights, thus becoming neglected and even criminalised by the statutory legal system 
(Maganga 2003). Despite a strong emphasis by Governments on formal laws, 90% of land and 
related resources (e.g. water) in sub-Sharan Africa are still governed under customary 
arraignments (Van Koppen et al. 2014). Within the context of water management in Tanzania, 
Juma and Maganga (2005), differentiate between four types of customary laws, as follows: 
− Tribal: specific to ethnic groups; 
− Formal: recognised in courts of law; 
− Traditional customary: enforced by traditional authorities and strongly undermined by the 
abolition of chieftaincy in 1962; and 
− Living customary: combination of traditional customary law, statutory provision and day-
to-day practices. 
Arguably, failure to recognise and harmonise the dichotomy between formal and informal rules 
is one of the key challenges for integrated water resources management in Tanzania (Lankford & 
Mwaruvanda 2005). Maganga (2003) explains that fragmented planning approaches and 
inconsistent sectoral strategies in the Tanzanian reforms contributed to increased conflicts over 
water. For example, in a study of the upper Great Ruaha River catchment, van Koppen et al. 
(2004) observe that the newly-introduced fee system eroded customary water-sharing principles, 
thus fuelling upstream vs. downstream conflicts. As upstream users viewed water as a 
commodity, they no longer felt compelled to rationalise their withdrawals on the grounds of 
downstream users’ needs or environmental requirements. Lankford and Mwaruvanda (2005) 
propose a framework to integrate formal and informal water rights in the Greater Ruaha River 
Basin, which proposes altering proportions of water to each user according to changing 
circumstances. A similar framework would be beneficial at the scale of small-scale irrigation 
schemes, although the compromise between equity and efficiency is a major challenge in 
systems equipped with rudimentary infrastructure (see Section 6.3.1).    
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In Kiwere and Magozi, there are no written norms on how water should be distributed within the 
irrigation systems. Instead, informal arrangements exist, which are defined by the IO and 
supposed to be followed by all irrigators (see Section 4.4). In Kiwere, the agreed roster allocates 
water for tail-enders in the morning and for head-enders in the afternoon. Quotidian disputes are 
common, yet they tend to be resolved swiftly and in an amicable manner. This is consistent with 
Lecoutere’s (2011) and D’Exelle’s (2012) observations on irrigators’ behaviours in five 
small-scale schemes in the Mufindi district, in southern Tanzania. The authors note that fixed 
water-allocation rules are largely absent, while growers informally agree on water-sharing norms 
or rotation schedules. Generally, Mufindi irrigators have a clear preference for reconciliation 
over confrontation regarding water distribution conflicts. During filed experiments, it was found 
that communicating dissatisfaction was irrigators’ preferred way of dealing with conflict – rather 
than punishment rule-breakers. Lecoutere (2011) concludes that, as part of institutional 
pluralism, mechanisms of informal water justice are advantageous in the sense that they: i) can 
reconcile disputes before they escalate into violence; and ii) contribute to the gradual 
development of more sophisticated resource governance institutions. Nonetheless, pragmatic 
problem solving has the risk of becoming biased by social power imbalances derived from 
gender and social status (Ibid.).   
In Magozi (see Section 4.4) the informal arrangement is such that head-enders withdraw water 
from the canal at the start of the irrigation season (December to February), whilst tail-enders 
need to await their turn towards the end of the season (March and May). In dry years, when the 
river levels are too low to supply enough water for the entire scheme, some areas in will remain 
fallow or become unproductive. A very similar situation is noted by Lankford (2004) in 
traditional irrigation systems in the Usangu district in southern Tanzania. Like in Magozi, 
head-end rice irrigators in Usangu transplant in December-January, while tail-enders hire out 
their labour as the wait for the water to reach them later in March. In years with low levels of 
rainfall, only a reduced portion of the area at the top-end of the system is irrigated, with the tail-
end left uncultivated.  
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6.5.4 Policy gap at local (micro) level  
Currently, the objective of equity of supply is included in various polices at national (macro) and 
regional (meso) levels, yet it remains largely unaddressed at the local (micro) level of WUAs. 
The National Water Policy 2002 (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002 p. 17) mandates that 
‘every citizen has an equal right to access and use of the nation's natural water resources for his 
and the nations benefit’. Following this general statement, subsequent specific articles on equity 
of water supply are formulated on the basis of urban water supply and sanitation, without 
mention of equitable water access rights for irrigation purposes. The Water Sector Development 
Strategy 2006 and the Rufiji Basin IWRMD Plan call for equity of supply between regions, 
districts, communities and activity sectors including hydropower, domestic, irrigation and 
environmental uses. By contrast, the Water Resources Management Act 2009, National 
Irrigation Policy 2010 and National Irrigation Act 2013 make water equity considerations at the 
level of the WUAs. Importantly, the Water Resources Management Act 2009 notes that WUAs 
shall agree on equitable water reductions among their members in times of drought or restrictions 
in resources availability. The National Irrigation Act 2013 specifies that IOs shall monitor and 
keep records of water flows for irrigation, which should be used to evaluate equity in water 
distribution.  
Many of Tanzania’s IOs have only been operating for a relatively short time, and, thus, are still 
developing their rules and by-laws. For example, the Magozi IO’s current by-laws address topics 
such as leadership, membership, meetings, finances, rules and fines, but not water distribution. 
Instead, only a brief mention is made about irrigators’ rights to use irrigation resources, their 
obligation to follow rules and the applicable fines (see Appendix G). Given that this is a major 
concern for most irrigators (see Section 4.5.1), the Magozi IO intends to include equity of water 
supply as a new objective in their upcoming revised by-laws. However, even if equity becomes 
recognised in the local by-laws, the issue of rule enforcement still remains. As explained in 
Section 4.5.1, IOs only have limited powers to resolve local conflicts, which can be escalated to 
the local government authorities including ward office, region’s office and ultimately, the 
regional court.  
Policy investigations (van Rooyen et al. 2017) carried out on the six irrigation schemes included 
in this thesis note that lack of effective communication and coordination among various 
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irrigation actors (e.g. farmers, water authorities and policy makers) can be a major factor 
contributing to low crop productivity and profitability. The authors argue that, beyond 
technological interventions, improving interactions and interventions of multiple stakeholders 
can create positive changes within the systems. Thus, Agricultural Innovation Platforms (AIPs) 
provide a valuable opportunity for all actors to work collaboratively in the identification of 
challenges and their solutions. 
6.5.5 Lack of adequate definition of equity of water distribution  
Tanzania’s national water and irrigation polices address the objective of equitable water supply 
from a wide range of angles: socioeconomic development; water security; sustainability; 
efficiency; pricing; performance monitoring; and evaluation. While the goal is arguably well 
recognised, the legislative texts have important gaps in the definition and characterisation of 
water equity.  
First, the various pieces of legislation employ the terms (in)equity, (in)equitable, (un)equal, 
(un)fair and unjust in an interchanging manner without providing definition for each of them. 
Also, there is no mention to the differences of connotation between ‘egalitarianism’ and 
‘proportionality’ in water distribution, or vertical and horizontal equity.  
Second, current policies refer to equity of water supply using the expressions ‘quantities of water 
abstracted’, ‘allocation of water’, ‘water utilisation’, ‘water use’ and ‘water flows’. Only the 
National Water Policy 2002 and Water Resources Management Act 2009 briefly notes the need 
to develop pricing strategies aimed at favouring equitable water allocation. However, no mention 
is made about the impacts of reliability on water supply and distribution. The exclusive focus on 
water extraction is arguably one of the main reasons why the current system in Tanzania fails as 
a water management tool (van Koppen et al. 2004). In fact, across sub-Saharan Africa, water 
scarcity is not only a matter of physically scarce resources, but also a result of high seasonal and 
inter-annual variability.   
Thus, there is a need to reformulate the concept of water equity to cover, not only quantities, but 
also other critical aspects including reliability, obligations, benefits/externalities, decision-
making and land rights. Consequentiality, irrigation policies aimed at promoting equitable water 
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distribution within smallholder irrigation schemes should be articulated in a comprehensive 
manner addressing these six key issues.  
 Policy discussion 
Drawing from previous literature and insights from the fieldwork, the purpose of this section is 
to reflect on possible measures that could help mitigate water equity issues within smallholder 
irrigation schemes. Policy options should be regarded as a first step in evaluating possible 
improvements to the current system. A first-best policy is that solutions should be proposed and 
agreed to by irrigators themselves, while external advice plays a supporting role. As noted by 
Lam (1996), rules that are defined by irrigators who have been in the system for years are more 
likely to be followed than regulations imposed by irrigation officials who have little involvement 
with the scheme.  
A relevant example of participatory processes is presented by van Rooyen et al. (2017), who 
investigate the ability of AIPs to facilitate institutional arrangements towards greater 
performance of smallholder irrigation schemes. One of the first steps in the stakeholder 
consultation process is to have participants identify specific challenges and opportunities 
regarding their irrigation systems. Similar participatory methods in the study of water 
management in rural areas are applied by Abdullaev et al. (2009) in central Asia and Gallego-
Ayala and Juízo (2011) in Mozambique. The authors employ the SWOT method of analysis, 
which consists of evaluating Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats associated with 
the question of study (Pickton & Wright 1998). These four factors can be grouped by a) their 
origin, i.e. internal to the organisation (strengths and weakness) or external (threats and 
opportunities) or b) their impact, i.e. positive (strengths and opportunities) or negative 
(weaknesses and threats).  
In this section, possible policy interventions aimed at improving equity of water supply are 
investigated based on their positive/negative impacts, and not differentiating between internal 
and external factors. The type of analysis is employed, for example, by Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 
(2003) in the evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of various water governance structures. 
A complete SWOT analysis would require drawing a line between the irrigation schemes 
(internal) and the other actors (external). However, in this study, irrigation schemes are seen as 
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part of a multi-layer, cohesive system (see Figure 6-2) where roles and responsibilities are often 
shared or disputed among various actors. As the boundaries between users and stakeholders are 
often unclear (Campbell et al. 2001), it is difficult to establish a neat distinction between internal 
and external factors.  
6.6.1 Quantity 
Water distribution within smallholder irrigation schemes is extremely hard to measure to due 
technical and cost limitations (see Section 4.4). Although the technology exists, traditional 
irrigators typically lack the resources and skills to collect, analyse and interpret the data. Hence, 
it is only with external intervention that previous studies − for example, Anwar and Ul Haq 
(2013); Hussain et al. (2004) and Lal Kalu et al. (1995) − have been able to quantify water 
distribution within traditional irrigation schemes. Therefore, the use of sophisticated methods to 
measure and analyse equity of water supply defies the goal of farmer-led water management, as 
mandated by the subsidiarity principle.  
First, it is important to recognise that employing common metrics of water supply and 
distribution (e.g. volumes and inequality indices) is currently beyond the capabilities of 
traditional irrigators’. Instead, alternative measures that are easy to record and interpret would be 
more beneficial. For instance, irrigators could keep records of water availability at agreed 
intervals (e.g. weekly) by signalling whether plots are dry, wet or flooded, or, whether water 
height is ‘ankle or knee deep’. Water depths could also be read on scales built into the canals. 
This record-keeping system could also be applied to note timing of water deliveries to track 
frequency and reliably of supply.  
More accurate measures of water supply could be obtained by using tools such as wetting front 
detectors and soil moisture sensors. Since 2014, a pilot program in the Kiwere scheme (Stirzaker 
et al. 2017) has trained irrigators in the use of these tools (named FullStop and The Chameleon), 
which gives information on soil water and nutrient conditions in real time. Participants use these 
tools to improve their irrigation scheduling to better suit their crops needs and reduce their labour 
input. Reportedly, the use of the tools has helped reduce water use by up to two-thirds, 
improving equity of water distribution and reducing conflicts (Ibid.). While the potential benefits 
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are significant, complex and costly bureaucratic procedures to import the tools into Tanzania 
hinder their widespread implementation.  
Other enhanced agronomic practices include farm levelling and adoption of system of rice 
intensification (SRI) − first developed in Madagascar in the early 2000s and introduced in 2006 
in Tanzania, in the Morogoro area (Katambara et al. 2013). Water availability within the 
schemes could also be improved by specific infrastructure repair and upgrade works. During the 
author’s fieldwork in Magozi, it was noted that the intake capacity was significantly reduced by 
siltation of the main canal, which could be mitigated by installation of a silt trap. In the Kiwere 
scheme, building a small reservoir could increase water availability during the day as this could 
be filled during the night.  
6.6.2 Reliability 
Reliability of water supply considers whether water deliveries match irrigators’ needs and 
expectations. During the author’s fieldwork, irrigators in Magozi explained that the reliability of 
their supply was strongly dependent on precipitation and river flows. Reportedly, at the start of 
the irrigation season (December), they are unable to predict the river levels. However, they know 
that when it runs too low, there is not enough water flowing into the scheme and such water 
scarcity aggravates distribution disparities (Lal Kalu et al. 1995).  
A possible arrangement to mitigate head-tail inequities would be to supply head-enders first in 
odd-numbered years, and in even-numbered years deliver water first to tail-enders (Dani & 
Siddiqi 1987). Additionally, a common cultivation calendar would provide greater reliability of 
supply, as timing of supply to each part of the scheme would be agreed beforehand at the IO 
level. Such an arrangement was discussed with irrigators and is planned to be included in future 
business plans - a key strategy to increase synergy among all members of the IOs 
(Mwamakamba et al. 2017). In Mozambique, for example, business plans are now required 
following new national regulations approved in 2015. With the assistance of extension services, 
the business plans in Tanzania would help coordinating cultivation and harvest among irrigators 
in order to strengthen their access to markets through greater sale quantities and higher crop 
prices. During the author’s fieldwork, the vast majority of interviewees agreed that greater 
cooperation is critical for the success of their scheme. However, some were concerned that large 
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and powerful irrigators tend to set the collective rules to their own benefit, whereas the small 
ones have little negotiating power.  
Business plans should also provide specifications for infrastructure maintenance schedules and 
budgets (Mwamakamba et al. 2017). Currently in Magozi, water fees payed by irrigators 
contribute to the general IO budget covering a wide range of aspects. As a result, the scheme’s 
mid and long-requirements (e.g. maintenance) are often set aside to prioritise more immediate 
needs, such as debt repayment (Manero 2016). 
6.6.3 Obligations 
Irrigators in Kiwere and Magozi generally agree on the need to conduct routine maintenance 
tasks, such as clearing canals and removing weeds. On the other hand, they lack the capacity to 
undertake major works (e.g. rebuild control structures or collapsed banks), which typically 
require expertise and financial support from external agencies (Lam 2006). This situation is 
common among smallholder organisations in sub-Saharan Africa where deferred maintenance is 
typically viewed as a government responsibility (Letsoalo & Van Averbeke 2006).  
Breakage of maintenance or water-sharing rules is a common motive of dispute among Kiwere 
and Magozi irrigators. The IO may apply fines, yet when conflict persists or penalties are 
ignored, matters are escalated to regional authorities. As explained in Section 4.5.1, logistic and 
bureaucratic constraints pose major access obstacles for ill-resourced irrigators. As an 
alternative, transferring authority to judge water-related disputes from the regional court to the 
local IOs would make the legal system more accessible for all irrigators. Nevertheless, in 
practice, IOs would still struggle to enforce the rules (Mwamakamba et al. 2017). For example, 
in Kiwere, cutting-off water supply to errant irrigators was debated in an IO meeting held at the 
time of the author’s fieldwork. The majority of attendees voted against, as they view it as 
ineffective and unjust. First, plots at the tail-end of distributary canals would be inappropriately 
affected, as their supply is dependent on water flowing through neighbouring upstream plots. 
Second, discrepancies in obligations between land-owners and tenants mean that cutting off the 
supply would punish the cultivator, but not the owner who is responsible for paying fees and 
doing maintenance. This issue also applies to sanctions where errant irrigators are expelled from 
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the schemes. Furthermore, if the land from expelled irrigators becomes uncultivated, it would 
represent an important opportunity cost.  
Progressive fines increasing with the offender’s crop production or landholding size may provide 
a greater disincentive for wealthy irrigators’ to break the water-sharing rules. The choice 
between complying or breaking a set of rules may deepened on the financial benefits obtained by 
each action. Ostrom (1990) explains that when the benefits from rule compliance are smaller 
than those obtained from breakage minus sanctions, irrigators would have an incentive to break 
the rules. Contrary to this theory, van Koppen et al. (2004) note that in the Upper Ruaha 
catchment in Tanzania, payment for water resulted in increased use by upstream irrigators who 
saw it as an economic good ‘they had paid for’. The authors conclude that, in smallholder 
irrigation systems, it is preferable to disconnect payment of water services from entitlements of 
water to eradicate the tendency to overuse the resource. 
A key measure to promote respect of rules in irrigation systems is having irrigators themselves 
monitor their peers’ (Ostrom 1990). While monitoring by external actors can be expensive (van 
Koppen et al. 2004) and ineffective (Lam 1996), monitoring by irrigators tends to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour by keeping incentives to break rules low and likelihood of discovery 
high (Ostrom 1992). Nevertheless, a risk exists that monitors will be coerced or assaulted (Ibid.). 
6.6.4 Benefits/Externalities 
Equity of irrigation benefits is often noted as a desirable objective, for example regarding yields 
from irrigated crops. As elaborated in Chapter 5, crop production may be associated with 
adequacy of water supply and location within the irrigation scheme, in a way that 
water-dissatisfied irrigators suffer from lower yields and higher rates of crop failure. However, 
IOs have no redistribution mechanisms such as taxes or welfare programs to compensate 
disadvantaged irrigators for the shortfalls of the irrigation scheme.  
Water taxation and fee collection in Tanzania is extremely difficult to enforce among 
smallholder irrigators (van Koppen et al. 2004). An alternative measure to mitigate the negative 
consequences of water supply inequities could be to provide water-disadvantaged irrigators with 
better agricultural improvement opportunities. For example, when implementing innovative 
practices (e.g. soil moisture detectors or SRI) or training programs (e.g. seed selection, pest 
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control, marketing, etc.), a certain percentage of selected participants shall come from 
water-disadvantaged parts of the schemes. The difficulty lies in determining who is ‘water-
disadvantaged’, as this remains an ambiguous and variable concept.  
Soil erosion, increased salinity and water contamination are important negative externalities that 
can affect irrigators differentially, depending on their location within the scheme. For example, 
some tail-enders in Kiwere claimed their crops often became infected with pests and diseases, 
which allegedly were carried by water flushed into the canal by upstream irrigators. Such 
conflicts could be mitigated if they were regularly monitored and reported to the IOs, for them to 
mediate between irrigators regarding negative externalities. 
6.6.5 Decision-making 
Equity in decision-making is recognised in Tanzania’s national policies mandating that all 
irrigators who own land within an irrigation scheme should become members of the IOs. 
Membership provides irrigators with rights to vote, raise concerns, make suggestions, be 
informed of the IOs management (e.g. read financial accounts), elect board members and be 
elected. The nuance is that irrigators who rent land are not obliged to join the IOs, although they 
have the right to do so.  
In Magozi and Kiwere, many renters are not members of the IO because they are unaware of 
their participation rights, want to avoid the annual fees or feel unwelcome by landowners 
(Mdemu et al. 2017). Equity of participation in the decision-making process may also be 
hindered by social power struggles between groups (Nair 2016). For example, during an IO 
meeting in Kiwere, the author observed that most young irrigators remained quiet and did not 
participate in the discussions. IO membership of less-advantaged irrigators could be promoted by 
establishing a quota system whereby representatives from all sections of the scheme, economic 
levels, ages and genders are allocated a minimum number of positions within the IOs boards.  
Another mechanisms to increase participation and empowerment of less-advantaged irrigators is 
creating sectoral organisations, for example, at the head, middle and tail sections of the scheme. 
This measure, which is in line with Ostrom’s (1990) principle of nested enterprises, was 
discussed during qualitative interviews as part of the author’s fieldwork. Tail-end irrigators 
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explained that a sectoral organisation would strengthen their voices vis-à-vis head-enders and 
would protect them from one-on-one conflict and marginalisation.  
The overlap and incongruence among various governance structures is a major institutional issue 
in Kiwere and Magozi, as in many smallholder irrigation schemes in sub-Saharan Africa. Based 
on observations of the six schemes included in this thesis, Mwamakamba et al. (2017) note that 
irrigators lack clarity of where government infrastructure ownership ends and where their 
maintenance responsibilities start. As a result, the schemes were caught in a cycle of government 
and donor investments, infrastructure deterioration and requests for publicly-funded renewals. 
The authors state (p. 832) ‘clarifying ownership and responsibility for maintenance of each piece 
of hardware is an essential reform for sustaining irrigation schemes’. Clarification of roles and 
responsibilities should also apply at regional levels, in order to reduce friction between RBOs 
and District authorities. For example, development of business plans including irrigation 
scheduling, financial planning and marketing, could be outsourced to extension officers or other 
professional service providers who would be compensated based on their performance (Lam 
1996).  
6.6.6 Land rights 
Recognition of land rights is fundamental for participation in the irrigation scheme, including 
membership of IO, access to water and contribution to maintenance. Land renters often find 
themselves in vulnerable positions where they have no voice within the IOs or they are 
mistreated by landowners. Some renters have been cultivating in the schemes for a long time, 
while others only participates on a year-by-year basis, as they search the best opportunities in 
other scheme. Thus, landowners often see renters as ‘outsiders’ who seek to benefit themselves 
in the short term, at the expense of the collective system. On the other hand, renters argue that 
they are often the object of false accusations and discriminatory behaviour.  
Clarification of land rights needs to be carefully elaborated, as customary rules may contradict 
those of the IO. For instance, in Kiwere, an irrigator claimed to be the ‘owner’ of his plot, as he 
was fully dedicated to its cultivation and the only one paying fees, doing maintenance, etc. 
However, according to the land registry, his elderly father was the rightful owner, although he 
had not participated in the irrigation scheme for a number of years.  
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In Kiwere and Magozi, irrigators are often unaware of the exact area they cultivate as they lack 
the tools to do accurate measurements. In 2015, researchers from Ardhi University carried out a 
detailed mapping of both schemes (see Section 2.4.3). The information is now available to all 
irrigators and is valuable for a number of purposes, such as clarifying ownership, irrigation 
scheduling and fee collection. The main problem resides in the difficulty of keeping the maps up-
to-date. As farm plots are sold, inherited, added or abandoned the schemes may face what 
Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya (2007) call ‘cadastre-disaster’ – a situation where the cost of 
regularly updating land tenure data largely exceeds the benefits derived from it. As a result, over 
time, the original information is likely to become obsolete and of limited use. In Tanzania, 
maintaining accurate maps is one of the responsibilities of the NIC. 
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Table 6-5 Possible water equity policy interventions 
Equity 
aspect 
Action Advantages Disadvantages Reference 
Quantity  Non-metric water 
measures and manual 
record keeping 
Low-cost and accessible to all. Greater 
understanding of water supply across the schemes  
Low accuracy and proneness to subjective 
interpretation 
van Koppen et 
al. (2004) 
Quantity Soil moisture detectors Reduced water use and labour input. Increased 
water availability for downstream users 
Expensive import costs due to bureaucratic 
hurdles.  
Stirzaker et al. 
(2017) 
Quantity Improved agronomic 
practices 
Reduced crop water demands, labour and 
chemical inputs. Higher yields 
Barriers to innovate, e.g. access to training, 
willingness to change and take risks,  
Kashaigili et al. 
(2009) 
Quantity 
/Reliability 
Infrastructure upgrades Reduced water losses and easier maintenance/ 
Greater supply availability and reliability for 
downstream farms.  
High costs and external intervention 
required 
Lam (1996) 
Reliability Alternate head/tail in 
priority of supply  
Reduced inequities between head and tail-enders Needs revision during drought years to find 
a compromise between efficiency and 
equity 
Dani and Siddiqi 
(1987) 
Reliability Communal cultivation 
calendar 
Collective marketing to achieve higher crop 
prices. Greater certainty of supply for all 
irrigators  
Difficulty in satisfying individual and 
collective interests at the same time 
Mwamakamba 
et al. (2017) 
Reliability O&M specific budget Improved infrastructure operability. Reduced 
conflict over maintenance works 
Lack of financial management skills. Lam (2006) 
Obligations Transfer of water-judging 
authority to IOs 
Legal system more accessible for all irrigators Subject to corruption and conflict of 
interest.  
van Koppen et 
al. (2004) 
Obligations Errant irrigators to be 
refused water supply or 
excluded from scheme  
Greater disincentive to break the rules.  Downstream irrigators affected by shut-
down of supply to upstream neighbours. 
Discrepancies in obligations between 
owners and renters 
Ostrom (1992) 
Obligations Progressive fines Greater disincentive for wealthy irrigators to 
break the rules.  
False sense of entitlement to excessive 
water use.  
Ostrom and 
Benjamin 
(1993)   van 
Koppen et al. 
(2004) 
Obligations/ 
Externalities 
Monitoring by irrigators Low-cost. Reduced opportunistic behaviour  Rise to false accusations and corruption; 
subject to coercion and assault of monitors 
Ostrom (1992) 
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Table 6-5 Possible water equity policy interventions 
Equity 
aspect 
Action Advantages Disadvantages Reference 
Benefits Targeted training and 
development 
opportunities 
Increased crop production and incomes Difficulty in establishing priority order (e.g 
inter-annual variability) 
 
Decision-
making 
IO board quota system  Empowerment of disadvantaged irrigators to form 
part of the ruling committee  
Contradiction of the current voting system 
based on IO members freedom to vote 
 
Decision-
making 
Sectoral organisations Empowerment of disadvantaged irrigators (e.g. 
tail-enders). Reduced conflict among single 
individuals 
Additional layer of bureaucracy within the 
IO 
Ostrom and 
Benjamin 
(1993); Quinn et 
al. (2007) 
Decision-
making 
Clarification of 
institutional 
responsibilities 
Reduced overlap and conflict between IO, District 
authorities, RBWB and national government 
Lack of financial resources for all 
institutions to fulfil their duties 
Kashaigili et al. 
(2009) 
Decision-
making 
Agency-managed rules Effective in complex, large systems. Greater 
transparency and lesser conflict of interest 
between users and leaders of IO 
Disregard customary rules. Failure of 
irrigators to fulfil their individual 
obligations 
Lam (1996) 
Land rights Clarifying roles and 
responsibilities between 
owners and renters 
Reduced conflict over maintenance/fees. 
Empowerment of renters to participate in IOs 
Need to avoid clashes between customary 
and IO rules 
 
Land rights Use of cadastre 
information (maps) 
Accuracy and transparency regarding land tenure.  Difficulty in maintaining cadastre up-to-
date. 
van Koppen et 
al. (2004) 
Mdemu et al. 
(2017) 
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 Conclusions 
This chapter reviews Tanzania’s water and irrigation policies in terms of their equity of water 
supply objective. A framework for the analysis of equity of irrigation water supply is proposed, 
comprising six key aspects: quantity; reliability; obligations; benefits/externalities; decision-
making; and land rights. Such multi-dimensional approach is important because the core issue of 
water management in Tanzania lies, not only on physical scarcity, but also on numerous other 
factors, such as unpredictability of supply and poor governance (van Koppen et al. 2004).  
A careful examination of Tanzania’s water and irrigation policies suggests that the equity goal is 
well recognised at the national (macro) level, yet there is a significant gap at the local (micro) 
scale. After decades of policy decentralisation and following the subsidiarity principle, local 
water-governing groups (WUAs) bear the responsibility of managing their own resources. 
However, poorly defined goals and lack of resources often mean that equity of water supply is 
well beyond the IOs’ capabilities.  
Drawing from the literature and the examples of the Kiwere and Magozi, there are various 
challenges and opportunities in the pursuit of equity of water supply within smallholder 
irrigation schemes. This chapter provides a basis for considering options in reference to the six 
key aspects of the water equity analysis framework and include, among others, redefinition of 
water measuring standards; development of business plans (including common calendar and 
maintenance budget); clarification of responsibilities (e.g. owners/renters, RWBs/district 
authorities); empowerment of water-disadvantaged irrigators (e.g. IO board quota system, 
targeted education programs); monitoring by irrigators; and technological improvements (e.g. 
soil monitoring, infrastructure upgrades). While these are general recommendations, policies 
addressing water issues at local levels should be proposed and agreed to by irrigators themselves 
so as to ensure solutions are tailored to their specific needs and capabilities.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 Background and summary of research questions 
High economic inequalities pose a major obstacle to poverty reduction, especially in developing 
areas like SSA. While the association between growth-poverty-inequality is well understood at 
regional and country levels, it remains largely understudied at the local (micro) scales, such as 
rural communities.  
Over 70 percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas where agriculture is their main source of 
livelihoods and food security. It is within this context that irrigation is recognised as an effective 
strategy to increase agricultural benefits (e.g. crop production and incomes) and reduce 
irrigators’ exposure to hydro-climatic risks. A topic of much debate in the literature is the linkage 
between irrigation and inequalities, which is typically addressed at the scale of river basis or 
large irrigation schemes. But important inequalities also exist within smallholder agricultural 
communities and a key question is: do inequities in irrigation water supply play a role in 
aggravating or reducing economic inequalities? This thesis responds to this question and research 
gap through its four main goals, namely to: 
1. Estimate the level of economic inequality within smallholder irrigation schemes in sub-
Saharan Africa and its decomposition by types of economic activity. 
2. Identify the key linkages perceived by smallholder irrigators between water supply and 
economic inequalities. 
3. Evaluate the relative impact of water supply on irrigated crop income and production 
within smallholder irrigation schemes. 
4. Understand the shortfalls of Tanzania’s water and irrigation polices in terms of equity of 
supply and propose policy options to be considered by local actors. 
Each of these research objectives is addressed in a separate chapter, thus contributing to the 
overarching goal of the thesis in an orderly and consistent manner.  
This PhD thesis draws from the support of a broad, government-funded research project in 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique investigating strategies to increase water productivity and 
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profitability within six smallholder irrigation schemes. The six communities of study vary in size 
and number of members, but share common characteristics of smallholder irrigation: small plot 
sizes dependence on the farm as a main source of family income (Nagayets 2005). Across the six 
communities, 402 households were interviewed as part of a project-led survey in 2014. Because 
of certain research advantages in the institutional framework and the irrigation schemes, 
Tanzania was selected to carry out more in-depth investigations in this PhD.  
In 2015 the author spent three months doing fieldwork in the Kiwere and Magozi schemes, 
where 156 irrigators were interviewed. The research methods used in this PhD thesis consist of a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative, i.e. mixed-methods. Specific techniques include 
inequality analysis and decomposition, tests of statistical significance, thematic analysis, spatial 
analysis and multiple regression modelling.  
 Main findings  
Chapter 3 evaluates the level of income inequality and its decomposition within six smallholder 
irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique. The first important finding is that 
income inequalities (Gini Index) at these small scales are considerably high and largely exceed 
disparities at country level. From a policy perspective, this suggests that national statistics – 
commonly used to define livelihood strategies – may overlook significant disparities at local 
levels. For example, The Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2009a) argues that, given the country’s relatively low levels of inequality 
(Gini Index 0.38), income redistribution is not likely to be effective in achieving significant 
poverty reduction. By contrast, the results of this thesis show that this is not reflective of the 
situation in Kiwere and Magozi (Gini Index 0.60 and 0.58). The second key finding is that 
households with diversified livelihood activities have significantly higher income than those 
relying exclusively on agriculture – as suggested by non-parametric tests of statistical 
significance (Wilcoxon rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov). Interestingly, a Theil Index 
decomposition reveals that over 90 percent of total inequality (except in Mozambique where the 
population sample is very small) is driven by the within group, and not the between group 
component. Finally, a Gini decomposition by income source and marginal effects analyses 
indicate that agriculture has an equalising effect, whereas business and self-employment; 
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salaries; and other income sources have mixed effects that generally lack statistical significance. 
Thus, strategies aimed to improve livelihoods and lessen inequality levels within smallholder 
irrigation schemes could be two-fold: a) removing entry-barriers into more gainful, non-farm 
activates; and b) promoting income equalising activities such as agriculture to reduce within 
group inequalities. Importantly, chapter 3 notes that negative incomes − a common issue in the 
study of agricultural livelihoods – entail strong limitation in Gini decomposition analysis, which 
are discussed further in Appendix D. 
Chapter 4 investigates the linkages between irrigation water supply and economic inequalities 
within the Kiwere and Magozi schemes, located in southern Tanzania. As in most traditional 
irrigation systems in Tanzania, and elsewhere in the developing world, there are no objective 
measures of water deliveries in Kiwere and Magozi, given the lack of flow meters and manual 
records. To overcome this data gap and in contrast with the majority of previous studies of 
inequity of water supply, Chapter 4 employs irrigators’ perceptions as a proxy for actual water 
supply. Answers to open-ended questions were synthesised into common themes through 
thematic analysis, thus pointing out the key linkages between water and economic inequalities.  
The most original finding of Chapter 4 is that inequality of water supply affects irrigators 
through complex human and social mechanisms that, until now, have not been identified by the 
irrigation literature. These include the amount of time and effort spent waiting and quarrelling 
about water, which is a major opportunity cost for irrigators who could, otherwise, pursue other 
more gainful activities (e.g. marketing their crops, labouring, running non-farm business, etc.). 
Irrigators who are at the centre of water conflicts often become unwelcome by their peers and 
leaders, and, thus, remain excluded from collaborative initiatives such as marketing, training and 
finance. Moreover, when irrigators are affected by water scarcity, their livelihoods may become 
dependent on labour, land rental and small loans provided by better-off irrigators located in 
water-abundant parts of the scheme. Further in Chapter 4, in-depth interviews reveal that current 
rule-enforcement and prosecution arrangements may be biased against the poor. Chapter 4 also 
presents that results of crop yield and yield gap analyses in Magozi, indicating that irrigators who 
are dissatisfied with their water supply tend to suffer from lower yields, higher land failure rates 
and greater financial losses than the rest.  
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Chapter 5 carries out multiple regression analyses to test the hypotheses that adequacy of water 
supply (and proximity to the system’s intake) are positively associated with irrigation incomes 
and crop yields. Two OLS regression models are built. In the first model, income from irrigated 
crops is the dependent variable and the model combines data from the Kiwere and Magozi 
schemes. The second model sets paddy rice yields as the dependent variable and uses pooled data 
from 2014 and 2015 in Magozi. The theoretical models (with all independent variables) are 
formulated in logarithmic and linear forms and are tested using backward elimination and 
General-to-specific methods, in order to check robustness of the results. In the income model, 
water satisfaction is not significant, thus failing to confirm the formulated hypotheses. 
Significant factors include crop type, irrigated area, age, education and household size. The 
association between irrigated crop incomes and human factors suggests that, rather than focusing 
on technical aspects of irrigation, policies targeting poverty reduction through irrigation 
development might benefit from considering a broad range of intervention measures. In the 
paddy yield model, satisfaction of water supply is positive and significant, thus failing to reject 
the hypothesis. The negative and significant influence of the year dummy raises questions about 
the exposure of irrigated agriculture to hydro-climatic risks derived from inter-annual rainfall 
variability. Interestingly, in both income and yield models farm location appears to be 
significant, but not in the hypothesised linear manner. When distance to intake is converted into 
a trichotomous variable, dummies for head and tail location are negatively associated with 
incomes and yields. An important consideration is that, not only water-stress is an issue for 
tail-enders, but excessive water use is possibly detrimental for head-enders too.   
Chapter 6 regards to policy issues related to equity of irrigation water supply. An analytical 
framework is used that comprises policy implication and six key water equity aspects: quantity; 
reliability; obligations; externalities; decision-making; and land rights. Tanzania’s water and 
irrigation policies are examined in terms of their equity of water supply objective. One of the 
main findings is that, after decades of power decentralisation, local water-governing groups 
(WUAs) now bear the responsibility of equity of water supply, but such obligation remains well 
beyond their actual capabilities. In fact, Irrigators Organisations lack the resources and 
governance capacity to define, monitor and enforce equity of irrigation water supply, as well as 
other IWRM principles like reduction of non-beneficial water uses (i.e. losses) and 
environmental sustainability. Hence, based on the irrigation water equity framework, Chapter 6 
Chapter 7  
137 
highlights the pros and cons of possible interventions targeting greater equity of water supply 
within smallholder irrigation schemes. Importantly, volumetric measures of water equity 
commonly discussed in the literature are far removed from traditional irrigators’ practices and 
capacities. Therefore, an alternative form of accounting for water deliveries is required, possibly 
with irrigators’ personal observations as a low-cost, accessible proxy. Furthermore, national, 
regional and local water governing institutions often overlap and conflict with each other – an 
issue that could be mitigated by clearly defining rights, responsibilities and sources of funding.  
 Literature contributions  
This thesis provides a valuable insight into the association between water supply and economic 
inequalities within smallholder irrigation schemes in Tanzania. The work contributes to the 
existing literature gap in several ways. 
First, it provides empirical evidence of high income inequities at local scales, thus responding to 
the ‘need for deeper micro empirical work on growth and distributional change’ (Ravallion 2001 
p. 1807). As national statistics may overlook welfare impacts and be deceptive for development 
policy (Ibid.), the results of this thesis supports the need for a locally-based approach to define 
polices regarding the poverty-growth-inequality triangle. 
Second, this thesis identifies limitations in the Gini index decomposition in the presence of 
negative incomes. This finding is particularly important because such limitations are: a) not 
discussed by the original authors of the decomposition formulation − Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1985) – and b) overlooked by successive studies (Adams 2001; Lopez-Feldman et al. 2007; 
Möllers & Buchenrieder 2011). Theoretical and practical reasons suggest that the misuse of 
negative incomes in marginal effects and income transfer analyses can lead to erroneous 
conclusions regarding the inequality increasing/decreasing effect of changes in income 
distributions.  
Third, the open-ended, perception-based research method used in this thesis uncovers new 
linkages between irrigation water supply and economic inequalities. While previous literature is 
strongly dominated by quantitative measures of water supply income and crop production, this 
thesis suggests that human and social factors may be even greater drivers of the economic divide 
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among smallholder irrigation schemes. Erosion of human capital, decline in access to markets, 
barriers in accessing the legal system, social stratification and exclusion are some of the 
important linkages that remain ‘invisible’ to common metrics of agricultural production.  
Finally, this thesis develops a framework for the comprehensive analysis of equity for irrigation 
water supply. Although a number of frameworks exist for the analysis of water management and 
equitable distribution, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first work that systematically 
compiles all relevant factors for equity of irrigation water supply into a formal analytical 
framework.  
 Limitations 
The major limitation in this PhD research is the existence of important data gaps. As detailed in 
Chapter 2, the initial population sample - obtained in 2014 by the ACAIR project team - for each 
of the two Tanzanian schemes was 100 households (i.e. 200 in total). However, many 
observations had missing data and only a reduced number of participants could be re-interviewed 
in subsequent surveys. Moreover, the use of spatial data was hindered by the difficulties in 
linking survey answers to cadastral information. In particular, many irrigators were unaware of 
the right owner of the plots, primarily because of informal land tenure/rental arrangements. 
Although rigorous methods of analysis were followed in this thesis, the small sample sizes 
reduced the statistical power of the tests and regression models employed. Data limitations are 
acknowledged and their consequences discussed in each of the relevant chapters.  
A second limitation is given by the access to up-to-date qualitative information. Tanzania is 
undergoing a continuous transformation of its water and irrigation sector and, thus, much has 
changed since the author’s completion of fieldwork in August 2015. While time and budget 
constraints did not permit a second round of fieldwork, the author remained regularly informed 
through government websites, published literature and direct communication with in-country 
research teams. Despite efforts to incorporate the most recent information, it is possible that 
recent changes at local, regional and national levels have occurred that are not reflected in this 
thesis. At the time of completion of this thesis, the ACIAR-funded project was approved to 
undergo a second phase from 2017 to 2021. An opportunity exists to fill some of the data gaps 
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and deepen study of water and economic inequalities in Tanzania and, possibly, extend the 
research to Zimbabwe and Mozambique.   
 Opportunities for future research 
Based on the findings and gaps of this thesis, there are several opportunities for future research. 
Increasing equity of irrigation water supply is shown to be an important factor for socio-
economic inequalities, which should motivate policymakers to address technical and welfare 
issues in a conjunctive manner. This is applicable not only to Tanzania, but to most developing 
countries where irrigation is predominantly based on smallholder systems that typically suffer 
from persistent heterogeneities in water distribution. 
Future research would benefit from investigating in greater detail the drivers of economic 
inequality at small scales. As Ferreira and Ravallion (2008 p. 25) note ‘understanding of the 
economic factors behind changes in distribution (or behind the levels and incidence of growth) in 
developing countries requires a more microeconomic approach’. Within the context of the six 
irrigation schemes of this thesis, and other smallholder communities elsewhere, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate the growth elasticity of poverty reduction, following a similar 
approach of previous studies at national scales (Bourguignon 2003).  
Spatial analysis is another area that deserves further consideration in the study of water and 
economic inequalities. Quantitative results in this thesis suggest that location advantages do not 
necessarily follow a linear pattern, but could be clustered around different areas of the scheme 
(i.e. head, middle, tail). Hence, with the adequate amount and quality of data it would be possible 
to build auto build spatial autoregressive models to explain variations in farm location and 
production factors, following the examples of Florax et al. (2002) and Zhang et al. (2010). 
Spatial Lag and Spatial Error models could be the used to better understand possible spatial 
correlations between water, yields, incomes, human factors, etc. Moreover, as noted by 
qualitative findings in this thesis, social factors play important roles and, thus, should be 
considered in regression analyses, for example, including variables for conflict levels or 
participation in collaborative activities.  
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From a broader perspective, it would be valuable to assess water supply and economic 
inequalities in other geographic areas to compare the results to those of Kiwere and Magozi in 
Tanzania. Although smallholder, traditional schemes across the world share many 
characteristics, their barriers and opportunities for development can be strongly determined by 
the local context. The framework for analysis of equity of irrigation water supply developed in 
this thesis could be applied to other schemes that are part of a Phase II of the ACIAR-funded 
project. It would also be worthwhile to extend the study to South Asia – an area where important 
heterogeneities in irrigation water supply exist according to previous studies, but which have not 
yet been analysed in a comprehensive manner from an equity perspective.
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Appendix A. Household surveys questionnaires 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 Farm household Survey for ACIAR funded project: 
 
Increasing Irrigation Water Productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe through on farm monitoring, 
adaptive management and agricultural innovation platforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Irrigation Scheme_________________________________Scheme code: _______________Household Head Name: _________________________ 
 
Common Household Name: _________________________Respondent/Interviewee: ___________________________ 
 
Relation to HH Head_________________________Interviewer/Enumerator______________________Date:_____________________ 
Introductory Statement 
This survey is carried out by  Ardhi university, Government of Tanzania, in collaboration with the University of South Australia and 
the Australian National University as part of the project ‘Increasing Irrigation Water Productivity in Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe through on farm monitoring, adaptive management and agricultural innovation platforms’ funded by the Australian 
International Centre for Agricultural Research. The purpose of the survey is to establish farm and household characteristics of 
irrigator households as well as how you perceive a number of issues related to your irrigation scheme and your community. We 
will at least conduct one survey at the beginning of this project and one at the end so that we can identify any changes taking place 
during the process of implementing the Agricultural Innovation Platform. Your responses to these questions will remain 
anonymous but you will be given a household ID which is only known to the researchers on the project. This ID will allow us to 
contact you later and to compare your answers from the first and subsequent surveys. Information will be treated as strictly 
confidential.  
All the questions in this survey are about your farm and household situation during the 2013/14 season. We would like to interview 
a member of the HH who is either a key decision maker or is actively involved in farming activities within the HH.  
Thanks you for your co-operation in this survey and we are looking forward to talk to you again over the coming years. 
 
 
1 Questions about your Household 
1 Who are the members of your household?(First ask about the head of household, then list the members of the household as each person relates to the head of 
household. Then fill out the rest of the table using the below keys.) 
 
HH 
No 
Name of HH member Relation 
to HH 
Head 
Marital 
Status 
Gender Age Educatio
n 
Children Edu. 
exp. 
Children not at 
school 
Working on 
farm (%) 
Working off 
farm (%) 
Working 
away  
1=Yes 2=No 
How long working 
away 
Health 
1              
2       
     
 
 
3       
     
 
 
4       
     
 
 
5       
     
 
 
6       
     
 
 
7       
     
 
 
8       
     
 
 
9       
     
 
 
10              
11              
Answer Key: 
Marital status: 1=never married; 2=Married/de facto; 3=married but not living with partner; 4=divorced; 5=Separated; 6=Widowed;  
Relation to HH Head:1=Head; 2= Husband; 3=wife; 4= Son; 5= Daughter; 6= Parent; 7= Grandchild; 8=Other(Specify)Gender:1=male; 2=female Age: Please record actual or estimated age in years 
Education: 1=no formal schooling; 2=some primary school; 3=completed primary school; 4=some secondary school; 5=completed secondary school; 6=some university or college; 7=Professional College/trade certificate; 8=still 
at school; 9=not started school yet; 10=other, specify 
Children Edu. Exp. (Educational expectations): For each child not yet started school or still attending school, ask: after which year/level do you expect them to finish school? 
Children not at school: For children not at school and not having finished high school: Why did they stop going to school? 1=Had to contribute to work on the farm; 2=Had to work off-farm to contribute to the family income; 
3=We could not afford to pay the cost of keeping him/her in school; 4=We do not think he/she needs any further schooling; 5=Not yet started schooling 6= Child did not want anymore, 7=Other, specify 
Working on farm: % of time spend working on the farm (includes selling or transport produce at the market or processing produce) 
Working off-farm: % of time spend working off-farm 
Working away: seasonal work away from home: which household members work away from home  
How long working away: On average how long time do they spend away from home (1= days, 2= weeks or 3=months). ? Please explore: how many month, week, days etc. to reach percentage 
Health: How do you consider each household’s members’ health: 1=Good (<5 days); 2=infrequently sick (6-10 days); 3=Frequently/regularly sick (>10 days); 4=Bed ridden 
 
2 Was the head of household born in this village  1=Yes:  2=No:  
b. If the answer is no to the above question: How many years have you lived in this village?         
 
c. And, why did you move to this village? 
d. What is the main language spoken in your household? 1=Ndebele; 2= Shona; 3=Other Zim (specify), 4= Shangana, 5= Ronga, 6= Potuguese, 7«Other Moz 
(specify)  
 
 
 
3 How many years has the household been farming?Years: Dry land farming _________ Irrigation farming______ Irrigation scheme_______ 
 
Let’s discuss the food security situation of your household 
4 Have you faced food shortage (i.e. not sufficient food from your own production) over the last 5 years (2009-2014)?1=Yes2=No(If No, go to Q 9) 
 
7 Out of the last five years, how many years were you faced with food shortages? Number of years? 
 
5On average, during which months do you face food shortage in a given year?(Please circle the months mentioned):J F M A M JJ A S O N D 
 
6 If you did not have access to an irrigated plot during which months would you face food shortage?(Please circle the months mentioned): 
J F M A M JJ A S O N D 
 
8What is the main cause of food shortage in your household? 
1=Drought  2= Poor harvest  3= Lost job   4= Death in the family  5=Unreliable income   
6=Inflation  7=Theft   8=family size  9=Irrigation scheme not functional   
 
10=Other (specify) 
 
 
9Have you received food aid in any form over the last five years? 1=Yes 2= NoIf yes, how many times? Number of years:  
 
10 Have you sold produce from the irrigation scheme to overcome your food shortage? 1=Yes    2= No  
     If yes,   1= During a normal year?      2=During a drought year?  
 
11 If you did not have access to the irrigation scheme, how would you have secured your food needs?  
 
Describe: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12Nutrition and food access; please indicate how often you access the following food items: (see Answer key below table) 
How often does your household milk sugar Meat fish beans other vegetables fruits 
a. eat/drink        
b. purchase        
Codes frequency: 1= daily, 2 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 4 = seasonally/occasionally, 5 = yearly, 6 = never 7=other (specify) 
13Which of the following assets doesthe household or somebody in your household own?(Tick all applicable boxes) 
Household assets   
1=Generator    2=Car    3=Motorbike/scooter  4=Bicycle    
5=Fridge    6=Sewing machine  7=Radio   8=TV    
9=Solar panel     
10=Borehole/water pump  11=Mobile phone  12= others specify 
 
Type of dwelling: 1=Brick   2=mud, grass 
Type of roofing 1= Timber 2 Thatched roof ; 3=metal or other solid roof  
   
Farm assets: 
1=Tractor 2=Tractor-driven tools3=Hand tools4=Animal-driven tools5=Wheel Barrow 6=Ox/donkey cart  7= Other (Specify) 
8= Disc plough, 9=Harrow Plough 
         
14 Which of the following financial arrangements do you have?(Tickall applicable boxes) 
1=Functional bank account      2=Savings account          
3=Traditional savings schemes at local community level   4=Traditional burial schemes at local community level    
5=Loan from a financial institution     6=Loan from an individual (Specify e.g. uncle, neighbor, trader etc)    
7=Loan from other institution (please specify e.g. church, government) 8=Don’t know          
9= No account                                                 10=Other (please specify)  
       
 
15 Do you think your participation in the irrigation scheme will provide you with a better life in the future?(Tick one box only)  
1=Much worse    3=Better    5=About the same   
2=Worse    4=Much better    6=Don’t Know    
7=No, I think we need to opt out of agriculture to achieve a better life in the future   
 
2 Questions about your Farm 
 
 
 
16 a. Next we would like to draw a map that outlines your fields and homestead. Start by showing your homestead compound. Then draw the fields closest and 
furthest in a picture on the ground. Our enumerator will transcribe this onto this page. Show any major landmarks near your homestead/fields like roads, school, 
and borehole.  (Draw map and crops grown in the 2013/14 season here). 
16 b. Please tell us about the land you and your household cultivates, who controls it and how (own/lease/share-farm) :(use keys below to fill out the form) 
(this should be similar to the areas and crops you have indicated on the map drawn in 16a) 
 
Area Unit of measurement  
1=ha; 2=acres; 3=m2 
Who owns Type of ownership Soil type Soil fertility Slope Erosion 
Land which can be irrigated:         
Irrigated plot (IP) 1     
    
Irrigated Plot 2 
 
 
      
           
 
      
  
 
      
Uncultivated during 13/14         
Farmed without irrigation in 13/14 
 
 
      
Rainfed Land: 
 
 
      
Rainfed Plot (RF) 1         
Rainfed Plot 2         
         
         
         
Uncultivated during 13/14         
Home garden (HG)         
Total land area   NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Interviewer: add up and make sure that the area for irrigated+rainfed+uncultivated ads up to the total area. If not ask questions until the numbers add up. 
Answer Keys: 
Who owns: note the person(s) who controls the land using the number(s) from question 1 i.e.1=Head; 2= Husband; 3=wife; 4= Son; 5= Daughter; 6= Parent; 7= Grandchild; 8=husband and wife 
9=Other(Specify), 
Type of ownership/access: 1= private title and use; 2=Government tenure; 3=Community tenure (no written lease); 4=Leased in (used others land and paid); 5=leased out (others use my land 
and pay); 6=borrowed land without paying; 7=share cropping in; 8=share cropping out; 9other specify, 10= used land <10 years, 11=used land>10 years, 12 = others use my land without paying 
Soil type: 1 = Sandy, 2 = clay, 3 = black soil, 4 = red soil;  
Soil fertility: 1 = Very fertile, 2=moderately fertile; 3= infertile;  
Slope: 1= flat; 2=slight slope (up to 20%), 3=steep 
Erosion: 1=no erosion; 2= moderate erosion; 3=severe erosion 
 
 
 
17If rain fed land or irrigated land is uncultivated: Why are you not cultivating all your rain fed/irrigated land? 
Please provide the answers here:  
(Specifyrainfed/irrigated land) 
18Crop production – (please fill out 
the following table, and check area sizes with question 16, note that the cultivated land should sum up.) 
Plot (refer to the map)          
crop name          
type/variety          
area size           
Unit of area (1=ha; 2=acres 
3=m2) 
         
tillage implement          
tillage passes [no]          
Date sown          
seed [unit] [unit]          
Farm Yard Manure [unit]
 [kg] 
         
Other manure. _______
 [kg] 
         
fertiliser 1, top dress [kg}
 [kg] 
         
fertiliser 2, basal 
[kg[kg][kg][kg]kgfertiliser
 [kg] 
         
fertiliser 3 ________[kg]
 [ ] 
         
fertiliser 4 ________[kg]
 [kg] 
         
total fertl expenses   
mt[US] 
         
herbicide expenses
  [US] 
         
fungi/pesticideexp
 [US] 
         
% of  irrigation water 
used 
         
Type of harvest          
water expenses 
[US/MT/sh] 
         
Cost of non-family 
labour 
         
Date harvested          
Output. [kg]          
Answer Key: 
Plot number: for each of plots of crop grown ask which of the plots in question 16 the crops was grown on (eg IP1 or RF 2) 
Crop: 1=Maize;  2=Sorghum; 3=Ground nut; 4=Tobacco; 5=Cotton;  6=Cow pea; 7=Pigeon pea; 8=Irish potato; 9=Sweet potato; 10=Tomato; 11=Finger Millet; 12=Bambara nut; 13=Sugar beans; 
14=Sun flower; 15=Soya bean; 16=rice; 17=Other cereal crops; 18=Other legume crops; 19=Other vegetables; 20=Fruits; 21=Feed crop, 22= cabbage, 23 = onion, 24=lettuce, 25=carrots, 26=green 
beans, 27= peppers, 28 chillies 
Tillage implement: 1=harrow; 2=disk; 3=rotavator, 4=plough, 5=other, please specify:    
Type of harvest: 1=manual; 2=mechanical      Months-1=Jan; 2= Feb; 3= Mar; 4=Apr; 5=May; 6=Jun; 7=Jul; 8= Aug; 9=Sep; 10= Oct; 11= Nov; 12= Dec 
 
 
 
19 What is your use of your main crop products (SHELLED or NOT): 
crop name 
(use code) 
% eaten % seed % feed % sold/barter 
If sold, specify market 
channel (code) 
Main months of 
sale 
Average price per kg (and range) 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Answer Key: 
crops 1=Maize, 2=Sorghum, 3=Ground nut, 4=Tobacco, 5= Cotton,  6=Cow pea, 7=Pigeon pea, 8=Irish potato, 9=Sweet potato, 10=Tomato, 11=Finger Millet,12=Bambara nut,  13=Sugar 
beans, 14=Sun flower, 15=Soya bean, 16=rice, 17=Other cereal crops, 18=Other legume crops, 19=Other vegetables, 20=Fruits, 21=Feed crops, 22= cabbage, 23 = onion, 24=lettuce, 
25=carrots, 26=green beans, 27= peppers, 28 chillies 
Market channel: 1=farm gate, 2=village market, 3=local collection point, 4= cooperative for bulk sales, 5= regular trader, 6=contract with buyer, 7= regional city, 8= wholesaler 
Prices: provide average price, and range if prices differed substantially by time of sales 
Months: 1=Jan; 2= Feb; 3= Mar; 4=Apr; 5=May; 6=Jun; 7=Jul; 8= Aug; 9=Sep; 10= Oct; 11= Nov; 12= Dec 
 
20 Which crops have you not yet grown, but would like to adopt? 
Crop  (use code) For what purpose? What prevents you from adoption? 
   
   
   
Answer key Crops 1=Maize; 2=Sorghum; 3=Ground nut; 4=Tobacco; 5= Cotton;  6=Cow pea; 7=Pigeon pea; 8=Irish potato; 9=Sweet potato; 10=Tomato; 11=Finger Millet; 12=Bambara nut;  13 = 
Sugar beans;14 = Sun flower; 15=Soya bean; 16=rice; 17=Other cereal crops; 18=Other legume crops; 19=Other vegetables; 20=Fruits; 21=Feed crops; other, specify: 22= cabbage, 23 = onion, 
24=lettuce, 25=carrots, 26=green beans, 27= peppers, 28 chillies 
 
21Do you think you got the best possible price for your commodities or do you think there are other buyers/market channels that would pay a better price? 
1. Yes, there are other buyers that would pay a better price  2. No, this is the best price I can get   3. Don’t know  
 
 
 
22If yes in the question above: Why do you not sell to that buyer/market channel?  
Please provide the answer here:  
 
23Did you buy any fertilizer and/or farm chemicals during the 2013/14 season?(Tick all that apply) 
1=Yes 2=No, If your answer to the above is Yes, tell us more on how these were bought 
1. Seller came to the village   2. I bought it from a wholesale business in a nearby town 3. Through irrigation association 
4. I bought it on the nearest local market  . 5. Other, specify  
 
24Do you think you could get it cheaper somewhere else?(Tick one box only) 
1. Yes, there are other sellers that would be cheaper  2.  No, it was the best possible price  3=Don’t know   
 
24.1 Do you get subsidized/free  inputs (seed, fertilizer)? 1. From government?  2. From NGOs  3. No, I don’t get those.  
25If yes to the above question, why did you not buy it there? 
Please provide the answer here:  
 
26Do you commonly need farm equipment that you do not own? 1=Yes 2=No . If yes, how do you commonly get access to equipment?(Tick all that apply) 
1. Rent itfrom yourirrigation association/cooperative   4. Borrow it from a neighboring farmer without payment  
2. Rent it from a private contractor     5.  Other        
3. Rent it from a neighboring farmerfor cash or in-kind    6.  Have no ability to access      
7.  Don’t know (do not read out only record if no answer)   
 
27Would better ability to access farm equipment significantly improve the viability/profitability of your land? 
 
1=Yes  2=No  3=Don’t know     
28What are the main constraints to improving the viability/profitability of your land? (rank 1-3) 
1= Inputs (seeds fertilizers)  2=Implements and tools  3=Knowledge and information  
4=Access to functional markets  5=Access to land/Tenure  6= Access to water   
7=Quality of water    8= Salinity  
9 =Other - specify      
 
 
 
3Questions about your Livestock 
29Please tell us the details of your livestock production in the 2013/14:(please use the answer key below to fill out the form) 
 
 Number 
currently 
owned 
Who 
own/ 
Control 
How 
many are 
used as 
Draft 
animals 
Main dry season feed 
(rank, see codes) 
Main rainy season feed 
(rank, see codes) 
Main dry season 
water source (rank, 
see codes) 
Main rainy season 
water source(rank, 
see codes) 
Costs 
inputs 
(MT) 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3  
Cattle 
 
  
    
         
Donkeys 
 
  
    
         
Pigs 
 
  
    
         
Sheep 
 
  
    
         
Goats 
 
  
    
         
Chicken 
 
  
    
         
Ducks 
 
  
    
         
Other 
 
  
    
         
Answer key:Number: please provide the number of each category 
Who own/control: Who in the Household controland make most decisions regarding these animals: provide number from table in Q1 If more than one provide all person numbers(1=Head; 2= 
Husband; 3=wife; 4= Son; 5= Daughter; 6= Parent; 7= Grandchild; 8=husband and wife , 9=Other(Specify), 
Feed, in order of importance rank the three most important feed types: 1=rangelands, 2=crop residues grazed in rain fed fields, 3=crop residues collected in rain fed fields, 4=forage planted in 
rain fed fields, 5=crop residues grazed in irrigation fields, 6=crop residues collected in irrigation fields, 7=forages planted in irrigation fields, 8=purchased stock feed, 9=other (specify) 
Water Source, in order of importance rant the three most important water sources: 1=surface water, 2=wells, 3=river, 4=irrigation scheme, 5=borehole, 6=others (specify) 
 
30 Please tell us the details of your livestock marketing during the 2013/14 season:(please use the keys below to fill out the form)  
How many were lost/died 
(specify) 
How many 
consumed 
How many sold If sold, specify market channel 
(code) 
When did you sell 
1=Jan; 2= Feb; 3= Mar; 4=Apr; 5=May; 6=Jun; 
7=Jul; 8= Aug; 9=Sep; 10= Oct; 11= Nov; 12= Dec 
Average price per animal 
(range) 
Donkeys 
      
Cattle 
      
Pigs 
      
Sheep 
      
Goats 
      
Chicken 
      
Ducks 
      
Other 
      
Answer Key:Who sold to: 1=Farm gate; 2=village market; 3=local business centre, 4=collection point, 5=sale pen; 6=regional auction, 7=regional town, 8=others (specify) 
Prices: provide average price, and range if prices differed substantially across animals and time of sales 
 
 
 
31Do you think there are other buyers that would pay a better price? 
1. Yes, there are other buyers that would pay a better price  2. No, it was the best possible price  3=Don’t know  
 
32If yes to the question above, why did you not sell to that buyer/market channel? 
Please provide the answer here: 
 
 
33Who makes the major decisions in the household over the following crops and livestock?(If joint decision by several note all relevant(i.e.1=Head; 2= 
Husband; 3=wife; 4= Son; 5= Daughter; 6= Parent; 7= Grandchild; 8= Husband and wife; 9=Other (Specify) 
 
 Rain fed crops Irrigated crops Cattle Small stock 
What crops/feed to grow     
Use of farm implements     
Buying of inputs     
When to carry out the work     
When and where to sell the products     
How to use the income from sale     
 
34When making decisions about your farm (what to grow, where to sell, when to irrigate etc.), where do you seek advice from? (tick all relevant) 
 Rain fed crops Irrigated crops Livestock  
 Source of 
information 
Relevance 
 
Source of 
information 
Relevance 
 
Source of 
information 
Relevance 
 
What crops/feed to grow       
How to manage the crops/livestock       
Where to sell the outputs       
Answer  key: 
Sources of information 1=Buyers of my crop/livestock; 2=Sellers of farm input; 3=Extension officer; 4=Farmer group/cooperative; 5=Irrigation association; 6=Research; 7=NGOs; 
8=Other farmers; 9=Others (specify) 
Relevance: 1=Yes, relevant I follow the advice; 2=Sometimes I follow the advice; 3=No, not relevant, I don’t follow the advice. 
 
35If the answer above was 2 or3(sometimes or not relevant), why is it not relevant? 
Please provide the answer here:  
 
 
 
 
36 Have you over the last three years, or do you intend to over the next three years:(Tick all that apply)  Last 3 years       Next 3 years 
               1= Yes; 2=No  1=Yes; 2=No 
a. Increased your irrigated area on an annual basis (that is taking multiple cropping into account)        
b. Acquired additional irrigated land (either purchased, leased or share farmed)          
c. Acquired additional dry farm land (either purchased, leased or share farmed)          
d. Acquired any implements to improve the productivity of your land           
e. Diversified your crops to better deal with risk              
f. Intensified crop production to increase your profit             
g. Specialized on certain crops you are growing to increase your income           
h. Increased the proportion of your production that you are selling rather than consuming         
i. Decreased your irrigated area on an annual basis (that is taking multiple cropping into account)        
j. Disposedof any of your irrigated land (either sold, leased out or share farmed out)         
k. Disposedof any of your dry farm land (either sold, leased out or share farmed out)         
l. Disposed of any implements used to increase the productivity of your land          
m. Changes to the crops you are growing to reduce your workload from farming and accepting a lower farm income     
n. Increased the proportion of your production that you and your family are consuming         
o. Reduced the size of your holding of livestock              
p. Increased the size of your holding of livestock              
 
37Have you used any of these practices on your farm, if so when did you start doing it and are you still doing it?(Fill all relevant columns) 
Practice 1= Yes; 2=No When Adopted 
(years ago) 
Do you do this 
every year? 
1= Yes; 2=No 
Why not Used 
Pumping directly from river independently of scheme 
   
 
Establish ground water pump 
   
 
Carry water in buckets or other devices from local water source 
   
 
Growing cover crop 
   
 
Run-off harvesting 
   
 
Mulching 
   
 
Crop rotation 
   
 
Accessing other natural resources such as wood, charcoal, fish etc. 
   
 
Planting leguminous crops (e.g. cowpea) to utilize remaining soil moisture after 
harvest of main crop 
   
 
Grow crops or varieties which require less water or have a shorter growing 
season 
   
 
 
 
 
38Do you think that the temperature in your area has generally changed over the past ten years?(tick one box only)1= Yes  2= No   
If yes, did it: 1=increase   2=decrease   3=became more unpredictable  4=pattern changed   
 
39 Do you think that rainfall in your area has generally changed over the past ten years?1= Yes  2= No  (tick one box only) 
If yes, did it:1=increase   2= decrease   3=became more unpredictable  4=pattern changed   
 
4Questions about your Irrigation 
 
40How would you define your right to receive water? E.g.: is it to a certain number of irrigation events, a certain flow rate during a certain period of time? 
 
Please provide the answer here:  
 
 
 
41What do you need to do to receive water?(Tick all that apply) 
1= I have to order it a certain number of days in advance  2=Irrigation management committee tellsme when I will get the water  
3=Set Irrigation Roster (A certain day per week etc)  4=Other (please specify in box):        
 
42Do you always get all the water you need when you order it?(Tick one box only) 
1=Never  2=Rarely  3=Mostly   4=Always   
 
43How much do you pay for water?      Price per ha/acres or other: 
 
44Do you think that is a reasonable rate for water?(Tick one box only if the farmer does pay for the water) 
1=Far too expensive  2=Expensive  3=Fair  4=Cheap  5=Very cheap  6= Not applicable 
 
45Apart from paying this amount, do you also have to do some work maintaining the irrigation system?(Tick one box only) 
 1=Yes    2=No    
 
46 Ifyes to the question above, what and how much? 
 
 
47 From which type of canal do you receive your water? (Write the plot number) 
1=Primary   2=Secondary  3=Tertiary   4=Overflow from neighbouring plot  5=Don’t know   
 
 
 
48Is it lined or earthen?(Tick one box only) 
1=Lined  2=Earthen   3=Don’t know    4= Pipe  
 
49 Is it a permanent canal or temporary furrow/canal?(Tick one box only) 
1=Permanent  2=Temporary   3=Don’t know   
 
50Where on that canal are your plots located: (Write where the specific plots are) 
1=Beginning   2=Middle   3=End  4=Don’t know   
 
51Overall how satisfied are you with your supply of irrigation water?(Tick one box only) 
1=Very dissatisfied  2=Dissatisfied  3=Neutral  4=Satisfied  5=Very satisfied  6=Don’t know   
 
52Do you think water is equitably distributed among the irrigators in your irrigation system?(Tick one box only) 
1=Totally disagree   2=Disagree  3=Neutral   4=Agree  5=Strongly agree  6=Don’t know   
53How do you determine when to irrigate and how much water to apply?Please write the answer here:  
 
 
 
 
 
54Do you think you could improve the way crops are irrigated?  (Tick one box only) 
 1=Yes   2=No   3=Don’t know   
 
55If yes to the previous question, please explain how?(Please provide the answer here):  
 
 
 
 
 
57 Over the next five years, how do you expect the adequacy, quality and timing of your water supply to change?(Tick one box only) 
1=Become much worse  2=Become worse 3=Stay the same 4=Improve    5=Improve greatly  6=Don’t know   
 
5Questions about your community 
58How satisfied are you with the support you receive from your local community?(Tick one box only) 
1=Very dissatisfied  2=Dissatisfied  3=Neutral   4=Satisfied   5=Very satisfied  6=Don’t know   
 
 
 
58.1 Are you member of any group or association? (Tick) 
1=AIP  2=Farm producer association  3=Irrigation scheme association  4= Church group   5=Others, specify   
 
59 Thinking about your local community, its wellbeing and the support you receive from it, in five yearshow good do you think it will be? (Tick one box only) 
1=Much worse   2=Worse  3=About the same  4=Better   5=Much better  6=Don’t know   
 
60 Within your irrigation district, do you think there is a significant gap between the poorest and wealthiest families? 1=Yes  2=No  
 
61 If yes, over the past ten years, has this gap:  1=diminished  2=about the same   3=Increased  4= don’t know 
 
62 In the future, do you expect this gap to:  1=diminish  2=remain the same  3=Increase  4= don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
6Questions about your Values and Attitudes 
63In the following sections we would like to explore the values you hold in general terms.  Please use a seven-point scale to measure the importance of each 
value “as a guiding principle in my life”:  extremely important (7), strongly important (6), important (5); neutral (4);   unimportant (3); strongly unimportant 
(2); opposed to my values (1). 
. 
Value List Rating (1 to 7) 
Value that Is Most Important(tick 
one only) 
Value that is Least Important(tick 
one only) 
Honoring of parents and elders (Show respect)     
Capable (competent, effective, efficient)     
Unity with nature (fitting into nature)     
Choosing own goals (selecting own purposes)     
Wealth(material possessions, money)     
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)     
Daring (seeking adventure, risk)     
Healthy (not being sick physically or mentally)     
A spiritual life (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)     
Ambitious (hard working, aspiring)     
Successful (achieving goals)     
Responsible (dependable, reliable)     
Social recognition (respect, approval by others)     
Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)     
Self-respect (belief in one’s own worth)     
Social order (stability of society)     
Loyal (faithful to my friends, group)     
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)     
Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)     
Meaning in life (a purpose in life)     
 
 
 
 
 
64Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements:(Please tick the answer agreed with) 
 
1=Extremely 
disagree 
2=Strongly 
disagree 
3= 
Disagree 
4=Neutra
l 
5=Agree 6=Strongly 
agree 
7=Extremely 
agree 
Habits and initiatives 
When I work on the farm, I Do it the way it has always been done 
     
  
When I work on the farm, it is something I do without thinking. 
     
  
To change the way I am managing my farm would require a big effort  
     
  
I am ready to take risks in order to develop new strategies on my farm, e.g. produce new 
crops and sell them at a new market 
     
  
Balance between economic, social and environmental issues 
Decisions about investments at my farm are more about immediate livelihood 
benefits/solving problems, rather than about long term environmental benefits 
     
  
I am more concerned about ensuring immediate livelihood benefits/solving problems than 
attending to traditional/cultural/social activities or lifestyle 
     
  
Investing in long term environmental benefits is more important than attending to 
traditional/cultural/social activities or lifestyle 
     
  
Common property and community engagement 
Land is the most important heritage of the family, more than livestock or other assets. 
     
  
Myneighbors’ farming practices affect me andmy farming practices 
     
  
The cooperation with other community members helps me in case of emergency 
     
  
I am interested, active and  motivated to undertake activities in the community 
     
  
Engagement with external actors 
I invested more in my farm because of the knowledge that I gained from other farmers  
     
  
I have started new collaborations with organizations/partners outside the community that 
help me to engage in new value chains 
     
  
Leadership, communication, information sharing 
I have a clear understanding of my role and responsibility within the community. 
     
  
I trust the leaders in my community. 
     
  
We have structures that help us to communicate and share information effectively in our 
community. 
     
  
If I bring in good new ideas, I know that they will be supported by the leaders and my 
community. 
     
  
 
 
 
 
65Households expenditures and income: 
Household expenditure 2013/14, in USD/shilling/Meticais 
 expenses trend, shr, 5 y   expenses trend, shr, 5 y 
crop inputs  ↑ = ↓  Household food  ↑ = ↓ 
harvesting/transp.  ↑ = ↓  education  ↑ = ↓ 
livestock inputs  ↑ = ↓  health  ↑ = ↓ 
hired labour  ↑ = ↓  social events/leisure  ↑ = ↓ 
irrigation expenses  ↑ = ↓  personal transport  ↑ = ↓ 
others___________  ↑ = ↓  housing  ↑ = ↓ 
    others___________  ↑ = ↓ 
total agricexpenditure 2013/14    total non agric- expenditure   
 
Household income for 2013/14 
Activity revenue trend, shr, 5 y   revenue trend, shr, 5 y 
crops, rainfed  ↑ = ↓  agricultural labour  ↑ = ↓ 
crops, irrigated  ↑ = ↓  other non-agric. lab.  ↑ = ↓ 
livestock sales  ↑ = ↓  regular employment  ↑ = ↓ 
milk sales  ↑ = ↓  business/self-employed  ↑ = ↓ 
other_  ↑ = ↓  remittances  ↑ = ↓ 
other________________  ↑ = ↓  others____________  ↑ = ↓ 
    Seasonal work away from home  ↑ = ↓ 
total on-farm income    Total off-farm income   
 
Thank you very much for your time and do you have any questions, suggestions, comments or issues we should know?
 
 
2015 authors’ Fieldwork survey 
KIWERE 
Interviewee details 
1. Name of respondent 
2. Household head name 
3. Respondent code: … 
4. Land code 
5. Which village do you come from?  Kiwere   Kipera         Ngela 
6. Where is you plot located?       1= beginning  2= Middle  3-End 
7. How many acres do you own? 
8. Do you rent out your land to someone?   No  Yes 
8.1. If yes, how many acres? 
9. Do you rent land from someone else? 
9.1. If yes, how many acres? 
9.2. Name of landowner 
9.3. Land code of rented land (from list) 
10. Do you get water :  Morning       Afternoon? 
11. Apart from irrigation, do you have other sources of income? 0=No 1=Yes.   
Which?:  
 
 
Water supply  
12. Overall, how satisfied are you with your water supply?  
1=Very dissatisfied  2=Dissatisfied  3=Neutral  4=Satisfied 
 5=Very satisfied  6=Don’t know   
12.1. If not satisfied, why? 
 
13. Does competition for water vary during the irrigation season?   0=No   1=Yes 
If yes, how? How does it affect you? 
 
14. Typically, do you have enough water to meet your crop water requirements?  0=No 1=Yes.  
15. Which crops do you grow? 
 
 
 
 
16. During the dry season, do you: 
 1= 
Never   
 
2= 
Sometimes    
3= Most 
of the 
time 
Comments 
16.1. Have problems with the roster     
16.2. Work at night     
16.3. Experience conflict with your neighbors     
16.4. Experience conflict with upstream farmers     
16.5. Experience conflict with your downstream 
farmers 
    
 
17. Do you think that the water supply you receive (volume, timing) has an impact on your economic 
situation?    0= No  1=Yes   4= I don’t know 
18. If your water supply was improved (more water and/or better timing), how would your economic situation 
improve?  
 
18.1. How much are you getting now? How much could you get if the water supply was improved? 
 
19. Do you think water is equitably distributed among the irrigators in your irrigation system? 
1=Totally disagree   2=Disagree   4=Agree 
agree  6=Don’t know   
19.1. If they answer yes, ask again if really it’s equally rom the intake to the bottom? 
 
 
 
 
 1=No    2=Neutral     3=Yes    4= I don’t know 1 2 3 4 Comments 
20.  
Taking into consideration all the issues of the irrigation 
scheme, do you think equality of water supply is among the 
top most important ones? 
 
  
 
 
21.  
Do you think that the wealthiest farmers tend to receive 
better water supply? 
 
  
 
 
22.  
Do you think farmers with better water supply tend to 
obtain higher productivity? 
 
  
 
 
23.  
Do you think that more productive farmers tend to be 
richer? (or the wealth comes from somewhere else) 
 
  
 
 
24.  
Do you think inequality of water supply makes farmers less 
willing to cooperate?  
 
  
 
 
25. In comparison to the rest of the farmers in the scheme, do you get: 
1= Less Water  2 = Same Water 3= More Water  4=I don’t know 
26. How would you rate the quality of the infrastructure (maintenance, functionality) in your part of the 
scheme? 
1= Bad     2= Neutral      3=Good     4= I don’t know 
27. How do you think the quality of the infrastructure in your section compares to the rest of the scheme?   
1= In my area it’s worse 2 = Same 3= Other areas are worse than mine  4=I don’t know 
Cooperation  
28. Do you think most farmers are to cooperate :  
Q Aspects 
1= 
Not 
willing 
2= 
Neu
tral 
3 = 
Willi
ng 
4= 
I don’t 
know 
Comments 
28.1.  Being member of IO      
28.2.  Paying fees      
28.3.  Doing maintenance      
28.4.  If people are willing to do 
maintenance, why are 
there so many weeds in 
the canals? 
 
28.5.  Maybe because they were 
busy with dryland? 
Yes 
No 
28.6.  Why would you chose do 
cultivate dryland instead 
of irrigated land? 
 
28.7.      Respecting water sharing 
rules 
     
28.8.  If people are willing to 
respect water sharing 
rules, why is there conflict 
around water? 
 
28.9.  Marketing products      
 
 
 
29. Which improvements would you suggest that would make farmers more willing to cooperate? 
 
Socio-economic inequality 
30. Which is more important for your family?   1= Dryland   2 = Irrigation 3= Other  4= I don’t know 
31. Within your irrigation district, do you think there is a significant gap between the poorest and wealthiest 
families?   0=No 1=Yes  
32. Which are the causes? 
 
 
33. Can water inequality be one of the reasons that contributes to wealth inequality? 
0=No  1=Yes 
34. Do you think this gap has some positive aspects? 0=No  1=Yes  
If yes, which? 
 
 
35. Do you think this gap entails some problems? 0=No  1=Yes  
If yes, which? 
 
 
36. If they mention loans ask if the rates are fair. How much do they borrow and have to give back? How 
much would be fair? 
 
 
37. If they mention labour, ask if wages are fair? How much are they typically getting and how much would be 
fair? 
 
 
 
 
38. Do you think the differences between wealthier and poorer families result in some children being 
disadvantaged in their education or is education the same for all children in the village? 
 0=The same   1=Yes, some children are disinvited because of the wealth gap 
39. In your opinion, this level 
 1=Should be reduced  2=Is acceptable 3= It would be OK to increase it   4=I don’t know 
40. How do you think the irrigation system has affected the gap between the poorest and wealthiest families 
within your community, compared to when there was only dryland farming?  
1= Reduced the gap    2 = No effect    3= Increased the gap    4= I don’t know  
 If you have noticed a change, what was it due to?  
 
 
41. In the future, do you expect this gap to:   
41.1.  1=diminish  2=remain the same  3=Increase    4= don’t know 
41.2. Can you explain why? 
 
 
42. Do you think more equitable water supply could help reduce the gap? 
42.1.  1= Not really     2 = Maybe    3= Yes   4= I don’t know  
42.2. How 
 
 
43. Compared to the rest of the irrigation scheme, do you think your family is generally 
 1= Worse     2 = Same/Average    3= Better   4= I don’t know  
44. Compared to the entire community, including families without access to irrigation, do you think your 
family is generally 
 1= Worse     2 = Same/Average    3= Better   4= I don’t know 
 
 
MAGOZI 
Interviewee details 
1. Name of respondent 
2. Household head name 
3. Respondent code (from baseline survey) 
4. Do you own land, rent land or both? 
5. If land is not under your name of you rent, what’s the name of the landowner?  
6. Farm plot identification code 
7. Are you a member of the Irrigator’s Organisation?  
8. Which village do you come from? 
1=Magozi   2=Ilolompya  3=Mkombilenga 
9. Where is you plot located? 
1= beginning   2= Middle  3-End 
Water supply  
10. Overall, how satisfied are you with your water supply?  
1=Very dissatisfied  2=Dissatisfied  3=Neutral  4=Satisfied 
 5=Very satisfied  6=Don’t know   
11. Production in 2014/15 
  2015 
Ideal situation with 
no water issues 
11.1.  How much land of your own land have you planted (acres)?   
11.2.  How much rented land have you planted (acres)?   
11.3.  How many bags of rice have you harvested?  (1 bag = 50kg)   
11.4.  Out of the area you planted, was there a part you were unable to 
harvest? If yes, how much (acres)? 
  
11.5.  Did you lose money in land you couldn’t harvest? If yes, how much?   
12. Do you think that the water supply you receive (volume, timing) has an impact on your economic 
situation? 
0= No  1=Yes   4= I don’t know 
13. If your water supply was improved (more water and/or better timing), would your economic situation 
improve? 
13.1.     1= Not much  2= A little bit/somehow 3=Yes 4= I don’t know 
13.2. If yes, how would it improve? 
 
 
 
 
14. Do you think water is equitably distributed among the irrigators in your irrigation system? 
1=Totally disagree   2=Disagree   4=Agree 
agree  6=Don’t know   
 
 1=No    2=Neutral     3=Yes    4= I don’t know 1 2 3 4 Comments 
15.  
Taking into consideration all the issues of the irrigation 
scheme, do you think equality of water supply is among the 
top most important ones? 
 
  
 
 
16.  
Do you think that the wealthiest farmers tend to receive 
better water supply? 
 
  
 
 
17.  
Do you think farmers with better water supply tend to 
obtain higher yields? 
 
  
 
 
18.  
Do you think inequality of water supply makes some 
farmers less willing to cooperate?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
1=Poor/worse   2=Average/Same     3=Good/better   4= I 
don’t know 
1 2 3 4 Comments 
19.  
In comparison to the rest of the farmers in the scheme, 
how would you rate your water supply is (considering 
volume, timing, reliability, etc.)  
 
  
 
 
20.  
How would you rate the quality of the infrastructure 
(maintenance, functionality) in your part of the scheme?  
     
21.  
How do you think the quality of the infrastructure in your 
section compares to the rest of the scheme?   
     
 
22. During my filed observations, I noticed that in your areas there was plenty of water / not a lot of water / 
too much water. Has it been like this during the entire irrigation season? 
22.1. 0=No  1=Yes 
22.2. If not, can you tell me how and why it has varied? 
 
 
Cooperation  
23. Do you think cooperation among farmers across the scheme is important? 
0=No  1=Yes 
 
 
24. Given the current situation, do you think most farmers are to cooperate with the scheme doing the 
following? 
Q Aspects 
1= 
Not 
willin
g 
2= 
Neutral 
3 = 
Will
ing 
4= 
I 
don’t 
know 
Comments 
24.1.  Being member of IO      
24.2.  Attending meetings      
24.3.  Paying fees      
24.4.  Doing maintenance      
24.5.  Respecting rules      
24.6.  Marketing products      
24.7.  Other:      
24.8.  Other:      
 
25. Which improvements would you suggest that would make farmers more willing to cooperate? 
25.1. … 
25.2. … 
25.3. … 
Socio-economic inequality 
26. Which is more important for your family? 
 1= Dryland     2 = Irrigation   3= Other sources of income   4= I don’t know 
27. Within your irrigation district, do you think there is a significant gap between the poorest and wealthiest 
families?  
 0=No  1=Yes  
28. Do you think this gap has some positive aspects? 
28.1.  0=No  1=Yes  
If yes, which? 
28.2. … 
28.3. … 
28.4. … 
 
29. Do you think this gap entails some problems? 
29.1.  0=No  1=Yes  
If yes, which? 
29.2. … 
29.3. … 
29.4. … 
 
 
 
30. Do you think the differences between wealthier and poorer families result in some children being 
disadvantaged in their education or is education the same for all children in the village? 
 0=The same   1=Yes, some children are disinvited because of the wealth gap 
31. In your opinion, this level 
 1=Should be reduced  2=Is acceptable 3= It would be OK to increase it   4=I don’t know 
32. How do you think the irrigation system has affected the gap between the poorest and wealthiest families 
within your community, compared to when there was only dryland farming?  
32.1. 1= Reduced the gap    2 = No effect    3= Increased the gap    4= I don’t know  
 If you have noticed a change, what was it due to?  
32.2. … 
32.3. … 
32.4. … 
 
33. In the future, do you expect this gap to:   
33.1.  1=diminish  2=remain the same  3=Increase    4= don’t know 
33.2. Can you explain why? 
 
 
34. Do you think better water supply could help reduce the gap? 
34.1.  1= Not really     2 = Maybe    3= Yes   4= I don’t know  
34.2. How 
 
 
35. Compared to the rest of the irrigation scheme, do you think your family is generally 
 1= Worse     2 = Same/Average    3= Better   4= I don’t know  
36. Compared to the entire community, including families without access to irrigation, do you think your 
family is generally 
 1= Worse     2 = Same/Average    3= Better   4= I don’t know  
 
 
  
Appendix B. Infrastructure observations  
  
Magozi system river intake Magozi illegal diversion from main canal 
 
Magozi stone canal in functional state yet fair maintenance levels (moderate siltation and weed growth along the banks) 
 
Kiwere tomato field adequately irrigated 
  
Kiwere concrete canal. Adequate functionally yet poor maintenance (siltation and vegetation growth along the bed) Kiwere aqueduct 
 
Figure B 1 Images of irrigation infrastructure in Kiwere and Magozi 
  
  Kiwere  
  Magozi  
Figure B 2 Infrastructure observations in Google Earth 
 
  
 
Kiwere  
 
Magozi 
 
Figure B 3 Canal functionality spatial representation 
 
Appendix C. Spatial data  


  
Appendix D. The limitations of negative incomes in the Gini 
coefficient decomposition by source  
The limitations of negative incomes in the Gini coefficient decomposition by 
source1 
A. Manero 
Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
School of Commerce, University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia 
ana.manero@anu.edu.au  
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) developed a decomposition of the Gini coefficient by 
income source that has been extensively used in the literature. This method has strong 
limitations in the presence of negative incomes, which were not discussed by the original 
authors and have been widely overlooked in successive studies. Through theoretical 
argumentation and practical examples, this article shows that, when using negative 
incomes, (1) the original decomposition formulae become inappropriate, (2) the marginal 
effects analysis may yield erroneous results and (3) the Pigou-Dalton “principle of 
transfers” is not always met. This has critical implications for policy development, given 
that strategies based upon incorrect analyses could actually result in undesired greater 
income inequalities. The Gini source decomposition should be carefully applied by 
researchers and policymakers, especially in rural developing areas, where negative 
incomes are common due to financial losses from agricultural activities.   
JEL Classification: D31; D63 
I. Introduction 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) demonstrated that the Gini coefficient can be calculated as:  
𝐺 =
2
?̅?
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑘, 𝐹(𝑦))
𝑚
𝑘=1 =
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))   (1) 
where: 
y= (y1,…,yn) is the income of n individuals ranked so that the yk are in 
nondecreasing order (j< k implies yj < yk) 
                                                 
1 This is an Author’s Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 
Applied Economics Letters on 27 October, 2016, available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1245828  
  
?̅? is the mean income 
F(y) is the cumulative distribution of total income in the sample, i.e. 
F(y)=[f(y1),…f(yn)], where f(yk) is equal to the rank of yk divided by the 
number of observations (n).  
Based on this formulation, the authors developed the following decomposition 
of the Gini coefficient by source:  
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑅𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑆𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1      (2) 
 where Rk is the "Gini correlation" between income component k and total 
income, Gk is the relative Gini of component k, and Sk is component k's share of total 
income. 
This method for decomposing the Gini coefficient has strong limitations in the 
presence of negative incomes. However, they were not discussed by the original authors 
despite their results suggesting the existence of negative incomes in their dataset (“Head 
Self-Employment” Gini >1). Furthermore, constrains imposed by negative incomes 
have been overlooked by several successive studies applying Lerman and Yitzhaki’s 
Gini decomposition technique (Lopez-Feldman, Mora, and Taylor 2007, Adams 2001, 
Möllers and Buchenrieder 2011). In an attempt to preserve the integrity of the Gini 
decomposition method, Mussini (2013), excludes negatives incomes to ensure 
normalization, while Mussard and Richard (2012) indicate that incomes must be 
nonnegative, otherwise, most formulae become inappropriate. Still, these studies do not 
explain the underlying reasons why such restrictions exist nor discuss the consequences 
of (mis)using negative incomes in the Gini decomposition.  
Negative incomes arise when the expenses derived from an economic activity 
(e.g. business or self-employment) exceed the earnings. Correctly accounting for 
negative incomes is particularly critical within the context of rural welfare economics, 
as it is common for agricultural businesses to record losses (Allanson 2005). Moreover, 
households experiencing negative incomes tend to be the most affected by poverty and 
inequality, hence, they represent a key (bottom) part of the income distribution (Rawal, 
Swaminathan, and Dhar 2008).  
II. Theoretical explanation 
Limitations defined in original formulae 
The results shown by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) extend derivations from previous 
work by Kakwani (1977) and Shorrocks (1982). While Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) do 
not discuss the case of negative incomes, restrictions imposed in such cases can be 
found in the original formulae. 
Kakwani (1977) proposed an “income inequality decomposition by factor 
components” that: 
𝐺 =
1
𝜇
∑ 𝜇𝑖𝐶𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1      (3) 
 where µi is the mean of the ith factor income of all individuals and Cgi is the 
“concentration index” of the mean ith factor income gi(x). Cg is obtained by integrating 
a certain function F1[g(x)], where 𝑥 is income. All functions of income used by 
  
Kakwani (1977), including F1[g(x)], are only defined for the interval 𝑥 ∈ [0, ∞), thus 
excluding negative incomes (x<0).  
The decomposition technique developed by Shorrocks (1982) is based on a first 
assumption that, given income 𝑌, inequality is measured by a function 𝐼(𝑌) that is 
continuous and symmetric. This assumption is not always satisfied by the Gini 
coefficient when using negative incomes. In the specific case when the sum of incomes 
is equal to zero, the mean is also zero and thus, ?̅?=0 in the denominator of formula (1) 
causes a discontinuity in function G.  
The sources’ marginal effects 
Following their newly proposed Gini decomposition, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) 
formulated a method to understand how changes in a particular source would affect 
overall income inequality. Starting from (2), the technique consists of calculating the 
partial derivative of the overall Gini (G) with respect to a percentage change (e) in the 
source k and then dividing by G to obtain the source’s marginal effect: 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑒𝑘
⁄
𝐺
=
𝑅𝑘𝐺𝑘𝑆𝑘
𝐺
− 𝑆𝑘     (4) 
Again, this application of the Gini decomposition by source cannot be 
generalised in the presence of negative incomes. This is because, as a result of negative 
incomes, the Gini coefficient is no longer bounded within the [0,1] interval, which 
means there is no common scale of comparison. In fact, when using negative incomes, 
the Gini coefficient cannot be used to compare inequalities across populations or time 
because a larger (or smaller) value does not necessary indicate a greater (or lower) level 
of inequality. Consequently, a positive (or negative) derivative cannot be directly 
interpreted as an increase (or decrease) of the level of inequality.      
Pigou-Dalton "principle of transfers". 
Another limitation of the Gini coefficient when including negative incomes is that it not 
always meets the Pigou-Dalton "principle of transfers". This principle requires that any 
mean-preserving progressive transfer (a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer 
individual) lowers the value of the inequality index, or, equivalent, any mean-preserving 
regressive transfer (from a poorer to a richer individual) increases the measure of 
inequality (Shorrocks and Foster 1987). In particular, the Pigou-Dalton "principle of 
transfers" is violated when the sum of incomes (and thus, the mean) is negative.  
According to equation (1), any income transfer that preserves ?̅? and lowers G 
should result in a decrease of Cov(y,F(y)) and vice-versa. When the mean is positive, 
this principle is verified, yet when the mean is negative, a reduction of the covariance 
would yield a larger Gini (although smaller in absolute value). In fact, the negative sign 
of ?̅? would turn a decrease of the covariance into an increase of G (and vice-versa), 
given than the covariance is always nonnegative. In Lerman and Yitzhaki’s (1985) 
formulation, incomes yk are ranked in nondecreasing order, and therefore, their ranks 
f(yk) must also be nondecreasing. Since y and F(y) move in the same direction (are 
positively related) their covariance must be nonnegative.  
The violation of the “principle of transfers” by the Gini coefficient when the 
mean income is negative can be mathematically proven as follows: 
  
 ?̅? < 0 ⇒  ?̅? = −|?̅?|      (5) 
and, by definition in equation (1): 
 [𝑦𝑗 < 𝑦𝑗 ⇒ 𝑓(𝑦𝑗) < 𝑓(𝑦𝑗)] ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦)) ≥ 0 ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦)) = |𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))|   (6) 
Using expressions (1), (5) and (6), G can be re-written as: 
𝐺 =
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦)) =
2
−|?̅?|̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
|𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| =  − |
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))|        (7) 
Given y and F(y), the Gini coefficient would meet the “principle of transfers” if 
any mean-preserving progressive transfer (resulting in y’ and F(y’)), would verify that: 
𝐺 > 𝐺′     (8) 
When ?̅?<0, following equations (7) and (8), G and G’ should verify: 
𝐺 = − |
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| > 𝐺′ = − |
2
𝑦′̅̅ ̅
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′))|  (9) 
Applying (6), the relationship between the covariances is such that:  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦)) > 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′)) ⇒ 
|𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| > |𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′))| ⇒ 
−|𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| < −|𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′))|        (10) 
A mean-preserving transfer means that ?̅? = 𝑦′̅. Hence, dividing (10) by ?̅? and ?̅?′ 
and multiplying by 2, we obtain: 
− |
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| < − |
2
𝑦′̅̅ ̅
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′))|           (11) 
Using the expression of G given in (7) and applying it to (11) results in: 
𝐺 = − |
2
?̅?
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝐹(𝑦))| < 𝐺′ = − |
2
𝑦′̅̅ ̅
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦′, 𝐹(𝑦′))|    (12) 
which contradicts the requirement of the Pigou-Dalton “principle of transfers” 
given in (9). 
III. Practical examples 
Based on the theoretical considerations explained above, the purpose of this section is to 
provide practical examples of cases when the use of negative incomes is incompatible 
with Lerman and Yitzhaki’s (1985) Gini decomposition technique. 
The marginal effects of income sources 
Assuming a population of ten individuals who receive their incomes from three 
different sources, A, B and C, the marginal effects (% Change) of each source are 
calculated using equation (4) (see Table 1).  
  
The first inconsistency arises when examining the marginal effect of source B. 
The only impact of this source consists of increasing the income of the top earner 
(y10 =10), while leaving the other nine unchanged. Making the richest individual even 
richer naturally widens the income gap, meaning that source B has an inequality-
increasing effect. Nonetheless, its marginal effect is negative (-0.97), which should only 
result from an inequality-decreasing source.  
The second questionable result regards the sources’ shares of total income. For 
source A, SA=1.00, which would indicate that 100% of the population’s income comes 
from source A. However, this is not the case, as certain individuals also receive incomes 
from B and C. Moreover, B has a share of total income larger than one (SB=1.25), while 
C’s share is smaller than zero (SC=-1.25). Although it is mathematically possible (and 
simple) to obtain such results, shares outside the [0,1] range pose a conceptual problem. 
By definition, a share is a portion of the total; therefore, it makes little sense for a share 
to be larger than the total or smaller than zero.  
Table 1. Example of negative incomes and the sources’ marginal effects 
Source Income distribution 
Total  
income 
Income 
share 
Relative 
Gini 
Gini 
correlation 
Share  
of G 
% Change 
 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 ∑ 𝑦𝑖
10
𝑖=1   Sk Gk Rk   
A -4 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 8 1.00 1.75 1.00 0.44 -0.56 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 1.25 0.90 1.00 0.28 -0.97 
C -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 -1.25 -0.90 1.00 0.28 1.53 
Total  -14 -2 -1 1 1 1 1 2 3 16 8   4.00     
Pigou-Dalton "principle of transfers". 
An example illustrating the violation of the Pigou-Dalton “principle of transfers” is 
shown in Table 2. Scenarios A, B and C represent the income distributions of ten 
individuals. The only difference between the three distributions are the incomes of the 
top (y10) and bottom (y1) earners. Scenario B represents a mean-preserving progressive 
transfer of two units of income from the richest individual (y10) to the poorest (y1). 
Theoretically, this should reduce the level of inequality (G>G’), yet the Gini coefficient 
of B is larger than that of A (GA<GB), although smaller in absolute value (|GA|>|GB|). 
Symmetrically, scenario C illustrates a regressive transfer from a poorer to a richer 
individual that, however, yields a lower measure of inequality (GA>GC).  
Table 2: Example of negative incomes and the Pigou-Dalton “principle of transfers” 
Scenario Income distribution Mean Covariance 
Gini 
Coefficient 
 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 ?̅? Cov(y,F(y)) G 
A -12 -8 -7 -5 2 3 4 5 6 10 -0.2 1.92 -19.2 
B -10 -8 -7 -5 2 3 4 5 6 8 -0.2 1.74 -17.4 
C -14 -8 -7 -5 2 3 4 5 6 12 -0.2 2.10 -21.0 
IV. Implications 
The restrictions imposed by negative incomes in the Gini decomposition by source 
formulated by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) have important implications. First, from a 
theoretical standpoint, it is inadequate to apply this method without discussing and 
  
verifying whether the data violates or not the basic principles of the Gini coefficient and 
its decomposition. Second, from a practical perspective, the misuse of the marginal 
effects and income transfer analysis can lead to erroneous conclusions. In the instance 
when an inequality-reducing policy is desired, the complete opposite effect could result 
if the intervention was inadvertently based on the wrong understanding of the Gini 
coefficient’s (positive or negative) variation. Researchers and policymakers should 
carefully take into consideration these limitations and consequences, particularly in 
rural developing areas where income losses due to farming activities are commonplace.  
It is recommended that further research in this area investigates whether existing 
Gini coefficient adjustment techniques, such as Chen, Tsaur, and Rhai’s (1982) 
normalization, could be used to overcome the restrictions imposed by negative incomes 
in the Gini decomposition. If an adequate correction cannot be found, it would be highly 
beneficial to develop a new method to compute the Gini coefficient and its 
decomposition by source that could be applied in all cases when negative incomes exist. 
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Appendix E. Sensitivity analysis on income inequality and its 
decomposition 
Table E 1 Gini coefficient sensitivity analysis 
  
Income Gini Adjusting for negative farm incomes 
Income Gini Excluding HHs with negative Farm Income 
Income Gini Excluding HHs with negative HH income 
Gini for HH Revenue (without considering farm expenses) 
Income Gini including negative incomes 
Mkoba 0.60 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.63 
Silalabuhwa 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.42 0.52 
Kiwere 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.93 
Magozi 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.66 
25 de Setembro 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.85 
Khanimambo 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.59 
Table E 2 Gini coefficient decomposition sensitivity analysis - % Change by method of calculation 
 Excluding HHs  with negative Farm Income 
 Revenue only  
(without considering farm expenses) 
  Ag Sal/Wages BSE Other  Ag Sal/Wages BSE Other 
Mkoba -0.03*** 0.01 0.02** 0.00  -0.10*** 0.02 0.02 0.05* 
Silalabuhwa -0.03** 0.01 0.02* 0.00**  -0.10* 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Kiwere 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01***  -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Magozi 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01  -0.09** 0.02 0.07*** 0.00 
25 de Setembro -0.03*** 0.01 0.03** 0.00  -0.10 0.11* 0.00 0.00*** 
Khanimambo -0.03*** 0.01 0.03**   -0.03 0.04 -0.01  
* The values are statistically significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Table E 3 Theil index sensitivity analysis 
  
Income Theil Adjusting for negative farm incomes 
Income Theil Excluding HHs with negative and zero Farm Income 
Income Theil Excluding HHs with negative and zero HH income 
Theil for HH revenue (without considering farm expenses) 
Mkoba 0.64 0.45 0.58 0.55 
Silalabuhwa 0.41 0.31 0.35 0.27 
Kiwere 0.63 0.47 0.46 0.46 
Magozi 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.46 
25 de Setembro 0.89 0.73 0.74 0.66 
Khanimambo 0.66 0.17 0.31 0.36 
 
  
Appendix F. Example of the distance calculations in ArcMap 10.3.1
 
  
Appendix G. Tanzanian policies on equity of water distribution  
Policy Articles related to equity of water distribution 
The National Water Policy, 2002 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2002) 
3.1 Sustainable water development and use implies that (iii) water resources management is financed and raw water priced to promote efficiency, sustainability and equity. 
3.2 (…) an integrated water resources management is needed to ensure (…) equitable and sustainable use and management of water resources for socioeconomic development 
3.3. Main Policy Principles in Water Resources Management 
In order to attain equitable, efficient and sustainable water resources management and based on experiences gained in the country and international understanding, the Water Resources Management will be based on the following guiding principles: Socio-Economic and Water Allocation Aspects, Protection and Conservation of Water Resources, Water and the Environment, Water Resources Planning and Development, Information, Education and Communications, Trans-boundary Waters, Institutional Framework 
4. The objective of the policy for Water Resources Management is to develop a comprehensive framework for promoting the optimal, sustainable and equitable development and use of water resources for the benefit of all Tanzanians. The specific objectives are (i) To develop equal and fair procedures in access and allocation of the water resources. 
4.1 Water Resources Allocation, Use and Socio-Economic Considerations: 
4.1.1 Water as a common use resource. Objective: To have in place fair and equal procedures in access to and allocation of water resources so that all social and economic activities are able to maximize their capacities. 
(…) every citizen has an equal right to access and use of the nation's natural water resources for his and the nations benefit 
Laws and Regulations will be put in place to ensure that (…) every citizen has an equal right to access and use of the nation's natural water resources for his and the nations benefit. 
4.3 Water Demand Management: Water demand management measures will be undertaken to conserve and use the available water efficiently and equitably. 
4.4 Water for Low Income Groups and Community User Groups: Appropriate social equity considerations shall be put in place so that a basic level of water supply and sanitation service is provided to the poor at affordable costs.  
4.9 Service Regulation. Goal: A service delivery system to ensure efficient and equitable use of water. (…) it is important that all members of the community including the disadvantaged groups efficiently and equitably use the water. Communities will ensure the protection and conservation of water sources as well as equitable service provision to economically disadvantaged groups within the communities. 
4.11 Accountability to the Public 
In the delivery of services in the urban and peri-urban areas, the entities are accountable to the customers in the sense that the customers receive reliable and adequate service all the time and are fairly treated in tariff setting and treatment in general. 
  
Policy Articles related to equity of water distribution 
Water Sector Development Strategy, 2006 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2006) 
1.3.2 Links to Other National Policies 
Equity. Inequitable and unjust water allocation practices and ill-defined water rights that restrict access to and control over water resources pose a major obstacle to poverty reduction. Planning processes that alienate affected communities from decision making and from sharing benefits of water development projects foster social stratification and limit the prospects of poverty reduction through economic growth.  
Good Governance and accountability: water resources in all basins are properly used and equitably allocated by 2010/11 
3.2.2 Functions and Responsibilities of New Organisations 
Water Users Associations: Manage allocation of water resources at local level. Manage equitable allocation of water resources during drought 
3.4 INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 
3.4.2 Problem Statement:  Fragmented planning without adequate consideration of cross-sectoral water management issues and challenges has led to the perception of alienation by smaller but widespread users of water that they are primary losers in basin management efforts, and that water resources planning is urban biased and fosters rural inequity 
3.4.4 Goal: Effective and equitable planning for the use of water resources is carried out on an integrated multisectoral basis. 
3.9 WATER UTILISATION AND ALLOCATION 
3.9.2 Problem Statement:  Effective water allocation and monitoring of water use is hampered mainly by inequitable and non-prioritised allocation of resources; 
4.5 MANAGING DEMANDS 
4.5.3 Policy Direction: Water demand management measures will be undertaken to encourage users to protect infrastructure and conserve and use available water efficiently and equitably by putting in place economic tariffs, metering, rationing, leakage control, and mass education on frugal use of water, and by instituting regulations on efficient use of water. 
5.1 POVERTY ALLEVIATION STRATEGY 
5.1.4 Goal: Water resources are managed equitably and water supply, sewerage and sanitation services are improved so as to contribute effectively in the Nation’s poverty eradication efforts. 
6.3 WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT RECURRENT COSTS 
6.3.2 Problem Statement: Water resources management activities have continued to be under-funded relative to the other subsectors of water supply, sewerage and sanitation. This has resulted in inequitable water allocation. 
  
Policy Articles related to equity of water distribution 
The Water Resources Management Act, 2009 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2009) 
 
4. The objective of this Act is to ensure that the nation’s water resources are protected, used (…) in ways which take into account (…) 
(c) promoting equitable access to water 
(d) facilitating social economic development  
44.-(1) Any person who (…) uses water in excess of that authorised (…) commits an offence 
81 (1) 2. The objects of the (Water Users) Association shall be to:  
(d) agree by consensus of its members equitable reductions in the quantities of water abstracted from the source under its responsibility in times of drought or other restrictions on resource availability 
(f) do such other things as may be considered necessary by a majority of its members in order to manage the water resources in its area in a fair and equitable manner 
96 (2) The water abstraction charges (…) shall, among other things be based on a pricing strategy that take into consideration of (b) the need to achieve an equitable and efficient allocation of water and water conservation 
97. The (water) charges collected shall be used for (b) funding of water resources development and construction of waterworks, including- (iii) the cost of water distribution and ensuring equitable and efficient allocation of water 
National Irrigation Policy, 2010 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2010) 
 
2.4.9 Cross-sectoral issues 
Objective 
To have optimal utilisation of water allocated for irrigation development and a mechanism for exercising the socio-economic mobility principles of water. 
Policy Statements 
In order to achieve the above objective, the following will be undertaken: 
vii) Facilitate organisation and formulation of entities such as Water Users 
Associations (WUA) for water users within a common catchment or sub- 
promote improved management practices and the use of technologies with a high water use efficiencies 
2.4.10.2 Gender 
The concept of equity access to water or irrigated lands and decision making is a challenge which has to be addressed. 
3.2.2.5 Ministry Responsible for Community Development Gender and Children 
The Ministry shall ensure equitable access to benefits accruing from irrigation interventions to all gender and vulnerable groups. 
  
Policy Articles related to equity of water distribution 
The National Irrigation Act, 2013 
 (The United Republic of Tanzania 2013) 
31. Objects of the irrigators’ organizations shall include- 
(a) to promote and secure equitable distribution of irrigation water among its users;  
32. The irrigators’ organizations shall perform the following functions- 
(a) to prepare and implement water schedule for each irrigation season, 
(c) to regulate the use of water 
(h) to monitor and keep records of water flows for irrigation; 
50. (1) At the end of each cropping season, the Irrigator’s Management Committee (…) shall conduct an evaluation including continuous monitoring of respective irrigation scheme. 
50. (3) The performance monitoring and evaluation shall cover (a) equity in water distribution; 
Rufiji Basin IWRMD Plan: Final Report 
(WREM International 2015) 
6.1.2 Equity 
This principle requires that economic, social and environmental benefits accruing from management and development of the basin water resources are shared in a fair and equitable manner amongst different groups. Equity considerations may be appropriate between different regions and districts, between upstream and downstream communities, between different livelihood groups, and between water use sectors. 
6.5 Strategic Directions. Strategic Direction 5: Consolidate water governance to enhance institutional coordination and stakeholder participation and ensure equitable allocation and efficient use of water resources. 
7.3 Strategic Area 2: Water for Economic Development: 
7.3.2 Rationale 
Equally important is the principle of equity, which will require programmatic considerations of social development issues such as employment, local livelihoods, nutrition, and food security. 
7.3.3 Strategies and Strategic Actions 
Strategy 2.1: Consider that hydropower storage projects serve multiple objectives and strive to determine equitable and balanced water use levels across sectors and regions based on scenario assessments, trade-off analysis, and stakeholder consultations 
7.6 Strategic Area 5: Water Governance 
7.6.1 Strategic Direction 
Consolidate water governance to enhance institutional coordination and stakeholder participation and to ensure equitable allocation and efficient use of water resources. 
7.6.2. Rationale 
The interventions under this Strategic Area principally aim to ensure the equitable distribution of the economic and social benefits of the basin resources across economic sectors and segments of society, and the attainment of environmentally sustainable development. 
  
Policy Articles related to equity of water distribution 
MKILMA Irrigators’ Association By-Laws  
(MKILMA 2011) 
2.1 The objectives of the union will be: (…) III.  To ensure that every union member has a right to use all resources of the irrigation area (…) as long as he/she follows the rules and regulations. 
7.1 The union committee will be responsible for (…) b) supervising all irrigation activities and good use of land and water. c) ensuing union members follow the rules and regulations  
LAWS 2. Every union member will use their irrigation water according to the regulations accepted by all. 
i. Whoever will be found using water without following the regulations will be punished to pay 50,000/= Tshs up to 30,000/= Tshs as a fine. 
ii. Whoever will fail to pay the fine will be taken to court. 
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